

JAPANESE AND CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE IDEA

OF A SINO-JAPANESE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

1895 - 1911

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ABSTRACT

With the expansion of Western power in the Far East in the nineteenth century, relations between China and Japan entered a new phase. For the first time, Chinese and Japanese attitudes towards each other were related to an image of Western power. China and Japan became aware that they were part of the same entity which was being threatened with foreign control and engulfment. With this realization came the belief that as both countries had much in common, racially and culturally, they should work together to combat Western incursions. However, in adjusting themselves to the outside world, China and Japan conceived resentment, resolutions as well as ambitions. The comparable and yet different ways in which each country responded to the Western challenge created circumstances which prevented the realization of a special relationship.

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the changes in the nature of the argument for Sino-Japanese cooperation between 1895 and 1911. Particular reference is made to the attitudes of different groups of people who were not necessarily responsible for policy-making but whose views were nevertheless influential among the Chinese and Japanese populace. Chapter I gives an account of the political setting in which the idea arose in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Chapter II describes the changes in Japan's political life which both strengthened and challenged her belief in a closer relationship with China. Chapters III and IV deal with China's response to and later rejection of Japanese guidance and leadership. Chapters V and VII look at Japan's rising status and power in East Asia, her search for a definite role in world politics as well as a position of supremacy on the Asian continent. Chapter VI gives an account of Japan's role in the educational development of China in this period which made up a significant part of the Japanese idea of leading her Asian neighbours to 'civilization' as a first step towards achieving an 'Asian revival'.

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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF THE ARGUMENT FOR SINO-JAPANESE COOPERATION : WESTERN ENCROACHMENT IN THE FAR EAST IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

This study looks at the development of the idea of cooperation between Japan and China from the first major war between the two countries in 1894-1895 to the end of the Manchu dynasty in China and the last year of the Meiji era in Japan. The idea arose in the latter half of the nineteenth century mainly as a response to the threat of Western domination in the Far East. Advocates in both Japan and China in the period under discussion often made reference to the historical and cultural relationship which had existed between the two countries. A survey of the earlier relations between Japan and China would help to throw light on this theme which made up an important part of the argument for cooperation between the two countries.

The earliest evidence of relations between China and Japan can be found in Chinese historical records of the Han dynasty around 100 B.C. In the following seven centuries, there was little direct contact between the two countries. In 607, the first official envoy to the Chinese court representing the whole of Japan arrived at the then capital of China, Lo-yang, where he presented a letter from his sovereign. The opening words were "The Emperor of the sunrise country writes to the Emperor of the sunset country." In the following year, the Japanese mission took the return journey accompanied by two Chinese envoys sent by the Sui Emperor. The letter which they brought ~~was~~ couched in the language usually held by the Chinese towards foreign states. Japan was treated as a vassal.⁽¹⁾ This first Japanese envoy marked the beginning of official relations between the two countries.

(1) G.B. Sansom, Japan, a Short Cultural History, London, 1962, P.87.

In 608, the Chinese envoys left Japan, accompanied by a number of scholars chosen by the Japanese Prince to study Chinese learning. Japanese interest in Chinese culture reached a peak in the seventh and eighth centuries when China was flourishing under the T'ang administration. Japanese trade and cultural missions were sent to the T'ang court. Students travelled to China to learn the Chinese methods of administration and engage in the pursuits of artistic and intellectual learning. All this cultural borrowing contributed to the phase of achievement for Japanese civilization known as the Nara culture in the early eighth century.

Following this phase of cultural relations with the T'ang, a more native form began to develop in the Japanese culture and a reaction against direct borrowing grew up towards the end of the ninth century. The disruption of power and the failure of the political institutions of the T'ang dynasty in the beginning of the tenth century played a part in this slowing down of interest in things Chinese. Students stopped coming to China and for sometime, official relations were curtailed.

However, the commercial relations between China and Japan which had begun in the form of private trade in earlier periods continued to grow. By the fourteenth century, the Ashikaga rulers then in power in Japan were giving patronage to the booming continental trade which had greatly contributed to the economic power of the Shōgunate. The Ming rulers of China in this period adopted a Confucianist attitude towards the tributary system. In 1405, the ruling Japanese Shōgun, Yoshimitsu, accepted the status of a vassal of the Chinese Emperor. The Bakufu hence acquired the monopoly of the China trade and received lavish gifts from the Chinese Emperors. In return, it was asked to suppress the piratical raids on the China coasts.

After the death of Yoshimitsu in 1408, his son and grandson did not carry on the nominal tributary relationship with China. In the

mid-fifteenth century, the outbreak of internal wars in Japan and increasing dynastic struggles in China disrupted all official relations. Trade between the two countries also faltered but it continued on a private level, sponsored mainly by the Western daimyōs and often backed financially by Zen monasteries. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, however, this unofficial trade had also declined largely owing to the increasing activities of the Japanese pirates, often aided by Chinese rebels in the southern maritime provinces of China. In 1459, the Chinese government ordered that the China coasts be closed to Japanese traders but illicit trade and piratical activities continued. The closure put an end to the official relations between the two governments.

In 1588, Hideyoshi introduced a law to tighten up control of the trade profits and suppress the piratical plundering along the China coasts. This measure marked the beginning of a more positive policy towards the Asian continent. In his position of power, Hideyoshi contemplated expansion on the continent. His plan was to establish an empire stretching between Japan and the Philippine Islands. The Korean campaign (1592 - 1598) ended in great losses for both the Chinese and Japanese armies and fleets. Neither side could claim a decisive victory. Hideyoshi had ordered the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Korea before he died in August 1598. For Japan, it was a futile campaign, there was no territorial or financial spoils.

Official relations between China and Japan were again severed as a result of the Korean campaign. But a Chinese trading colony in Kyushu had grown up and it continued its pursuit of legitimate trade as well as smuggling. When in 1639 Japan adopted a policy of limited contact with the outside world, a restricted flow of trade was also carried out by way of the island of Tsushima to Korea and through the Ryūkyūs to China. The Ryūkyū Islands and Korea thus constituted points of

contact between Japan and China up to the Meiji Restoration.

Throughout the centuries, Chinese cultural influences had continued to infiltrate into Japan through monks and traders. Confucianism was introduced to Japan by Zen Buddhist monks in the sixth century. But it was not until the Tokugawa period in the seventeenth century that a modified form of Confucianism played a decisive role in Japanese political life. The Tokugawa rulers found this neo - Confucianism compatible with their political philosophy. In teaching loyalty, piety and in general, the correctness of relations between the individual and the state, the Confucian philosophy found common ground with the political needs of the Tokugawa Bakufu. The military classes and retainers of the Bakufu were persuaded to study the philosophy. The Japanese government hoped that in this way their military zeal might be channelled into the right direction and they would become loyal and dutiful subjects of the Bakufu. In the early years of the Tokugawa rule, Confucianism contributed greatly to the maintenance of peace and order in the Japanese society.

What applied to relationships within society applied also to relations between states in the old world of East Asia. The civilization moulded by the dogmas of a Confucian hierarchical order was not one in which equality between states had made much headway. Up until the end of the nineteenth century, China's superiority was accepted by her tributary states in East Asia. Although Japan had only accepted the appearance of a vassal state for a brief period and was never quite brought to heel, she was for centuries overshadowed by China's greatness. Most Japanese acknowledged China's superiority in strength and culture and regarded her as the source of Asian civilization. The sense of kinship with China and Asia in general, however, remained in the background in Japanese thinking with regard to her neighbours. It was not until they were confronted with the threat of foreign incursions from outside Asia that the Japanese became aware of the need for cooperation with the other Asian countries and in particular China

in protest against the West.

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Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, the Western powers began to expand their interests and influence into the Far East. The disparity in military power and technology between the Western and Eastern countries made it impossible for the latter to resist the Western advance. As a result of the First Anglo - Chinese war of 1839 - 1842, China was forced to enter into an unequal treaty relationship with the powers, characterized by the enforced opening of treaty ports, extraterritoriality, the most - favoured - nation clause and tariff fixed by treaty.

The decade following China's defeat saw the Western diplomats and naval officials who had been active in China busy putting into effect a similar treaty system in Japan. The Japanese who had for almost three centuries isolated themselves from the rest of the world now yielded to diplomatic pressure from the West and emerged to take part in international politics. Commodore Perry's treaty with Japan in 1854 and the second American treaty of 1858 were followed by Japanese treaties with England, Russia, the Netherlands and France. Each of these treaties imposed on Japan obligations which were not reciprocated by the Western powers. From this Western encroachment on the East (seiryoku tōzen), a sense of national danger arose. Japan discovered that, compared to the powers of Europe and America, she was so weak that she invited interference, defeat and possible control.

This sense of insecurity surrounding Japan's national independence gave rise to the quest for equality with the West. The sonnō - jōi movement of the Bakumatsu was a reaction to this external pressure. The West's forceful opening of Japan was seen as an affront to the

dignity of the Japanese Emperor and the integrity of the national polity. As the people lost faith in the ruling classes who had been inadequate in dealing with the violation of the country by foreigners, they looked to the imperial institution which for almost three centuries had been obscured by the Bakufu. While "respect for the Emperor" (sonnō) was a reaction to the danger threatening Japan's national polity, "expulsion of the foreigners" (jōi) was an expression of the desire for diplomatic independence for Japan.

The movement carried with it the characteristics of a nationalist revolution and provided the ideological preparation for the Meiji Restoration. The goal of this nationalist revolution was reforms in the internal institutions with the view to achieving independence and expansion for the nation. In order to establish a concept based on the principle of national independence, the ruling classes of the early Meiji period tried to instil the idea of Japan, the "sacred country" (Shinkoku) in the minds of the people. This image of Japan as the "chosen country" was intended to prepare the people to resist foreign incursions and preserve the national essence. From the beginning, the Meiji leaders sought to cultivate in the people a sense of patriotism and pride in the power of the nation. Hence the imperial government vowed in March, 1868, to "explore tens of thousands of miles of the seas and spread Japan's national prestige to the four corners of the earth ..."(2)

Many Japanese writers and ideological leaders of the Bakumatsu and Kaikoku period shared a desire to expand Japanese influence and prestige on the Asian continent. Prompted by an anxiety about Japan's

(2) Oka Yoshitake, "Kokuminteki dokuritsu to Kokkarisei" (National Independence and Raison d'état) in Kindai Nihon Shisōshi Kōza, Tokyo, 1961, VIII, p.12.

national existence vis-à-vis the Western, especially British and Russian expansions in the Far East, not a few believed that Japan had to gain a foothold on the continent and in particular, Korea. International politics was explained solely by power and the strength and power of a country were based almost entirely on the extent of a country's territories.⁽³⁾ They contended that if the Western powers used force, Japan had to do the same. What Japan lost to the West by trade had to be recovered in territories on the Asian continent. For decades after the Restoration, the argument for the invasion of Korea (seikan ron) was a recurrent theme in Japanese politics.

The Nisshin teikei ron

At the same time, the threat of Western engulfment of the East made many Japanese conscious of the need to ally themselves with the other Asian countries against the Western enemy. Chinese defeats at the hands of the Western powers could only have sapped the confidence of many Japanese continental expansionists and made them hesitant about Japan's strength. Up to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 - 1895, the Japanese ~~had~~ regarded China as a strong power. If China, or Japan, for that matter, could not withstand Western aggression single-handedly, the two countries should join hands to fight for their national independence. Many began to talk of Sino-Japanese cooperation (Nisshin teikei) in the Bakumatsu period. Among the earliest advocates of this idea were Satō Nobuhiro, Hirano Kuniomi and Katsu Kaishū. Some like Ōshima Tomōin who were in favour of the invasion of Korea were also supporters of the Nisshin teikei ron.⁽⁴⁾

Although the Nisshin teikei ron ^{was} ~~had been~~ motivated largely by fear and considerations of political necessity, it had also been inspired by

(3) ibid., p.14.

(4) ibid., p.13 and 17.

Also Watanabe Ikujiro, Nihon Kinsei Gaikō-shi, Tokyo, 1938, p.136.

the fact that Japan had extensively inherited Chinese culture in the past centuries and that the two countries belonged to one race as distinct from the white Western nations. It was also because of this consideration for cultural and racial affinity between the countries of the Far East that some Japanese included Korea-despite her being a weak country - in their argument for Asian solidarity against the West. Moreover, many in Japan were aware that Asian countries needed to strengthen themselves and learn Western technology before they could hold out against Western aggression. The dream of Japan as an advanced and strong nation leading her neighbours had been an important element in the argument for cooperation between the Asian countries since the Bakumatsu period.

Thus in 1863, Katsu Kaishū of the Bakufu Navy told Kido Kōin:

"What we ought to do is to send out ships from our country and impress strongly on the leaders of all Asian countries that their very existence depends on banding together and building a powerful navy, and that if they do not develop the necessary technology they will not be able to escape being trampled underfoot by the West. We should start with Korea, our nearest neighbour, and then go on to include China."⁽⁵⁾

Government leaders of the early Meiji period were particularly aware of the need for Japan to make technological progress such as had been attained by the Westerners. Iwakura, Ōkubo and Itō attached great importance to the consolidation of the internal administration of the country. They believed that this was the best way to attain prosperity and strength for Japan. Like the advocates of the *Seikanron*, they were concerned with Japan's national security. But they did not think that Japan's position could be strengthened by external expansions. Instead, they argued that Japan should channel her energy

(5) Quoted in Marius B. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration, Princeton, 1961. p.165.
Katsu actually sailed to Korea but his plan ended unsuccessfully owing to the lack of positive support from the Bakufu.

into internal reforms. As they were aware of British and Russian expansion in the Far East, they were anxious that Japan should not allow her relations with China and Korea to deteriorate.⁽⁶⁾ Instead, Japan should improve her relations with China and in particular, come to an agreement with the Chinese government on Korea.

It was largely because Japanese leaders of the early Meiji period regarded China as a power to be reckoned with and that some kind of cooperation should be fostered between the two countries that they took the initiative to come to an understanding with the Chinese government in 1870. In 1868, councillor of state (sangi) Kido Kōin had brought to the notice of Sanjō Sanetomi and Iwakura Tomomi his view that an invasion of Korea was necessary on the ground that the Korean government had to be reprimanded for its stubborn attitude towards Japan. Kido's proposal was not taken seriously by the government because of the internal instability at the time. In 1870, the issue was reopened when Kido appealed to Inoue Kaoru in the Home Ministry for support. This time Kido urged that Japan should negotiate with China on the Korean issue. His proposal received the support of many government officials especially Miyamoto Koichirō of the Gaimushō. The Gaimushō decided to send a mission to China headed by Yanagiwara to negotiate with the Chinese and drew up a plan comprising "Three clauses governing the policy towards Korea". The third clause stated:

"The mission to China will conclude an equal treaty with China, then go to Korea to open negotiations. Should Korea show any signs of unwillingness to cooperate, Japan will correspond with China to arrive at a decision of how to deal with Korea, whether to settle the question in peace or with a war. This is what is called a policy of befriending the country further away and taking on a belligerent attitude towards the country nearer home..."⁽⁷⁾

(6) See Watanabe Ikujiro, *op.cit.*, pp. 123ff.

(7) Quoted in P'eng Tse-chou, Meiji Shoki Nichi-Kan-Shin Kankei no Kenkyū. (Studies of relations between Japan, Korea and China in the early Meiji period), Tokyo, 1969, p.27.

It would appear that the Gaimushō reckoned that it was necessary for Japan to arrive at an agreement with China before taking any actions regarding Korea.

The first Sino-Japanese treaty of friendship and commercial regulations was signed on 13th September, 1871. It provided for reciprocal extra-territoriality and reciprocal treaty obligations. It was agreed that in both countries, trade was to be limited to the treaty ports. Both countries agreed to the mutual exchange of diplomatic and commercial agents. It was by and large, the first example of an 'equal - treaty' between Japan and China and marked the beginning of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Article One provided for mutual non-aggression against each other's territorial possessions. Article Two provided for mutual good offices in case either of the contracting parties experienced injustice or wrong from a third country. This article appeared to open the way for a defensive alliance in the event of either country entering into military confrontation with one or more of the Western powers. It did in fact arouse the suspicion of some Western countries and the American chargé d'affaires in Tokyo, De Long, expressed to the Japanese government his dissatisfaction with the inclusion of Article Two in the treaty and urged the Gaimushō to remove it.⁽⁸⁾ In May, 1872, the Gaimushō sent Yanagiwara back to China to negotiate certain changes in the treaty including the cancellation of Article Two. In the end, however, the article was not removed from the ratified treaty in 1873, although it was never appealed to in the twenty years of its existence as a clause of alliance between the two countries.⁽⁹⁾

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- (8) Dai Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Records) Tokyo, Vol. IV, pp. 236-237. Later volumes (from Vol. 8) appear under title, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho.
 (9) T.F. Tsiang, "Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, 1870-1894" in Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Peking, Vol. XVII (1933-1934), p. 12.

Some historians think that Japan had intended to conclude a treaty with China based on the treaties concluded between China and the Western powers, thus giving Japan treaty rights equal to those given to the Western countries in China. ~~And that~~ It was only because Japan was not strong enough to make China accede to such terms that she settled for an equal treaty with China.⁽¹⁰⁾ The fact that Japan had wanted to include the most - favoured - nation clause in the treaty seemed to indicate that this had been the case. Also, Ōkuma's comment on Japan's proposals in the negotiations was also revealing. He thought that the rights and privileges enjoyed by the European countries and America in China were results of victories in wars fought with China. As Japan did not yet have the strength to dictate to China, it was, in Ōkuma's opinion, absurd that she should demand the same rights and privileges from China.⁽¹¹⁾

It would seem that the Japanese government was conscious of the inequality in status between China and Japan with regard to Korea and wanted to rectify the unequal relationship between the two countries. Since Japan had been compelled to emerge from her isolation to enter into diplomatic relations with the West, one of her most urgent policies was to revise her unequal treaties with the Western countries. It was conceivable that she had attempted in 1870 to apply the same principle in reforming her relations with China. It was also possible that the Japanese leaders were contemplating cooperation with China in defending Japan from foreign aggression.⁽¹²⁾ An equal relationship was necessary before Japan made any commitment towards this end.

(10) See Andō Hikotarō, Nihon no Chūgokukan, Tokyo, 1971, p.45. and P'eng Tse-chou, op.cit., pp.27ff.

(11) Quoted in P'eng Tse-chou, op.cit., p.31.

(12) Oka, op.cit., pp.17-18.

For almost three decades up to the Sino-Japanese war, the Nisshin teikei ron carried considerable weight in the Japanese government's policy towards China. Iwakura Tomomi, minister of state to the Emperor from 1868 until his death, was a staunch believer in the harmony of relations between Japan and China. Other government leaders including Itō, Inoue and Ōkubo were also convinced that Japan's immediate concern was to strengthen her internal administration and a peaceful relationship with China was of prime importance. In 1871, Iwakura headed a mission to America and Europe and was aware of the difference between the technological progress of the Western countries and that of Japan. In 1873 he and Ōkubo maintained that Japan could not afford to commit herself in external ventures and objected strongly to the proposal to invade Korea.

Iwakura's conviction that Japan had to put emphasis on modernization was motivated by his fear of the West. He accepted that Japan's relations with the Western powers had to take first place in her foreign policies only because the latter had the upper hand. A memorandum on foreign affairs which he sent to Sanjō in 1869 pointed out that too many people had misunderstood the real meaning of Japan's policies of cordial relations with foreign powers. It said:

"Although we have no choice in having intercourse with the countries beyond the seas, in the final analysis those countries are our enemies ... Day by day those countries develop their arts and their technology with a view to growing in wealth and power. Every country tries to become another country's superior. Country A directs its efforts at country B, Country B at Country C — they are all the same ..." (13)

(13) Quoted in M.B. Jansen, "Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan" in R.E. Ward, ed., Political development in Modern Japan, Princeton, 1968, p.158.

This reservation about Japan's relations with the early-developed countries of the West was largely accountable for his advocacy of a conservative policy towards China and Korea.

In 1875, in a memorial to the throne, Iwakura emphasized the insecurity of Japan in a situation in which China was being threatened with possible annexation by Russia. He maintained that Japan had to befriend China so that the two countries could give each other help to ensure national integrity and co-existence. During the 1882 crisis in Korea, he pointed out to the foreign minister the bigger issue of Western encroachment and the need for Japan to ally herself with China to confront it. As he saw it, independence for Asia depended on Japan and China and no other country in Asia. He had faith in the potentialities of China to strengthen herself. It was unwise, in his opinion, for Japan and China to enter into a war over Korea. He cautioned the government not to commit itself too much in helping Korea to gain independence as this, he maintained, would jeopardize the friendly relations between Japan and China.⁽¹⁴⁾ A month later in the same year, Inoue told Itō who was then in Europe his opinion on the policy towards China. It was in the main similar to the proposal of Iwakura. He pin-pointed the sweeping tide of Western encroachment in Asia and expressed his desire to see not only China and Japan agreeing to overlook their existing conflicts but the three countries, China, Japan and Korea cooperating with one another in the midst of this crisis.⁽¹⁵⁾

Thus, when in 1885, Itō concluded the Tientsin Convention with Li Hung-chang on the issue of Korea, the spirit of a peace-line policy existed towards China. This convention took place after an abortive coup within the Korean government when members of the pro-Japanese faction,

(14) Watanabe Ikujiro, *op.cit.*, p.139

(15) *ibid.*

calling themselves the Independent Party, attempted to topple the Chinese-dominated faction then in power. The Convention did not solve the question of Korean independence. It was concluded with Japan's tacit acknowledgment that China's historical relationship with Korea was superior to Japan's treaty relationship with Korea.⁽¹⁶⁾ Ōkuma's Kaishintō, then in opposition, stood by the government in the Korean and Chinese problems. Ōkuma commended the peaceful policy of Itō and Inoue as rightly the policy to pursue, from whichever angle one was to look at Japan's situation and destiny in the Far East.⁽¹⁷⁾

This line of policy in which China was allowed a free hand to consolidate her influence in Korea was pursued at the risk of opposition from radical Japanese supporters of the Korean Independent Party notably Ōi Kentarō, Gotō Shōjirō and Itagaki Taisuke. In 1885, Ōi and ^{some of} his followers clamoured to cross to Korea and deliver her from the corrupt influence of the Chinese. They criticized the government at home for having allowed Japan's national rights to be impaired and pressured the Itō government into taking action to avenge the country's loss of prestige. They wanted to introduce constitutional politics and reforms in the internal administration of Korea. The government took a firm stand throughout the crisis and in November, 1885, imprisoned Ōi, Kobayashi and several other dissidents.

For a decade after 1885, Japan's political influence in Korea was in decline. Russian influence began to appear in the Korean government after the Tientsin Convention. Anxiety over the infiltration of Russian influence moved foreign minister Inoue Kaoru, to propose that a special arrangement be made with China whereby the two governments

(16) *ibid.* p.140. This was maintained by Li Hung-chang throughout the negotiations. Li believed that China still had a stronger hand to play in the political affairs of Korea.

(17) *ibid.* p.142.

could coordinate their policies towards Korea. The 1880's also saw Japan very much occupied with attempts to carry out treaty reforms. Inoue was hoping that the Russian intervention in Korea might be warded off by encouraging China to enhance her leadership and control, that is, should a Sino-Japanese cooperative policy in Korea prove to be unrealizable.

The Shinkan Kaijo ron

Throughout the 1880's, Japan strove towards the goal of achieving equality with the West and institutional, social and cultural modernization was carried out. By contrast, China, and for that matter, Korea, remained in their backward state of development. The 1884 war between France and China ended again in defeat for China. The traditional belief held by many Japanese in China's national strength began to be shaken. After the mid - 1880's, Russia began to take a more ambitious attitude towards international politics in the Far East. A feeling of unease grew up concerning Korean and Chinese national independence which directly affected that of Japan. 'Independence' for Korea gradually became altered to 'dependence' as the Japanese politicians and writers became convinced that Korea's backwardness and weakness made her too inviting a prey for other powers. Similar considerations came into play to transform hopes for cooperation with China to hopes for leadership of reform in China and finally to 'protection' and coercion of a China apparently incapable of playing her true role in international politics. The Nisshin teikei ron gradually gave way to the argument for reforming China and Korea, or the Shinkan kaijo ron. (18)

In the same period, activists in the popular rights movement (jiyūrinken undo) preached liberalism and democracy, adopting the radical

(18) Oka, op.cit., pp. 23ff.

outlook of the idealistic move for Sino-Japanese cooperation. Up to the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, they challenged the domination of the Satchō oligarchs and their idealism stood in opposition to the conservatism represented by Iwakura and Itō. Their theory of internal democratisation and the identification of the destiny of the nation with that of the people, they maintained, was the only way to uphold the nation's independence from foreign domination. This liberal and reformist movement maintained a consistently Asian orientation. In addition to the question of Japan's national independence, they talked of the revival of the Asian peoples.⁽¹⁹⁾

Itagaki Taisuke, founder of the Jiyūtō (the Liberal Party), claimed that the Party by no means restricted its aims to Japan but that it was dedicated to spreading the regenerating ideals of freedom and liberalism throughout China and Korea as well. He hoped for the reconstruction of China and Korea along the lines of European and American civilization and enlightenment (bummei-kaika) and the introduction of democracy and liberalism into these countries as central to the question of achieving independence for Asia. The opening issue of the Tōyō Jiyū Shimbun (Eastern Liberal News) appearing in 1881 with the founding of the Liberal Party contained an article written by Nakae Chōmin. Nakae said that the objective of forming the party was to expand the natural liberty of the people of Japan and to extend the concept of the people's inherent liberty to the rest of the Asian countries. This constituted, he maintained, a part of the movement to achieve equal rights for the peoples of the East, thus strengthening the solidarity among the nations of Asia and erasing the injustice that had been done to them by the Western powers.⁽²⁰⁾

(19) *ibid.* pp. 20-21.

(20) *ibid.* p. 21.

Ueki Emori, another member of the Liberal Party and a founder of the Kōa Kai (Rise Asia Society), applied the principle of liberty and equality to Japan's relations with the other Asian countries and maintained that all Asian countries had to be equal before sharing joint responsibility in the East. Ueki's ultimate goal was the attainment of a utopian world government.⁽²¹⁾ That all Asian countries should stand on an equal footing was also maintained by Ōi Kentarō in 1885 when he urged that Japan had to exert herself in the internal politics of Korea in order to uphold the Korean Independent Party. He believed that his Liberal Party, though already dissolved by 1885, and the Korean Independent Party, then beginning to decline in influence, had the same objective which was to give the Korean people their rights and happiness. He was convinced that this could be achieved by introducing democracy into Korea. Ōi was seeking to rid the rest of Asia of "bureaucratic feudalism" and in doing so, he believed that he was furthering greater Asian prosperity as well as fighting the Tokyo government.⁽²²⁾

Sugita Teiichi took positive steps towards the realization of the revival of Asia. In his Kōa Saku (Plan to revive Asia) which came out in 1884, he emphasized the importance of communication of knowledge among the Asian countries and the need for Japan to unite and cooperate with the people of other Asian countries. During the Franco-Chinese war of 1884, he crossed to China and embarked on a project of reconstructing the country. With the support of other Jiyūtō members like Nakae Chōmin, Kurihara Ryōichi, Suehiro Shigeyasu, Ueki Emori and Kobayashi Kusuo, he set up the Tōyō Gakuran (The Eastern School) in Shanghai with the aim of training the Chinese. He also felt that the people with

(21) Takeuchi Yoshimi, Ajia Shugi, Gendai Nihon Shisō Taikēi 9. Selected Works on Asianism, Tokyo, 1963, p. 9.

(22) *ibid.*, pp. 28-32.

influence in China, either within or outside the government, needed to be enlightened on the very question of China's territorial integrity. He would have liked to see a diet system, modelled on that in Japan, introduced into China. He had intended to implant the ideas of popular rights and people's participation in government onto the continent, believing that neither independence for Asia nor freedom for the East could become a reality without them.⁽²³⁾

The *Shinkan Kaijo ron* was also supported from another quarter represented by Arai Sei and Nezu Hajime. Their military background accounted for their awareness of the Western military might and the strategic importance of Asia in a confrontation with Russia. They believed that China was in state of temporary degeneration but with help from Japan, she could still be saved from the West. This theory was very similar to the Jiyūtō theory of Japanese guidance. Both Arai and Nezu regretted the fervour with which Japan was absorbing the Western civilization. In this respect, their outlook was very different from that of the Jiyūtō members who tried to implant Western democratic ideas on Asian soil. Moreover, Arai regretted that too little interest was shown by the Japanese government in China. In 1886, he went to China after he had been appointed to the General Staff. At Hankow, he set up an ostensibly mercantile establishment and assigned his men geographic sectors of investigation, thereby collecting extensive regional information. Supported by Nezu Hajime who was engaged in promoting educational activities in China through the Tōa Dōbun Shoin (East Asia Common Culture College), Arai set up a school in China to equip the students with the training to promote trading and commercial business between the two countries. Arai's declared mission was to establish peace in the Far East and save the world from suffering. The first step towards this goal, he maintained, was the reconstruction of China.⁽²⁴⁾ The Russian announcement of the

(23) Oka, op.cit., p. 22.

(24) ibid., p. 23.

construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1887 strengthened his conviction of the need for China to reform her internal affairs. In 1890, he established the Sino-Japanese Trade Research Bureau (Nisshin Bōeki Kenkyūsho) in Shanghai. But neither the school nor the bureau received enough financial support from the government at home. Obsessed with the idea of exploring and cultivating ties with China and rejecting Westernization, Arai was one of the few individuals who dedicated their lives to the cause of Asian revival. He firmly believed that the potentialities of China - her expansive territories, rich resources, her central position in Asia and in particular her naval strength - would serve as great assets to both China and Japan if they would become allies in the battle against the West.⁽²⁵⁾

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, Japanese fear of Western aggression and hope for cooperation between the Asian countries persisted. An editorial entitled "A personal view of national defence" which appeared in the Asahi Shimbun on 3rd October, 1890, drew the public's attention to the "Crisis in the Far East" caused by the "European invasion". It was time, the article said, for China and Japan to forget their entanglements in the past and conclude a treaty of alliance so that their respective independence would be safeguarded in the future.⁽²⁶⁾ There was still faith in China's eventual awakening as was borne out by another editorial in the same paper, expressing optimism regarding the prospects

(25) From Arai's report on his mission to China 1886 -1888 to the throne, written in 1889, in Nakashima Masao, compiler, Taishi Kaiko-roku, Tōa Dōbunkai, Tokyo, 1936, Vol. II, pp. 471ff. In fact, Arai warned in 1894 that if China became too wealthy and strong, she might be dangerous for Japan. Japan would have to make her long-term plans with caution. See Arai Sei's "Opinion on China" (Taishi Iken), 1894, cited in Shimura Toshiko, "Bojutsu Henpō to Nihon" (*The 1898 Reform Movement and Japan*), Tokyo Toritsu Daigaku Hōgakukai Zasshi, Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 258.

(26) Quoted in Oka, op.cit., p. 18.

of friendly relations between the two peoples of Japan and China, when China's potentialities in the way of territories, man-power and resources would be put to meaningful uses. (27)

In 1893, Tarui Tōkichi's "Daitō Goho Ron" (Great Eastern Coalition) came out in the Chinese, urging China to join the proposed Japanese-Korean alliance. In Tarui's opinion, China was one of the two great powers in Asia, beside Japan herself. These two great nations were responsible for upholding the dignity of the yellow race. The author deplored the rumour that China was soliciting England's support in strengthening her position vis-à-vis Japan. He warned that this would only throw Japan into the arms of Russia, and then China, even with the help of England, could not hold out against Japan and Russia on the same side. Moreover, this move by China would be treacherous as she would be betraying a nation of her own race and culture. Besides, it would be to China's advantage to join forces with Japan and Korea to keep check on the ambitions of the Western powers especially Russia. Tarui pointed out that Russia was a common enemy to China and Japan. With the joint military effort of Korea, Japan and China, China could possibly recover the lost territories in Heilungkiang and the key areas in Manchuria already lost to Russia. Once the danger from the North was contained, China could look to the rest of Asia. It would be desirable, the author said, for China to cooperate with Japan to introduce civilization to the southern and south-eastern Asian countries, to free them from Western domination and eventually to bring about a great nation of the yellow people in confrontation with the European challenge. (28)

(27) *ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

(28) Tarui Tōkichi, "Daitō Goho Ron", collected in Takeuchi Yoshimi, *op.cit.*, pp. 106 ff.

Tarui was the leader of one of the left-wing derivatives of the Liberal movement of the early 1880's, the Sakaitō (Eastern Social Party), which was first organized in 1882 in Hizen. Its principles were the upkeep of ethical standards, equality for all and its goal was the greatest happiness of the masses. It was even intended that its activities would be extended to Korea and China. He was also determined to revive Asia and when the Manchu dynasty suffered defeat by the French in 1884, he made for Hong Kong in the hopes of working out a programme with the Ko-lao Hui.

Nevertheless, the theory of Sino-Japanese cooperation ~~was~~ necessarily affected by the diplomatic entanglements of the two countries. Korea's sovereignty or lack of it had been a vexing problem especially for Japan since the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871. The 1876 treaty concluded between Japan and Korea can be seen as an attempt on the part of Japan to put Korea outside the Chinese suzerainty as it included a clause recognizing Korea's independence.⁽²⁹⁾ Meanwhile, Japanese nationalism, born of its encounter with the West during the Bakumatsu sonnō-jōi movement, was aggravated by the unsatisfactory settlement with China in 1882 and 1885. The dissatisfied Japanese public had been critical of the government's conciliatory policy towards China over Korea. Within the government itself, military men had been clamouring for independent command and the expansion of military defence in the late 1880's. It must be remembered that the myth of the strong Chinese fleet remained until 1894. Soejima Taneomi, one of the first foreign ministers, believed that only by expanding into the Asian continent could Japan hope to safeguard her own national independence. Because of her insularity, he said in the 1880's, Japan was vulnerable to attack from all sides. Only by controlling Shantung and eventually the interior of China could Japan build a basis for national strength, a condition absolutely necessary for national independence.⁽³⁰⁾

Others were concerned that as long as Korea remained under the corrupt Chinese influence and therefore vulnerable to Western aggression, Japan could not hope to safeguard her own independence. In 1890, Yamagata Aritomo maintained that:

"Japan's line of interest was essential to her line of sovereignty if she was to become truly independent

(29) T.F. Tsiang, op.cit., p. 61.

(30) See Akira Iriye, "The Ideology of Japanese Imperialism: Imperial Japan and China" in Grant K. Goodman, compiler, Imperial Japan and Asia, a Reassessment, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, 1967, p. 34.

of reliance on outside help. Korea was Japan's line of advantage. Its independence was, therefore, essential to Japan and that independence was being endangered by the eastward progress of the Trans-Siberian Railway. It followed that Korea could be trusted neither to hostile Western hands nor to a power unable, as was China, to preserve it as Japan's sphere of interest."⁽³¹⁾

At the same time, advocates of the reconstruction of China were in their turn disappointed that their idea met with an apparent lack of response from the Chinese. In addition to that, there was disillusionment regarding China's internal corruption and doubts about China's ability ever to effect reforms. Sugita Teiichi who had gone to China in 1884 could recall in 1886 the lack of insight of the Chinese to the world situation and their reactionary attitudes towards changes. While he was travelling in Europe in 1886, he became even more aware of Western military prowess and the threat of Western imperialism. As long as China remained unawakened to the need for self-renovation, Japan was alone in fighting Western advance and political security in the Far East was, as Sugita saw it, a hope of the past.⁽³²⁾ As the nineteenth century drew to its close, the talk of partitioning China among the Western powers confirmed the fear of the loss of national independence for Japan. It appeared to many Japanese that the only way to preserve their country was to make military preparations with the view to taking part in the forthcoming partition. As Sugita put it, Japan must secure a place at the table as a guest instead of continuing to be the meat at the banquet.⁽³³⁾

In the decade before 1894, members of the Jiyū Minken Undo were

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- (31) ^{Paraphrased} ~~Quoted~~ in M.B. Jansen, "Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan" in R.E. Ward, ed., Political development in Modern Japan, Princeton, 1968, p.182.
- (32) Sugita's "Plan of National Policy" (Kokuze Saku) drafted while he was travelling in Europe, in Oka, op.cit., p. 26.
- (33) Shimura Toshiko, op. cit., pp. 254-255.

also influenced by the clamour for the nation's right (kokken). Ōi Kentarō viewed with dismay the decline of Japanese influence in Korea. He thought that China's corrupt leadership could not safeguard Korea from the danger of Russian engulfment. His frustrations were aggravated by China's arrogant and suspicious attitude in response to the Japanese offer of guidance. After a decade of abortive attempts to evolve a "Policy of the East" in conjunction with the other Eastern countries, Ōi spoke in 1891 of "Japanese domination in the East" and became convinced of the need for Japan to take military action against China over the Korean question. (34)

According to E.H. Norman,

"The primary task in [Japan's] foreign policy during the first thirty years of the Meiji period was to abolish that symbol of a nation destined for foreign domination, the unequal treaties. To turn back before they had reached the status of an independent power would spell humiliation, disaster, and possibly submission to foreign rule, while to continue along the course so brilliantly charted by the Meiji leaders meant expansion in the only direction permitted by history and geography, namely, the Asiatic mainland where half-awakened peoples were stirring ⁽³⁵⁾uneasily under the menace of Western powers".

The Sino-Japanese war was seen by many Japanese in terms of a struggle between a country which was trying to develop civilization and a country whose backwardness threatened to jeopardize peace in the Far East. Japan's victory in the war ended the tributary relationship between China and Korea and removed China's political influence from the peninsula. The Japanese could now look forward to a phase of enlightened and progressive development in the East Asian countries which many maintained to be vital to the survival of Asia. At the same time, the establishment of a Japanese foothold on the Chinese mainland which Meiji expansionists and some government leaders saw as a requirement of Japanese security was also expected to follow as a result of the war. It would appear that with Japan's national independence secured, the need for cooperation with China to preserve East Asian integrity would lose much of its urgency.

(34) Oka, op.cit., p.26.

(35) E.H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, New York, 1940, p.198.

And yet to the rest of the world, the war revealed China's weakness more than demonstrated Japan's strength. The fact that Japan was not yet a determining factor in Far Eastern international politics was indicated by the successful intervention of Russia, France and Germany in the peace settlement between Japan and China to have Japan restore to China the Liaotung Peninsula. Japan was thus prevented from acquiring a sphere of influence in China only to make way for a new phase of Western imperialistic activities in the Far East. The Japanese felt that they had more reasons to fear the loss of their independence than before the war with China. Many believed that a struggle between the East and ^{the} West was inevitable in the near future and there remained the need for China and Japan to make common cause with one another.

* * *

Meiji Japan's success at self-strengthening and modernization highlighted China's contemporary failure. For two decades after her defeat by England in the war of 1839-1842, China remained unaswakened to her weakness against the Western powers. It was not until Western encroachment reached a new height in 1860 with the Anglo-French seizure of Peking that the Chinese became aware of the military superiority of the West and began to see modernization as a solution to both her domestic

and foreign problems. In the 1860's, attempts were made to carry out reform in self-defence. Yet these attempts at self-strengthening were halting and uncertain and progress towards modernization remained slow. Moreover, few Chinese leaders were ready to re-examine China's relationship with the rest of the Asian countries which they always regarded as inferior. Consequently, for decades after China's first confrontation with the West, few Chinese accepted that they needed to cooperate with their Asian neighbours in keeping the Western powers at bay.

It was not until the late 1870's that some in the Chinese government began to advocate cooperation with Japan to fight Western aggression. Most of these early advocates of Sino-Japanese cooperation were also reformers who saw that China, in attempting to strengthen herself, needed help from Japan which was by 1880 a fast-modernizing country. Some were also influenced by the Japanese argument for cooperation between the two countries which by the 1870's had much influence within and outside the Japanese government.

In 1877, six years after Japan's attempt to formalize diplomatic relations with China, the Chinese government sent its first minister, Ho Ju-chang, to Japan. Ho was accompanied by Huang Tsun-hsien, secretary to the legation. Huang was one of the first Chinese who favoured the idea of China and Japan maintaining their traditional friendship and making joint efforts to attain an equal and harmonious relationship. Moreover, he advocated that China and Japan should unite their strength for their mutual benefit and resist the aggression from Russia and the other Western powers. In his poem, "Presented to Arisugawa Taruhito Shinno at the Official Opening of the Military Academy", he said,

"I came to present my credentials,
And you greeted me with jade and silk.
We stand together in Asia
And have from old had friendly relations,

Like cheeks and jawbone⁽³⁶⁾ relying
 [on one another]
 Like the two wings of an army,
 I trust that each will be prosperous and strong
 And then be able to assist the other.
 Brethren, let us strive to rouse ourselves;
 Foreign insults will vanish on their own.
 Let us throw away our armour and
 Sing of the great peace
 And preach it for a million years."⁽³⁷⁾

Huang represented the new scholars in late nineteenth century China and was an active member of the reform movement in the 1890's. He was convinced, soon after his arrival in Japan, that only by following Japan's example of modernization could China hope to save herself. He was also one of the early advocates of China sending students to Japan. He believed that as Japan once learned from China, China could now learn from Japan and benefit from the fact that the two countries had the same cultural background. While he was secretary to the Chinese legation from 1877-1882, he drafted numerous documents and despatches for Ho Ju-chang to the Tsungli Yamen and the Peiyang Commissioner Li Hung-chang, analysing Japan's national affairs and explaining the policies China should take towards that country. But all his proposals and pleas were rejected by the Chinese government.⁽³⁸⁾

Because Huang was keenly interested in Japan's success at development,

(36) It was also common for Chinese and Japanese advocates of Sino-Japanese cooperation to compare the relationship between the two countries to that between the lips and the teeth, or the front wheels and the back wheels of the same carriage, hence the imagery of "shinshi hosa" (in Japanese).

(37) Ch'ien Ngo-sun, ed., Jen-Ching-Lu Shih Ts'ao 11 Chüan, Shanghai Commercial Press, 1936, Vol. III, pp. 9a-10b. Translated in Jocelyn Milner, "The Reform Ideas of Huang Tsun-hsien's 'History of Japan' and its influence on the Hundred Days' Reform," in Journal of the South Seas Society, Singapore, Vol. XVII (1961) Part 2, p. 53.

(38) Cheng Tzu-yü, "Huang Tsun-hsien and Japan", Journal of South Seas Society, Singapore, Vol. XVII (1961), Part 1, p. 20.

he made a careful study of the social and political history of that country and of the reasons underlying the Japanese reforms and Westernization around 1880. In his study of Japanese affairs, he always kept his native country in mind. His two works, "Miscellaneous Poems on Japan" and "A History of Japan" were designed to reflect China in the mirror of contemporary Japan.⁽³⁹⁾

In 1882, Huang was appointed to San Francisco as consul general. At the farewell banquet which was held in his honour by his Japanese friends, Huang composed his poem, "Farewell to my gentlemen friends in Japan", reiterating his wish for an alliance between the Asian countries and urging Japan and China to retain their "brotherly ties" and unite their "strength and aspirations" to confront their common enemy.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Within the Chinese government, the question of making Japan an ally arose, perhaps for the first time, over the Ili crisis in 1880. A little earlier in the 1870's, relations with Japan had become strained over the issue of the Liuchiu Islands and two factions had sprung up in the Chinese government. One faction, which favoured a pro-Japanese foreign policy, included the governor-general of Nanking, Liu K'un-i, the governor-general of Chekiang, T'an Chung-Lin, the governor-general of Fukien, Wang K'ai-ta and Chang Chih-tung in Peking. The second faction, which opposed this policy and favoured making Russia China's ally, was led by the governor-general of Tientsin, Li Hung-chang. Because of Li's prevailing influence in Peking at this

(39) Jocelyn Milner, *op.cit.*, p. 66.

During the time when Huang was actively engaged in the reform movement in China from 1896-1898, he added to and revised his works on Japan. His "History of Japan," in particular, had a great influence on K'ang Yu-wei, one of his close associates in the 1898 Reform period.

(40) Cheng Tzu-Yü, *op.cit.*, pp. 21-22.

time, the Chinese government gave priority to the settling of the Ili question over the Liuchiu issue. Li believed that differences with Russia had to be settled at once, or else Japan and the other powers would seize the opportunity of the Russo-Chinese estrangement to "hatch plots against China". To him, the argument of China making Japan an ally did not hold water. Japan was, in his opinion, too weak to give China any support against Russia. But if China could come to some sort of an agreement with Russia, even at the expense of making concessions to Russia, then, with Russia on her side, she would be in a position to bully Japan. The key point in Li's argument was that the disparity of strength of Russia and Japan was too great and China had to make sure that she was backing the stronger of the two.⁽⁴¹⁾

But towards the last decade of the nineteenth century, the argument for making Russia an ally gradually lost ground. As Anglo-Russian rivalry extended to the Far East in this period, China came under the influence of the anti-Russian propaganda of the British and American missionaries and diplomats in China. When the pro-Russian faction in China prevailed in 1880, some missionaries had warned, in the *Review of the Times*, that if China entered into any agreement on mutual support with a foreign power, she would alienate herself from the rest of the world.⁽⁴²⁾ Meanwhile, the Russian threat to the Far East was fully exploited in an attempt to persuade China to enter into an alliance with England. A.R. Colquhoun, Correspondent of the *London Times*, wrote an article on England's policy in the Far East in which he stressed that with the help of England,

(41) Li Wen-chung Kung Ch'uan Chi (Complete works of Li Hung-chang, drafts of memorials). Nanking, 1905, Vol 39. p. 4. Quoted in Wang Shu-huai, Wai-jen yü wu-hsü pien-fa (The foreigners and the 1898 reform movement), Taipei, 1965, p.124.

(42) "China needs not conclude any agreement for mutual defence with a foreign power", Review of the Times, Vol. 14 (1878-1879), p. 501. Quoted in Wang Shu-huai, *ibid.*, p. 126.

China could shield Korea and the Chinese north-west territories from Russian ambitions and even recover the maritime province of Amur which she had lost to Russia in 1860. Colquhoun added that Japan would be included to make up a three-power pact against Russia.⁽⁴³⁾

As hostility between Japan and China grew before the war of 1894-1895, Western missionaries tried to influence the Chinese public to believe that it was unwise of China to seek war with Japan. Y.J. Allen, the American Methodist missionary and journalist, stressed the need for Japan and China to cooperate and give each other help against "a strong common enemy." A war, he said, would be to the disadvantage of both countries and if Japan and China became permanent enemies, then both would be destroyed in the end.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Some believed that friendship between the two countries would benefit China as Japan had much to offer her. Timothy Richard, for example, thought that Japan was spreading Western learning to the Koreans and the people living in Manchuria and the Chinese could learn from Japan's enlightened policy. He even thought that if Japan were allowed to administer those territories and apply her modernized methods, then better prospects and prosperity for the people living in those areas would follow.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The Western missionaries' idea of China learning from Japan had great influence on Chinese reformers and scholars, mainly outside government

(43) Chang Chung-fu, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Baltimore, 1931, pp. 9-11.

(44) Y.J. Allen, "On dissolving enmity with foreigners", Y.J. Allen and Erh-k'ang Tsai, Chung-Tung Chan-chi Pen-mo (History of the Sino-Japanese war over Korea, the political situations in the Far East, based on Chinese and foreign office publications and newspapers). Shanghai, 1897, Vol. 1, Part 6, p. 21.

(45) Ting Tse-liang, "The discovery of Li Hung-chang's treacherous conspiracy, encouraged by Timothy Richard before the Shimonsaki peace conference", in Chou I-liang et al., compilers, Chung-jih Chia-wu Chan-cheng Lun-chi (Collection of discussions on the Sino-Japanese war), Peking, 1954, p. 34. Cited in Wang Shu-huai, op.cit., p.136.

circles. These scholars were anxious to see reforms carried out in China-reforms modelled on Japan and England. They were at the same time politically-motivated reformers and many saw in these two countries worthy allies as well as models for China. Wang T'ao, editor and contributor to the *Shen Pao* and one of the founders of modern journalism in China, advocated a cooperative policy towards Japan and England so that help could be obtained from those two countries and China could strengthen her military defence and fortify her frontiers. (46)

Although up until the Sino-Japanese war, Japan was not regarded as a big power, some of the early reformers believed that Japan and China had common interests and the two countries should combine their efforts to keep Russia at bay. Ch'en Ch'ih said in his book "Yung Shu" (Problems of Political and Economic Reforms) that China's misfortune at the moment was caused by Russia's penetration into eastern Asia. Once the Siberian Railway was completed, China would see the end of peace along her north-eastern and north-western frontiers. Japan was small and poor and could not stand up to Russia. But as she and China were in the same boat, the two countries could negotiate secretly to form an alliance. Ch'en believed that in fact, Japan feared Russia more than China did. And her desire to safeguard Korea as a bulwark was not unlike that of China. (47)

While these Chinese did not believe without reservations that Japan was a friendly country desirous of cooperating with China, they were convinced that the two countries should, from necessities, make common cause with one another. Moreover, as the Chinese thought before the war

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- (46) Wang T'ao, T'ao-yuan Wen-lu Wai-pien (Works by Wang T'ao on Reforms), collected in Wu-hsü- Pien-fa (Historical materials on the Hundred Days Reform of 1898), Shanghai, 1953, Part 4, p. 22.
- (47) Ch'en Ch'ih, Yung-Shu Nei-wai pien (Problems of Political and Economic reforms), Shanghai, 1898, Inner Volume, Part 1, p. 5. Quoted in Wang Shu-huai, op. cit., p. 144.

that Japan was a weak country, any ambitious designs that Japan might have had regarding China were not taken very seriously. In fact, many Chinese scholars in this period regarded Japan, when compared to Russia, as the lesser of ~~the~~ two 'evils'.

On the other hand, there were mounting suspicions regarding Russian intentions in East Asia. Immediately before the Sino-Japanese war, Russia wanted to cooperate with China in keeping Korea from Japanese intervention. Some Chinese reformers strongly advised the government against entering into any agreement with the Russians on the issue. Ch'en Chiu, reformist writer, thought that Russia's intentions were no less ambitious than those of Japan with regard to Korea. Once she had succeeded in keeping Korea from Japan, Ch'en warned, Russia would lay claim to the right of protecting Korea and come into conflict with China over the question of suzerainty over Korea. It was unwise of China, he maintained, to invite Russian intervention while fighting Japan over the Korean issue. (48)

In the last two decades ^{of} the nineteenth century, China was drawn towards Japan by the Russian threat. Aroused ^{to} ~~by~~ a sense of urgency by Russian harassment of Chinese territories in the 1880's, Chinese government leaders began to see Japan in the light of a possible ally. But many of them still believed that the ancient strategy of "using the barbarian to control ^{the} barbarian" was applicable in the late nineteenth century. Japan was looked upon as just one of the foreign countries that could be manipulated in the intricate procedures of diplomacy. Nevertheless, it is significant that the question of making Japan an ally occupied an important place in the political thinking of the Chinese government.

(48) Ch'en Chiu, "On Russian support for China" in Ch'en Chung-i ed., Huang-Ch'ao Ching-shih-wen San-pien (Supplementary collection of articles on social themes), Shanghai, 1898, Vol. 78, p. 13.

And when Western encroachment in the Far East reached a new height in the post-Sino-Japanese-war era, some government leaders became the principal group which urged cooperation with Japan.

Early Chinese reformers were motivated by idealistic as well as political considerations. Some of them genuinely believed in friendship between the two countries and that China could learn from Japan. In part, their enthusiasm came as a response to the Japanese argument for Asian solidarity. But a greater admiration for Japan and a deeper concern for the friendly relations between the two countries were to be found in their successors, the Chinese reformers of the 1898 period.

CHAPTER TWO

JAPAN'S AWARENESS OF HER CHANGING STATUS IN ASIA, 1895-1904

Japan's weakness and inferiority in international politics in the
post - 1895 period

The retrocession of Liaotung forced on Japan by the Triple Intervention came as a blow. Contrary to the belief that Japan had emerged as a strong power from the war with China, her position in the post-war world seemed as insignificant as before. Many Japanese became aware of the true nature of international politics and came to advocate that Japan put an emphasis on power-politics in her future relations with the strong countries.

Furthermore, the surrender of Liaotung shattered Japan's hopes for national independence. The Japanese believed that they had fought the war with China to ensure independence for Korea with the ultimate goal of establishing peace in the Far East. This in turn had been motivated by the desire to safeguard Japan's own national independence in face of Western advances in the East. The post-war intervention, especially that of Russia, threatened to substitute pre-war Chinese control in Korea. A new phase of Western imperialistic activities in the Far East seemed to have begun with the Triple Intervention. For the Japanese, their government's failure in its use of diplomacy had resulted from Japan's weakness compared with the powers. Tokutomi Ichirō (Sohō), a journalist, had this to say of the retrocession of Liaotung in his autobiography,

"After hearing about it I became almost a different man psychologically.... It had happened because we weren't strong enough. What it came down to

was that sincerity or justice didn't amount to a thing if you weren't strong enough."⁽¹⁾

And Kuga Minoru commented,

"International politics cannot be argued with reasons alone, they have to be determined by force."⁽²⁾

Nevertheless, the victory over China had given the Japanese confidence in their country. Intoxicated by their victory and anxious to enhance their national prestige, the Japanese clamoured for concessions from China immediately after the war. Some, however, believed that Japan should be cautious lest her demands should alienate China completely. Ōkuma, leader of the Progressive Party in opposition to the Itō government, felt that Japan should not allow the war to damage the friendship between the two countries. Even before the powers intervened in the Sino-Japanese settlement after the war, Ōkuma had commented that Japan would be wise to return Liaotung to China in the hope of retaining friendly relations between the two countries. On the occasion of Li Hung-chang's arrival in Japan in March, 1895 to negotiate the peace treaty, Ōkuma talked to a newspaper reporter about his views on the post-war situation.

"... It is the right of the country which has won the war to take over [Liaotung] but it would also be a gesture of magnanimity on the part of the Emperor of Japan to return it to China. Needless to say, considerable conditions should be attached to the return [of Liaotung] so that our rights and interests in Korea will not be threatened from that area The Emperor of Japan has entered upon war with China to defend a weak Korea out of a sense of justice. Now that China has lost the war and realized the mistakes she has made, the Chinese ruler should be made the permanent friend of the Japanese Emperor. It is not likely to be

(1) Quoted in Oka Yoshitake, op.cit., p. 34.

(2) Kuga Minoru, "A personal view on the political issue of the retrocession of Liaotung," Nihon, 27th May, 1895.
Cited in Oka, ibid.

the wish of the Emperor of Japan himself to seize the land of origin of a close friend." (3)

Arao Sei who had gone to China a decade earlier with the hope of improving Sino-Japanese understanding spoke strongly in favour of Japan and China joining hands against Western aggression. In his "Refutation of erroneous opinions regarding China", written in 1895, he opposed the idea of Japan demanding territorial concessions from China as it would set an example to the other countries and lead to the partition of China. He also feared that excessive Japanese demands might arouse the hostility of the Chinese people against Japan thus giving the Western countries an opportunity to exploit the disharmony between Japan and China to their own advantage. He maintained that only by "cooperating and taking concerted actions" would Japan and China save the Far East from Western encroachment. If the two countries forsook this course of action, then there would be no hope of an Asian revival. (4)

There was also a wariness of China's potential strength despite her defeat. Tokutomi Sohō wrote in 1895 in an article entitled "China must not be bullied" that if patriotic feelings, loyalty, bravery, a sense of honour and readiness to act in the name of justice were the natural qualities of mankind, then the saying that these were lacking in the Chinese was not likely to be true. Once education was given to the Chinese people, they would no longer submit to be bullied. Now that China had suffered a serious blow, it was not likely that she could strike back at Japan with much strength. Japan should seize this opportunity to make peace with her. (5) This concern about

(3) Ōkuma-kō hachijūgonen-shi (Biography of Ōkuma Shigenobu, 1838-1922), Tokyo, 1926, Vol. II, p.203.

(4) Arao Sei, "Refutation of erroneous opinions regarding China", 1895, pp. 23-29. Cited in Shimura Toshiko, op.cit., pp. 263-264. Also, Oka, p. 36.

(5) Tokutomi Sohō, "China must not be bullied" in Kokumin Shimbun, 18th February, 1895. Paraphrased in Oka, op.cit. p. 31.

China's potential strength remained an important factor in Japan's consideration of China as an ally against the West in the post-1895 era.

The Argument for the Preservation of China

The war of 1894-1895 exposed China's vulnerability. The powers, rivalling as well as cooperating with one another, advanced their interests in China by creating spheres of influence. In 1896, Russia asked Chinese permission to build a railway across Manchuria to Vladivostok. The Peking government at first refused but Li Hung-chang who negotiated with the Russians in St. Petersburg got Peking's agreement to his signing in June a secret Russo-Chinese treaty of alliance. (A bribe of three million rubles had been promised to Li by the Russian government). By this agreement, China and Russia would fight together against any future Japanese expansion on the continent, and the newly-established Russo-Chinese Bank was given the right to finance the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria.

In December, 1897, Russia sent a naval squadron into Port Arthur and got from China in March, 1898, a twenty-five-year lease of the southern tip of the Kwantung Peninsula including Port Dairen and Port Arthur. She also acquired the right to connect these ports with the Chinese Eastern Railway by a north-south line, the South Manchuria Railway. The Russian occupation of Port Arthur was in fact encouraged by Kaiser William II of Germany who in November, 1897, had set an example by sending a German squadron into Kiaochow in Shantung. By March, 1898, Germany had formally secured the lease of Kiaochow for ninety-nine years. Following the Russian and German successes, England leased Weihaiwei in 1899 and France in the same year, obtained a lease of Canton Bay for ninety-nine years.

When Japan saw how China was threatened with partition, she began to feel more keenly the threat to her national independence and peace in the Far East. It was in the midst of this scramble for concessions that the argument for the preservation of China, *Shina hōzen ron*, came into being. The Japanese believed that they could no longer adopt a passive role in Far Eastern politics in the face of Western aggrandizement. Independence for China was crucial to peace in the Far East and hence of great importance to Japan. Should China be partitioned by the powers, Japan would find Western menace on her doorsteps. Preservation of China would not only be in China's best interests but also to the advantage of Japan and the Japanese were not championing this cause merely out of a sense of justice. It was an awareness of Japanese strength and superiority among the Asian countries and at the same time, a realization of Japan's precarious position in international relations that led the Japanese to put forward the argument. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun wrote that careful considerations and prompt actions on the part of Japan were needed to redress the political situation in East Asia. Japan might not be strong enough to compete satisfactorily with the other powers in peace time and the resources that she could draw on might be inadequate at times of crises, but the Japanese were a capable nation and instead of viewing the situation with folded arms, she should do what she could to improve it.⁽⁶⁾

a. Expressions of dissatisfaction with the official policy

The Japanese government's policy at this juncture was marked by a lack of action regarding the powers' violation of peace in the Far East. The Itō government had been aware that Japan was not strong enough to

(6) "The recent Western advances in China", 21st July, 1898, p.1. in Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun microfilm reproduction by Mainichi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1966. This newspaper will hereafter be cited as TNNS.

protest against the enforced retrocession of Liaotung. After the Triple Intervention, it was prepared to come to terms with the Western countries with a view to consolidating Japan's political and economic positions in the Far East. Moreover, it was unwilling to forgo its share of concessions in China which lay in the province of Fukien.

Over the critical period of 1897-1898, therefore, the Japanese government adopted a wait-and-see policy. It cautiously refrained from taking any action regarding the Russian demand made on China for the lease of the southern tip of Liaotung. Itō feared that if Japan antagonized Russia, she would have to deal with France and Germany as well. Thus when Katō, minister to England, recommended that Japan coordinate her actions with England to oppose the Russian move and urged that it would be desirable and wise for Japan and England to form an alliance which would give the two powers undisputed naval power in the Far East, he secured no support from Tokyo. Itō much preferred an understanding with Russia on Korea and was anxious to stay out of the crisis.⁽⁷⁾

Nevertheless, the idea of an Anglo-Japanese alliance and the government's failure to protest against the powers' scramble for concessions in China became topics of much discussion in Japan. Many Japanese were dissatisfied with the government's tendency to align its policies with one or the other of the Western powers.

The Nihon, a nationalist newspaper, was highly critical of the

(7) William, L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, second edition, Harvard University, Mass., 1956, pp.472-473.

Japanese government's policy during the 1897-1898 crisis. It said that in order not to arouse the suspicion of the Western powers, the Itō government was watching the latters' partition of China with folded arms. In doing so, the government was making a serious mistake.⁽⁸⁾ Did not the Westerners include Japan in what they called the Far East and would they look upon Japan as different from China and Korea and hence refrain from making ambitious moves against Japan? Once the Western powers had partitioned China, they would set to work on Japan.⁽⁹⁾ In particular, the Nihon maintained, it would be unwise of Japan to form an alliance with England. The English were a different race from the Japanese, they were very keen on advancing their own interests and were not a dependable nation. The Japanese government should consider carefully the consequences of such an alliance before it made any commitments.⁽¹⁰⁾

Kōtoku Shūsui, editor of the *Yorozu Chohō*, also objected to the idea of an alliance with England. He said the English had always sought to advance their own interests without expending any effort. Before the Sino-Japanese war, England had declared herself a friend of China. Yet after the war, she turned her back on China and sided herself with Japan, the victor. During the Triple Intervention, however, she did not lift a finger to help Japan. Although she was now opposing the Russian action in China, once Russia succeeded in acquiring rights and interests from the Chinese government, she would make similar demands on China to further her own interests. Japan should not look for an ally in such an unreliable country.⁽¹¹⁾ He maintained that the government's current policy

(8) "The Itō government's policy towards China", *Nihon*. 7th March 1898. Quoted in Shimura Toshiko, op.cit., p. 271.

(9) "The new development in the eastern advances of the Europeans", editorial. *Nihon*, 7th February, 1898, *ibid*.

(10) "On the Anglo-Japanese alliance", *Nihon*, 8th August, 1898 *ibid*.

(11) Kōtoku Shūsui, "England's foreign policy", in *Yorozu Chohō*, 15th March, 1898, *ibid*.

only benefited the European powers. Instead, Japan should open her heart to the Chinese people and profess to the latter her willingness to take up the responsibility of preserving the integrity of China. If she would do so, China would certainly make an effort to rid herself of the oppression by the powers.⁽¹²⁾

According to Kōtoku, Japan's interests did not run parallel to those of England. The main concern of England was to protect and expand her unrivalled commercial interests in China. To do so, she maintained that the "open door" in China must be observed by all the powers. But this did not prevent her from claiming a sphere of influence in the Yangtze valley from which all powers were excluded. Hence her policy in China was far from being unselfish. She had approached Japan - and America and Germany - in 1898 to join her in preserving the integrity of China. But her main objective was to contain the Russian expansion in the Liaotung Peninsula. The logic of forming this anti-Russian block, according to Kōtoku, was founded on the idea of balance of military power so that England would be ready to go to war with Russia when necessary. However, Kōtoku maintained, this was not the way to bring about the preservation of China. What China needed most at the moment was reform. The reform of China was like the removal of a malignant tumour from a patient. Even when the operation was gently carried out, one still could not guarantee the recovery of the patient. If drastic actions were taken, then there would be no question of the patient's surviving the ordeal. China, a gravely ill nation, would certainly not survive the confrontation of forces between the powers on her territories. In

(12) Kōtoku Shūsui, "How to deal with today's situation in the East?", Yorozu Chohō, 19th March, 1898, *ibid.*

entering into a political alliance, a country must first be aware of the possibility of her entering into wars, an obligation which most alliances entailed. If Japan formed an alliance with England without paying due considerations to such a possibility, then she would be taking an irresponsible action. She should refrain from making any such commitment with England, America and Germany on moral grounds. Moreover, Japan's military defence was not sufficiently strong and her commercial stake in China was inadequately developed. An Anglo-Japanese alliance would only benefit England and not Japan.⁽¹³⁾

b. Japanese leadership in stemming the tide of Western expansion

Many Japanese believed that instead of timidly adjusting herself to the policies of the Western powers, Japan should act independently to safeguard her own independence. They asserted that there were special ties binding Japan to Asia and she should take the initiative in preserving East Asian integrity. That Japan, having modernized first, should lead China towards development and help her gain her independence was the theme of many newspaper editorials which appeared in 1898. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said,

"... This important undertaking [of leading the Chinese people towards enlightenment] for Japan has arisen out of the natural relationship between the two peoples and will have to be carried out on the basis of this natural relationship.... The mutual feelings between the Chinese and Japanese peoples are enough to bring out the successes in such an undertaking and it is not necessary to rely on diplomatic means.... China's land is in Japan's neighbourhood; the two countries have the longest peaceful relations. They are tied by race and language and share the same interests and concern in international politics. Can it be said that Japan's leadership of the Chinese people towards development is merely a question of bestowing a favour...?"⁽¹⁴⁾

(13) Kōtoku Shūsui, "Beresford's argument for a quadruple alliance", written on 24th-27th January, 1899, in Kōno Hiromichi, compiler, Kōtoku Shūsui, Hyōron to Zuisō (Kōtoku Shūsui, Reviews and Reflections), Tokyo, 1949, pp. 204-205.

(14) "The enlightenment of the Chinese people," TNNS, 31st August, 1898, p.2.

Ōkuma who formed the cabinet in cooperation with Itagaki in June, 1898, strongly supported the argument for the preservation of China. In a speech entitled *Shina Hōzen Ron* given at a general meeting of the Tōhō Kyokai (Association of Eastern Nations) on 19th October, 1898, he put forward the "Ōkuma Doctrine". Ōkuma said that although the Western powers were threatening to colonize the whole of China and by so doing destroy the Chinese system, they would not succeed. He claimed that China would no longer remain dormant; once a hero should arise, a sense of patriotism in the people would be aroused and the Chinese would unite to defend their country against the Western advances. The Chinese had always had a unified language and learning, a sense of loyalty, filial piety and justice which had taken root since Confucius. By organizing themselves and drawing upon those assets, they could rid themselves of their backwardness. The task of arousing their consciousness and giving them support, leadership and enlightenment fell on no other country but Japan. This was the "duty" and mission of the Japanese people. Japan was, after all, China's neighbour, bound to her in race, culture and language and equipped with the strength to support that country against foreign invaders. In so doing, Japan would be only repaying China for the historical and cultural heritage which she had received from that country. Unlike the Western powers, Japan had no intention of annexing China's territories. It was, Ōkuma said, not consistent with the benevolence of the Japanese Emperor and the sense of chivalry and justice of the Japanese people that they should covet the territories of another country.⁽¹⁵⁾

Embodied in Ōkuma's idea of Japan's role in preserving China was the theory

(15) Ōkuma-ko hachijūgonen-shi, op.cit., pp. 308-309. Also, Watanabe Ikujirō, Nihon Kinsei Gaikō-shi, op.cit., pp. 302-303.

that Asia should belong to the Asiatics. This was why he emphasized the suitability of Japanese guidance for China. Because of the geographical proximity and cultural closeness of the two countries, Japan, rather than the Western countries themselves, was better equipped to impart Western knowledge to China. Ōkuma envisaged that by becoming strong, the Asian countries would one day take the place of the European powers in the Far East.

Confrontation of the yellow and white races

The Far Eastern situation in 1898 was seen by many Japanese in terms of confrontation between the yellow and white races. Japan and China should therefore join hands in fighting the Western powers for the survival of the yellow nations. The Nihon wrote that European statesmen, in conducting their foreign policies, were guided by the notion that the countries of the world were divided into two groups; those belonging to the same race as themselves and had a similar political system as their own and those differing from them racially and politically. It was the ambition of these European nations, when the opportunity arose, to subject the countries of the latter group under their rule. Such a policy had in fact been carried out towards China which belonged to a different racial group and had a different political structure from that of the Europeans. Japan had reformed her political system on the European models and she was not protesting against the European powers' policies towards China. But such actions on her part would not make the European countries accept her as one of them because she was still a country of a different race. Because of this, the Nihon concluded, Japan would eventually have to act alongside the countries of her own race.⁽¹⁶⁾

(16) "The Europeans' ideas about the foreign countries", editorial, Nihon, 17th April, 1898, in Shimura Toshiko, op.cit., p. 271.

In early 1898, an article entitled "Alliance of the peoples of the same race" appeared in the *Taiyō* and was translated into Chinese and several European languages. It made an impact both inside and outside Japan. Konoe Atsumaro who wrote the article was at that time president of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet, a position which he held from 1896 to 1903. Konoe spoke of the necessity for an alliance between Japan and China to resist the aggression of Western nations and their aggrandizement in the Far East,

"... The future of the Far East is one in which the struggle between the human races will take place inevitably Temporary diplomatic considerations may lead to combinations which may for the moment obscure the main issue; but these are mere incidents detached from the great struggle, which is one between the yellow and white peoples in which the Chinese and Japanese must inevitably find themselves on the same side"(17)

Konoe also observed that the European nations did not regard the yellow race in quite the same way that they did those of Africa and other parts of the world; their contempt, he said, was mingled with fear,

"... The so-called administration of Africa, colonization of Australia and South-east Asia and exploration of South America [by the Europeans] indicate nothing but their conspiracy of conquering other races. As the differences in progress between these races on the one hand and the Europeans on the other are too great, the latter have had no difficulty in conquering these undeveloped lands However, as regards the yellow races, the European nations are contemptuous on the one hand and uncertain on the other. This is due, especially to the military skills which Japan has exhibited in the war with China. Although it is true that the level of civilization in terms of material progress of the yellow race is undeniably inferior to that achieved by the European powers, their national strength and potentialities are still hard to determine"(18)

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- (17) Konoe Atsumaro, "Alliance of the peoples of the same race (Dō Jinshu Dōmei) and the necessity for researches on the problems of China," *Taiyō*, 1st January, 1898, collected in *Konoe Atsumaro Nikki*, Tokyo, 1968, Fuzoku Bunsho (Supplementary Documents), pp. 62-63. This work will hereafter be cited as *Nikki*.
- (18) *ibid.*

As regards the "partition of China", Konoe said,

"... Although the danger of a partition of China is not imminent at the moment, it is imperative that the countries of the yellow race jointly evolve a method to protect themselves. It may not be necessary for the Western powers to ally with one another in a racial struggle in the undeveloped lands [of Africa, Australia and South America], it is not so easy for them if they want to conquer China. Hence, when the partition of China becomes a reality, it will also be a time when an alliance among the powers will be formed, resulting in a confrontation of the white and yellow races. In a situation like this, the destiny of the Japanese people can hardly be detached from the struggle"(19)

As he regarded an alliance between the Japanese and Chinese as indispensable and inevitable, he was much concerned at the tendency among his countrymen, especially those resident in China, to imitate the "evil example" of the Europeans and to affect to despise the Chinese. He deplored the foolish jubilation of the Japanese at the fall of China in 1895. The destiny of the Chinese nation, Konoe maintained, was bound up with that of Japan. The Japanese should cultivate a feeling of friendliness towards their neighbouring country, aid and encourage the Chinese in the advancement of their power and civilization. They should strive even more vigorously to remove from the minds of the Chinese people jealousy and suspicions against the Japanese. (20)

Concerning the situation in China itself, Konoe observed that the Peking government was as unenlightened and arrogant as in the old days. Not only was it reluctant to carry out reforms in China's civil and military institutions, despite the loss China had suffered in the war with Japan, but it was still dreaming of the "Great Chinese Empire," oblivious to the danger threatening the country. He urged the leaders of Japanese thought to go to China in order to become acquainted with the state of things there and to get to know important Chinese leaders with whom they might exchange views.

(19) *ibid.*

(20) *ibid.*

Konoe believed that there were influential people outside Peking who were concerned about the deteriorating situation in China. Chang Chih-tung, for example, was enthusiastic about reforms in the country and the people in Shanghai were aware of the ambitions of the Western powers and there was among them a gradual deepening of friendliness towards the Japanese. Because of this, cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese people would best be promoted on the unofficial level. But first of all, Japan had to research into China's problems, investigate the Chinese institutions, explore the customs of the local people and acquire more knowledge of the Chinese nation. He regretted that while many Japanese travelled extensively in Europe and learned a lot about the Western countries, very few knew enough about the affairs of China. And if Japan was to evolve a plan in conjunction with China to save the Far East from Western domination, she would have to overcome her ignorance regarding China. (21)

Such were the ideas and ambitions which inspired him to establish the Tōa Dōbun Kai (East-Asia Common Culture Society) in November, 1898. (22) At the opening ceremony, Konoe who became the first president of the Society said,

"Japan and China have had a long relationship with one another. Their cultures and values are similar. In sympathies and circumstances, they are as close as brothers, as close as the lips are to the teeth A few years ago, the great Heaven did not have pity on us and the two brother countries were engaged in hostilities against one another. The powers took this opportunity [to strengthen their influences in the Far East] and the situation has since become more and more dangerous. Is it not time the two countries forgot their past mistakes, discarded their hatred for one another and jointly defended themselves against

(21) *ibid.*

(22) See following Chapter and Chapter Six.

the outside foe? At this moment, both governments must in the name of justice and courtesy strive to strengthen the relations between the two countries and the two peoples must work together in good faith to attain mutual interests. The [intellectual and political] leaders of Japan and China...must treat one another with sincerity, bring forth the truth to everyone, support their governments and discipline the ordinary people in an attempt to resist the demands [of the strong powers] upon their territories...."(23)

Japan's role in the Chinese reform movement of 1898

The argument for giving support to the Chinese in reforming their institutions was reinforced in 1898 when K'ang Yu-wei, inspired by Japan's successful modernization, launched a reform programme with the support of his followers in the Hunan province, many of whom were scholars and minor officials in the government.

The Japanese government, however, was not openly disposed to the idea of fostering a special relationship with China which it feared would arouse the suspicion of the Western powers. Baron Albert d'Anethan, Belgian minister to Japan, reported that Itō had favoured a rapprochement between Japan and China just before the powers' scramble for concessions in China in early 1897.⁽²⁴⁾ But no positive step was taken by Tokyo towards this end over and after the 1898 crisis. But some Japanese diplomatic

(23) Quoted by Watanabe Ikujiro, op.cit., p.304.

(24) D'Anethan to de Favereau, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, No.249/104, 23rd December, 1897, in George Alexander Lensen, ed., The D'Anethan Dispatches from Japan, 1894-1910, Sophia University, Tokyo, 1967, p.75.

officials and military agents were convinced that China could and should be saved from Western domination through the help of Japan. They quietly implemented a policy that would give assistance to a movement in China that had the promise of strengthening the country against the Western powers especially Russia.

Inside China, the tendency of the Manchu court to favour Russia in its foreign policy and the suspicion and resentment which many Chinese officials in Peking continued to harbour against Japan after the war did little to further the cause of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. But outside the immediate supervision of Peking, there were other areas of activity and other centres of power in China which offered wider scope for the implementation of the policy of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Entrusted with the build-up of Chinese military forces, many of the provincial viceroys were desirous of strengthening China through progressive military reform. And it was to these provincial viceroys that the Japanese proposed that they would assist China in expanding and improving her military establishment.

In December, 1897, a military mission led by Kamio Mitsuomi was sent to Hankow by General Kawakami Soroku of the Japanese Army General Staff. The mission was to deliver to the governor-general of Hu-kuang, Chang Chih-tung, Kawakami's message that the previous war between China and Japan had been a mistake, that the increasing power of the white race in the Orient presented grave dangers to both China and Japan, and that closer relations should exist between these two Asian countries which were basically of the same race and culture. Japan would provide training in military science to Chinese students sent to Japan as a first step towards strengthening China militarily. She and England already had an understanding by which they were willing to align themselves with and give assistance to China. But should China continue

to ally herself with Russia, Japan would be obliged to support British policies of encroachment in the Yangtze Valley.⁽²⁵⁾

Kawakami's ideas were presented to Chang Chih-tung in January, 1898 and met with favourable response from the latter who, though reserved about China's alignment with foreign powers, was enthusiastic about the training of Chinese students in Japan. As news of Japan's desire to align herself with England and China and to help strengthen China against the Western powers spread to other parts of the country, it was received with favour by many of the Chinese reformers, especially those in Peking and in the province of Hunan. In particular, it was greeted with active enthusiasm by K'ang Yu-wei who had for a long time advocated that China should renovate herself by following the Japanese example of modernization and using Japan's programme of reform as a model. Soon after he learned of the Japanese wishes for closer relations with China, K'ang acted with energy and promptness. In mid-April, he presented his "Study of Reforms in Japan" to the Emperor Kuang Hsü, in the hope of providing him with a guide to reform adopted from the innovations that had already been put into effect in Meiji Japan. In June, he submitted a memorandum to the Emperor appealing to the latter to inaugurate a reform programme of China's institutions by following the example of the Meiji Emperor. A few days later, on 11th June, 1898, the Chinese Emperor issued the edict fixing the policies of the Empire. This was to herald a series of reform measures which lasted for just over three months.⁽²⁶⁾ K'ang's active advocacy of reforms modelling on the Japanese can largely be explained by his long-time

(25) Chang wen-hsiang kung ch'üan-chi (Collected memorials, works and papers by Chang Chih-tung), Peking, 1937, Vol.79, pp.19b-20b.

(26) For K'ang's efforts in preparing the reform programme of 1898, see Richard C. Howard, "Japan's role in the Reform Programme for K'ang Yu-wei" in Lo Jung-pang, ed. (with translations), K'ang Yu-wei, a Biography and a Symposium, University of Arizona Press, 1967, pp. 287 ff.

interest in the history of Meiji Japan. But it would appear that the knowledge of the willingness of the Japanese to assist China greatly encouraged him in his efforts to bring forth the reform programme of 1898.

Japanese newspapers' reviews of the reform movement

The Japanese responded favourably towards K'ang's efforts to reform the Chinese institutions. Some newspapers believed that the hope of the revival of Asia would eventually materialize now that the Chinese had awakened to the need for renovation. The Yorozu Chohō urged the Japanese people to sympathize with and support the Chinese in the same way that they would protect someone who had unfortunately fallen ill and was now making efforts to recuperate.⁽²⁷⁾ The Nihon observed that the Chinese reform movement, though still in its early stages, should not be dismissed lightly. The Japanese should not overlook K'ang's potentialities in saving China. Japan must take this opportunity to guide the Chinese people in reforming their institutions.⁽²⁸⁾

In April, Fukumoto Nichinan, super-intendant of the Nihon, went to China to report on the progress of the movement. Fukumoto believed that Japan had secured the independence of Korea by going to war with China. Now Japan should awaken China from her obstinacy and help her to get back on her feet so that the three countries would co-exist in East Asia and safeguard peace in this part of the world. He reported that the recent development in China indicated that Chinese inside and outside the government had awakened to such a need and they

(27) "Japanese measures in the Shashih riot", Yorozu Chohō, 18th May, 1898. Quoted in Shimura Toshiko, op.cit., p. 275.

(28) "Argument for promoting reforms in China's internal administration", Nihon, 13th May, 1898, ibid., p. 276.

were beginning to see that China must learn from Japan in order to strengthen herself. Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i who had advocated war in 1894 were now enthusiastic supporters of the Nisshin dōmei ron (the argument for a Sino-Japanese alliance). People like K'ang Yu-wei were convinced that it would be to China's advantage to acquire Western knowledge from Japan and not from the Western countries themselves. Translated books, newspapers and journals were coming out in large numbers advocating reform ideas and organizations were being set up to put these ideas into practice. At this moment, it was urgent for Japan to give guidance to these people, promote harmony among themselves and encourage their movement so that they would attain the same achievement as the Japanese had in the era of Keio. (29)

The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun pointed out that there would be mutual benefits for both countries if Japan took the position of a leader in the Chinese reform movement. It said that if China looked to any one European country for support in her reforms, she would arouse suspicions and obstruction from the other powers. But if she turned to Japan which stood outside the rivalries of the Western powers, such complications would not arise. Between Japan and China, agreements and understanding concerning matters of reform could be attained without the use of diplomatic strategies. Since the Sino-Japanese war, the Chinese people had not only recognized the progress Japan had made in civilization but also felt the need to look to Japan for support. Moreover, the advances of the European powers in the East had drawn the Chinese people closer to Japan. An opportunity had now arisen for Japan to enlighten and guide the Chinese. (30) In another editorial

(29) Fukumoto Nichinan, "The Japanese and Chinese situations", Nihon, 15th April, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 277

(30) "The enlightenment of the Chinese people", TNNS, 31st August, 1898, p. 2.

article, the same paper said that now that the Chinese had eventually awakened to the need for revitalizing their internal administration, adjusting their finances and making the most use of their talented people, Japan's long cherished hope was gradually becoming a reality. Should the Japanese not be pleased about it? Apart from striving for the best in reforming their institutions, the Chinese government and people must cultivate a sense of nationhood. Without this sense of nationalism, all the edicts for reform, no matter how benevolent they might be, would be to no purpose.⁽³¹⁾

The coup d'état in China in September 1898 and Japanese government policy

K'ang Yu-wei's reform programme, however, lasted only a hundred days. In initiating major renovations in the Chinese civil and military systems, K'ang was supported by a group of scholars with little political influence and a handful of minor officials in Peking. The progressive provincial viceroys were not prepared to fully endorse his reform programme which was then regarded as radical. Although K'ang, who had little political power in the Peking government, had the moral support of the Emperor, real power was in the hands of the conservative faction in Peking led by the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi and Li Hung-chang. Tzu Hsi had for long intended to depose Kuang Hsü and she viewed the liaison between the Emperor and the reformist party as a threat to her predominant position. K'ang Yu-wei's 'subversive' reform programme only hastened her decision to dethrone Kuang Hsü. On 21st September, 1898, she ordered the execution of six young reformist officials and the

(31) "Encouraging the best in the governing of the country", TNNS, 8th March, 1898, p. 2.

enforced seclusion of Kuang Hsü'.

On the day of the coup, K'ang Yu-wei's closest supporter Liang Chi-chao went to the Japanese legation to appeal to Hayashi Gonsuke, then minister to China, for his aid in rescuing the Emperor and protecting the lives of K'ang (who had departed for Shanghai) and the other reformers. Itō who was then visiting Peking suggested that Hayashi telegraph instructions to the Consul-General in Shanghai to give what help he could to K'ang and also made arrangements for Liang's escape from Peking to Japan. Efforts were also made by the Japanese legation staff to save Huang Tsun-hsien, T'an Ssu-tung, Chang Yin-huan, Wang Chao and others associated with the reform movement, but only Liang and Wang Chao arrived safely in Japan. When K'ang arrived in HongKong a few days after the coup, he immediately requested the Japanese consul to assist him to go to Japan. With the consent of Ōkuma, then prime minister, K'ang was able to find refuge in Japan. On 27th September, 1898, Ōkuma sent a telegramme to Hayashi, authorizing him to advise the Tsungli Yamen not to take any drastic actions against the reformers and to adopt moderate measures in all respects.⁽³²⁾

Although Ōkuma was sympathetic towards K'ang and Liang and offered them private support and encouragement, his government took no active part in furthering the cause of the Chinese reformers which was to launch a campaign in Japan to save the Emperor. Moreover, the Japanese government was not prepared to jeopardize its relations with the Tzu Hsi faction in Peking.

(32) Ōkuma to Hayashi, 27th September 1898, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Tokyo Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, Part 1, (1954) No. 560, P.663. This source will hereafter be cited as NGB.

This unwillingness to give active support to the reformers aroused criticism at home. The Nihon said that this was not the time for the Japanese government to have recourse to precedents in international law. The Japanese government had ^{in a} cowardly ^{way} refrained from taking actions to rescue the Emperor of China. If it had acted in this way because it did not wish to incur the displeasure of the Peking government or upset Chang Chih-tung and Li Hung-Chang, then it had acted disgracefully, jeopardizing Japan's prestige and dignity as an advanced nation in East Asia. ⁽³³⁾ In another article, the Nihon said that by propping up the regency in China, the Japanese government had dealt a severe blow to the Chinese reform movement which had been a result of much labour and efforts. In order to promote self-renovation in China, Japan must refuse to recognize the Tzu Hsi regency, urge Peking to restore the Emperor to power and advise the Chinese to adopt civilized methods of government. ⁽³⁴⁾

The Yorozu Chohō also regretted that the Chinese reform movement had ended abruptly and was equally critical of the Japanese government's inaction after the coup. It said that the reckless actions of K'ang Yu-wei and his supporters were merely mistakes of a transitional phase in the reform programme. Once this period of trials and errors had passed, their methods would change and cautious and capable people would emerge to carry them out. It was premature to predict failure for the Chinese reform movement and pass judgment on the rash attempt of K'ang and his supporters at this early stage. It was even more foolish of the Japanese foreign affairs authorities to say that there was

(33) "The plight of the Chinese Emperor", editorial, Nihon, 13th October, 1898. Quoted in Shimura, op. cit., p. 280.

(34) "The Japanese government's measures before and after the coup," Nihon 27th October, 1898, op.cit., p. 280.

no hope of success for the movement. If the Japanese government attempted to discourage the Chinese reformers or tried to prevent the Japanese people from giving them moral support, then it would be committing the biggest crime against justice.⁽³⁵⁾

The lack of official sympathy for the Chinese reformers was even more pronounced during the second Yamagata government which replaced the Ōkuma cabinet on 8th November, 1898. The new Japanese government was more concerned with remaining on good terms with the Peking government than promoting reforms in China. Hence when Yano Fumio, minister to China, advised Prince Ch'ing and other top officials in Peking to discard their conservative policy and make use of the services of the progressive officials in reforming the government,⁽³⁶⁾ he was criticized by the Gaimushō for having gone too far. The deputy foreign minister, Tsuzuki Keiroku, told Yano that such an advice on the internal policy of China would only arouse the resentment of the Chinese leaders and serve no purpose. It was not the concern of Japan whether the internal policy of China was progressive or conservative. Japanese officials should be concerned solely with the advancement of Japan's interests and make the most of every opportunity to achieve this end.⁽³⁷⁾

It would seem that the Yamagata government reckoned that it was in Japan's interests to secure the friendship of Peking instead of the reformers. Thus from late 1898, there began a short phase of rapprochement between the Japanese and the Manchu government. The Japanese leaders began to look upon the presence

(35) Naitō Konan, "The two phases in the argument for reforms in China", part 3, Yorozu Chohō, 30th October, 1898, *ibid.*, pp. 281-282.

(36) Yano to Aoki, 26th November, 1898, NGB, Vol.31, part 1, (1954), No. 610, p.719.

(37) *ibid.*, p. 720.

of K'ang Yu-wei and other Chinese refugees in Japan as a source of embarrassment. When Chang Chih-tung requested Segawa, Japanese consul in Hankow, to expel K'ang and his party from Japan, Aoki, foreign minister, advised Segawa to assure Chang that the Japanese government was far from willing to give asylum to K'ang and his party, nevertheless it was impossible owing to international usage to send them out of the country against their will. But every effort would be made to secure that end.⁽³⁸⁾ During this time, a split had developed between the Chinese refugees themselves. Wang Chao was in favour of bringing a compromise between Tzu Hsi and Kuang Hsi, while K'ang and Liang, on the other hand, stuck to their belief that no reforms could be implemented in China unless total power was restored to the Emperor.⁽³⁹⁾ This convinced the Yamagata government that the engagement by the Chinese refugees in Japan in "subversive activities" would cause harm to its relations with Peking and it offered K'ang assistance to leave Japan.⁽⁴⁰⁾ After K'ang had left Japan in March, 1899, Aoki again ordered Yano to step up measures to expel Liang.⁽⁴¹⁾ In December the same year, Liang left Japan. After the departures of K'ang and Liang, repressive measures were taken by the Japanese government against the activities of their supporters. At the request of Chang Chih-tung, reformist publications were banned in Japan.⁽⁴²⁾

In 1899, a secret move to foster a closer Sino-Japanese relationship was made between Fukushima Yasumasa and Odagiri on the one hand and Chang Chih-tung on the other. A Chinese secret mission was sent to Japan in July to discuss "secret matters" relating to the two countries.⁽⁴³⁾

(38) Aoki to Segawa, 6th December, 1898, *ibid.*, No. 613, p. 724.

(39) Wang Shu-huai, Wai-jen yü wu-hsü pien-fa, *op.cit.*, p. 234

(40) Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih (Material on the pre-1911 revolutionary history), Shanghai, 1953, Vol.1, p. 5.

(41) Aoki to Yano, NGB, Vol.32 (1955), No.413, pp.545-546.

(42) See following Chapter.

(43) See following Chapter.

As news of the coming of the Chinese mission reached Japan, the Japanese press speculated on the possibility of a Sino-Japanese alliance. It was conjectured that there would be closer cooperation in military and economic affairs between Japan and China if such an alliance materialized.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Yamagata, however, was opposed to the idea of a Sino-Japanese alliance. In anticipation of the arrival of the Chinese mission, he discussed the matter with foreign minister Aoki and minister of finance Matsukata and put forward his opinion in a memorial to the Japanese Emperor. He said that it was very likely that the Chinese government, encountering much hardship in its internal and external affairs, had decided to send a special mission to seek the help of Japan in keeping the Western powers at bay. He also said that when the Japanese government received the Chinese emissaries, it must take care not to injure their feelings in order to maintain the good relations with China. This was most important because China was Japan's "line of interests" and the Japanese government must seize every opportunity to extend it. However, if the relations between the two countries became too intimate, then the European powers would suspect that an alliance between Japan and China was being formed against them. This would incur difficulties and disadvantages for Japan at the peace conference which was being held in Hague. It was most ill-advised of Japan to ally herself with China in the hope of attaining independence for East Asia. The Japanese government should altogether avoid discussing this question with the Chinese emissaries.⁽⁴⁵⁾

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- (44) Teshirogi Kinsuke, "Bojutsu yori koshi ni itaru kakumeipa to henpōpa no kōshō" (The negotiations between the revolutionary and reformist factions from 1898 to 1900) in Kindai Chūgoku kenkyū, Chūgoku kenkyū I-inkai, ed., Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 1966, Vol. 7., p. 248.
- (45) Yamagata Aritomo, "Opinions regarding the Chinese special mission", 27th May, 1899, in Ōyama Azusa, (compiler), Yamagata Aritomo Iken sho (Reprints of 77 memorials and other writings by General Yamagata Aritomo, 1898-1922), Meiji Hyakunen-shi Sōsho, Vol. 16. Tokyo, 1966, pp. 251-253.

Thus the slender possibility of a Sino-Japanese alliance ended with the newly-founded consciousness on the part of the Japanese leaders of Japan's changing power status in the Far East. Although the Yamagata government was drawn closer to Peking and Chang Chih-tung as a result of the 1898 coup, it was not prepared to enter into further understanding with the Chinese government. By agreeing to play down the influence and suppressing the activities of the Chinese reformers in Japan, the Japanese government had helped to prevent the risk of the Manchu dynasty's downfall. It had come to accept the need to coordinate its policies with the Western powers in maintaining the status quo in the Far East.

Japanese government policies in the Far East in the early twentieth century

In 1900, Japan joined forces with the Western countries in putting down the Boxers in northern China. Foreign minister Aoki said at the time that under no circumstances would Japan act independently of the powers.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Throughout the crisis, Japan was anxious to impress upon the Western powers that she did not seek any exclusive or particular advantages and that her interests in China were identical with those of the powers. An imperial message from China to the Emperor of Japan asking for help in defending China against the insurgents and the foreigners⁽⁴⁷⁾ failed to call up an enthusiastic response from the Japanese government. In reply, the Emperor of Japan made no allusion to the Chinese proposal that Japan "make common cause" with China. He merely replied to make

(46) "The gist of foreign minister Aoki's replies [to questions] regarding the China incident." INNS, 16th June, 1900, p.1.

(47) See following Chapter.

it clear that Japan did not want to pursue towards China a line of conduct different from that of the other powers:

"... Now that all the powers have sent their troops to Tientsin, Japan is merely sending her own troops to relieve and protect her ministers from the harassment caused by the rebels and not for any other purposes The Japanese and Chinese have always been friendly with one another and in the event of an emergency, Japan will not refuse to fulfil her obligations. We hope that the Chinese government will apply itself more energetically to suppressing the rebels so that this will be used as evidence of its efforts and the stand that it has taken over the present crisis. In any negotiations that may be carried out among the powers, Japan will do her part to support China"(48)

The Yamagata government saw that a more promising future for Japan could be attained by acting in concert with the Western powers so that if a division of China were to ensue, Japan could and should have her share. Thus in 1900, the year of Japan's cooperation in the "Allied Expedition in Northern China" was also very nearly the beginning of her active expansions in southern China and southern Korea.

Since the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, Japanese governor-generals of that island had been suggesting practical implementation for plans of extending Japanese influence and interests into Fukien, the Chinese province opposite Taiwan. They believed that Taiwan and Fukien shared contiguous interests commercially and politically and because they were interdependent, they should be put under the same control. In 1898, Japan had secured from China a promise not to alienate the Fukien province to any other power. But when the Japanese government asked for railway rights in the province in 1900, it was refused. In August, 1900, Katsura Tarō, minister of war in the Yamagata cabinet, sent

(48) "The imperial message of the Japanese Emperor concerning the Boxer incident." Extract in TNNS, 20th July, 1900, p.1.

instructions to Kodama Gentarō, governor-general of Taiwan, to make preparations for an occupation of Amoy, capital of Fukien, to counteract the Russian presence in Newchang and the British presence in Shanghai. On 28th August, two Japanese vessels set sail for Amoy from Taiwan. On the same day, however, an unexpected order from Tokyo instructed the Amoy consul and Goto^{Shimpei} to postpone their landing operation. During this period of delay, British, Russian, French and American warships arrived in Amoy making the Japanese invasion impossible.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The decision to forsake the Amoy expedition was partly a result of Itō's caution. Protests against the Japanese expedition had been made by American, British and German representatives to the Japanese consul in Amoy as well as to Tokyo. Itō was sensitive to the possibility of a coalition of foreign powers being formed against Japan as had taken place soon after the Sino-Japanese war.⁽⁵⁰⁾ But a more important cause of the sudden decision to end the expedition was Russia's unexpected announcement on 26th August that she would withdraw her troops from Peking. It was feared in Tokyo that the Russian forces would be withdrawn to and concentrated in Manchuria. The Tokyo government thus decided to stop the venture in southern China in order to concentrate its resources in dealing with the problem in the North.

During the Boxer disturbances, Japan had approached Russia in July, 1900 with the proposal that Japan should take Korea while Russia took Manchuria as their respective spheres of influence. But the Russians

(49) For an account of Japan's abortive attempt to consolidate her influence in Fukien and South Korea, see Ian H. Nish, "Japan's indecision during the Boxer disturbances", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XX (1961), pp. 449-461.

See also Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, pp. 99-102.

(50) Ian H. Nish, *ibid.*, p. 454.

were not prepared to forgo their interests in Korea and rejected the proposal. Many Japanese at the time including the prime minister, Yamagata, felt that Japan should take advantage of the North China incident to consolidate her position in Korea, thus creating a substantial buffer state separating Japan's sphere of influence and Russia's frontier on the Yalu.⁽⁵¹⁾ In August, the Japanese government secured the German government's promise not to raise any objections to any action on Japan's part in placing Korea under her sphere of influence and to observe neutrality in the event of any power opposing the Japanese action. The Japanese government had also promised the German government that it was prepared to "reciprocate in the good will in case of a similar event which Germany may have to encounter in the path of her rapid progress and development."⁽⁵²⁾

The Yamagata government resigned in October, 1900 and no further action was taken towards this end. But these two incidents demonstrated that some Japanese leaders had tried to use the opportunity afforded by the Boxer crisis to consolidate Japanese interests on the Asian continent. In so doing, they were acting in line with the Western powers' policy of aggrandizement in East Asia. The Yamagata government had since 1899 dismissed the idea of forming an alliance with China against the West. In 1900 when the dismemberment of China seemed to be most imminent, it acted promptly to secure Japan's interests in preparation for such an eventuality.

However, still unsure of her own power among the Western countries, Japan dreaded a possible division of China. Some Japanese leaders

(51) *ibid.*, p. 457.

(52) Quoted in Nish, *ibid.*, p. 458.

were aware that the integrity of China could not be preserved merely by the powers promising not to occupy Chinese territories. China needed a progressive government which was capable of upholding the country's independence. Itō who succeeded Yamagata as prime minister in October, 1900, told Baron Albert d'Anethan that "Without foreign support, China will never succeed in making the financial, moral and political reforms in her Government, without which she is bound to perish. The Governments of Europe, Japan and America, therefore, must agree on a general plan of reform for China".⁽⁵³⁾ This emphasis on cooperation between Japan and the West in giving help to China marked the beginning of a new official attitude towards reform in China. Although some Japanese leaders still maintained that Japan should lead China towards development, the Shina hōzen ron had come to mean something rather different from what Ōkuma had advocated in 1898.

In 1902, Japan entered into an alliance with England with the objective of containing the Russian threat in Manchuria which had been growing since the Boxer Rebellion. The alliance pledged each power in support of the status quo and general peace in the Far East and territorial integrity of China and Korea. These were to be achieved by the affirmation of both powers' special interests in China and, in particular, Japan's predominant interests in Korea. It was the first time that Japan successfully concluded an alliance with a Western nation. With this diplomatic success, a change came about in Japan's political life which in the following years was to be dominated by power politics on the grand scale.

(53) D'Anethan to de Favereau, No. 14/11, 8th February, 1901. Lensen, op.cit., pp.146-147.

Russia's refusal to withdraw her troops from Manchuria after the Boxer disturbances continued to threaten Japanese security. Itō who had been succeeded by Katsura Tarō in June, 1901 but remained influential in the government still believed in the need for an entente with Russia. Under his influence, Japan proposed in 1903 a settlement with Russia based on the mutual recognition of Russian railway rights in Manchuria and Japanese political and economic interests in Korea. Russia countered with a guarantee of territorial integrity for Korea only, excluding China and demanded Japanese recognition of Manchuria as an exclusively Russian sphere of influence. Katsura's government, under pressure from a public opinion increasingly eager to fight, refused the Russian demands and war broke out in February, 1904. The outbreak of Russo-Japanese hostilities led to a revival of the rumour of ^{the} "yellow peril" in the West. Japanese government leaders were anxious to reassure the Western powers that the war was not a racial conflict. Prime minister Katsura, in particular, stressed that it was "no war of race, no war of religion".⁽⁵⁴⁾

The racial factor in Japanese political thinking in the early twentieth century

The changing power status of Japan in Asia was appreciated by most Japanese in the twentieth century. This awareness had two different implications for Japanese attitudes towards China. On the one hand, many Japanese shared the government's

(54) D'Anethan to de Favereau, No.101/58, 28th May, 1904, *ibid.*, p.190.

view that Japan needed to join in the game of power politics alongside the Western countries. They accepted that this would entail Japan's gradual abandonment of her role as the champion of the Asian nations in confronting Western power. On the other hand, the realization of Japan's growing prestige in Asia strengthened the belief that Japan should take a leading role in preserving China. Many Japanese claimed that they had taken an active part in the various attempts at change in China since the reform movement of the 1898 period and that Japan had a special role to play in China's regeneration. In educating Chinese students and helping to train the Chinese army, Japan could cultivate sympathy and understanding in the Chinese for the state of affairs in the Japanese nation, thus paving the way for a closer relationship between the two countries.

Those who took the second view tended to reject the government's policy of propping up the Manchu regime. They maintained that the Manchu rulers and not the Chinese people were responsible for the backward state in China. No doubt China had not exerted herself enough but given help, the Chinese would overcome their weakness and become a strong nation again. When this happened, the Eastern world would no longer have to suffer harassment and aggression from the West. The Japanese government's concern with China should be with the people and not the rulers.

In an article entitled "Two hundred years of Chinese and Japanese relations", Ōkuma again stressed his faith in the potentialities of the Chinese nation. He said that a people

with four thousand years of history could not perish. It was unfortunate that the Manchu rulers had failed in their duties towards their Chinese subjects and allowed the territories of the Chinese people to be placed under the sovereignty of foreign powers. But the Chinese people would not subject themselves to this humiliation for long. A time would come when wise and courageous men would emerge to organize the people in fighting for their independence. (55)

Ōkuma also predicted that a confrontation between the human races in the twentieth century would take place in China. As the present government of China could not save the country from being partitioned by the white powers, the duty of leading China away from this disaster fell on Japan. He reiterated that what China needed most was renovation in her educational system. The Japanese must first widen the Chinese people's horizon and encourage them in their pursuit of knowledge and justice. Such were the duties of ^{the}Japan~~ese~~ towards ^{the}Chinese with whom they shared a racial and cultural relationship.

Some writers also shared Ōkuma's view that a racial struggle was still going on in the twentieth century. An article in the Nihon entitled "Competition in the Pacific Ocean" stressed that the world was created for all mankind and

(55) Ōkuma Shigenobu, "Two hundred years of Chinese and Japanese relations", translated in Ch'ing I Pao (China Discussion), reform journal, Yokohama, (1898-1901), No.56, 4th September, 1900. Reprinted, Taipei, 1967, Vol.7, pp.3619-3622.

(56) *ibid.*

not for the white race alone. If the other races had been conquered by the white nations, it was because they did not realize that only the fittest survived and that they had not exerted themselves in fighting for their independence. Japan's position in the world was equal to those of the European powers. The Japanese were a nationalistic and aspiring people who had no lack of the qualities of the superior Asian race. Once she became the leader of the yellow race and, together with the Chinese, led the eight hundred million Asian people in confronting the white invaders, then the outcome of the conflict in the Pacific Ocean [sic] was still to be decided. The article said that the Japanese people wished to see China become another power beside Japan in the East, they hoped patriotic men in China would make sacrifices for their country and venture into bitter hardship for the attainment of civilization. The expansion of Asian power, the recovery of Asian sovereignty and the well-being of the yellow race depended on Japan and China. (57)

Some were disconcerted by the hostility and malice embodied in the yellow peril idea which was revived immediately before the Russo-Japanese war. They regarded it as a weapon which the Western powers employed against the Asian nations. Takahashi Sakue said it was evident that the confrontation between the races of the world was taking place as the world powers rallied to the "racial concept". The "countries of the same culture" in the East should therefore unite to form a front against the other races. (58)

(57) "The Competition in the Pacific Ocean", Nihon, translated in Yu-hsüeh i-pien (Foreign works translated by Chinese scholars studying abroad), Tokyo, No. 1, 14th November, 1902, pp. 88-90. (Facsimile, Taipei, 1968).

(58) Takahashi Sakue, "A look at the world especially the Far Eastern situation before removing the teaching of Chinese from the secondary school curriculum", in Nihon, 1st January, 1903. Paraphrased by Oka, op.cit., pp. 42-43.

The Nihonjin, a nationalist journal, warned that instead of coordinating her actions with the Western countries, Japan should join in the efforts of the Asian nations to counter Western encroachment. It said that although the competition between the races was a fact, the diplomats of Japan had avoided talking about it and newspapers and journals had refrained from discussing it. This was because they did not want to rouse the Westerners. They hoped that in the international competition, Japan would form a union with the Western countries to oppose China and Korea. That was why the Japanese government endeavoured to align its foreign policies with those of Europe. Troops were sent to China during the Boxer Rebellion with a view to supporting the Western powers as they attempted to punish China. Increasingly, Japan's foreign policies and national arguments had become directed towards unity with countries not of her own race and confronting those of the same race as herself. But, the Nihonjin stressed, the situation in international politics was one in which the peoples of the West opposed the peoples of the East. Because of this, cooperation between Japan and China was a necessity. If the Japanese, who were a dynamic people, would help and join hands with the Chinese, then the two countries would be able to preserve their national independence. But if Japan were to stand alone in this world of racial confrontation, then her future would be doomed. (59)

But as the article in the Nihonjin pointed out, not only government leaders, but many Japanese writers and newspapers had doubts about Japan's role in championing the Asian nations against the advances of the Western countries. They were beginning to think

(59) "The future of the Japanese nation", in Nihonjin, 20th February 1903, paraphrased by Oka, *ibid.*, p. 43.

that Japan would have to cooperate with the Western powers if she wanted to preserve her national independence. The Japanese who had a historical relationship with China should help the latter to achieve stability. But they must also have the cooperation of the Western powers to attain this goal. A situation in which the powers selfishly scrambled for concessions in China and competed with one another in establishing their respective spheres of interests was no solution to the China problem. Instead of following every action of the powers, Japan, equipped with better knowledge of the state of affairs in China, should try to enlighten the West on the necessity of cooperation with a view to maintaining peace in the Far East.

During the Boxer Rebellion, the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun which staunchly supported this line of argument advocated that the powers cooperate in preserving China. It very much regretted that the military activities of the Western countries had been motivated by "greed" and "opportunism". These Western powers had tried to further their own interests at a time when the Chinese government and rebels were engaged in hostilities. The paper urged that Japan refrain from doing the same and send troops to China only to protect Japanese lives and interests. Japan should fulfil her duty as China's neighbour by asking the powers to act with one mind in preserving China's sovereign rights. (60)

According to the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, the agreement between the Western powers to maintain the status quo in China was not enough guarantee for the restoration of China's independence. It merely perpetuated the situation in which China had no power to safeguard the lives and properties of her own people as well as those of the foreigners. The principle of preservation of China would

(60) "The China Incident", TNNS, 14th June, 1900, p. 2.

become a dead letter if the pledges made by the powers were not backed up by the restoration of sovereign rights and territories to the Chinese government. As long as this was not achieved, such declarations of 'preservation' would only produce negative results for peace in the Far East. Questioning the validity of the "preservation of China" as agreed upon by the powers, the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said,

"... First we must be sure about the exact meaning of the 'preservation of China' as agreed upon by the powers. Does it mean the maintenance of China's political and social stability? Does it refer to the preservation of China's territories? Or does it mean the preservation of China's sovereign rights? If it is the first, then is the partial stability in the political and social order in China with an absent Emperor and Imperial Court to be preserved? If it is China's territories that is in question, are then the perpetual leases of her territories and the unlimited military occupations of vast areas part of the 'preservation'? Not only are China's administrative and judicial rights disregarded when she is made to recognize the validity of leases and the occupations of her territories, but she also has to tolerate a system in which the foreign consular jurisdictional rights are allowed to remain in the settlements of the respective powers...."(61)

But such wariness of the Western powers' intentions in the Far East all but vanished with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902. The Russian threat looked like being contained with the promise from England to cooperate in maintaining general peace in the Far East. This new understanding with England brought about a feeling of comparative security. Moreover, the Japanese public was intoxicated with its consciousness of the country's new status as the ally and valued friend of a world power. S.L. Gulick observed that

"... With the advance of Russian aggression in

(61) "The meaning of the preservation of China", TNNS, 25th September, 1900, p. 2.

Manchuria, there was danger that Japan would again be thrown into anti-foreign agitation, but announcement of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement in 1902 dispelled that danger and evoked the enthusiasm of the people...."(62)

If Japan's new relationship with England did not break down in Japan all antipathy to the white race, it greatly reduced the Japanese fear of Western domination of Asia and hence her concern for the plight of China. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun changed its tone with regard to the preservation of China. In an editorial article in March, 1902, it said that the Chinese government leaders had only themselves to blame for the critical period after 1895 when the powers competed with one another to establish their respective spheres of influence in China. Fortunately for the Chinese government, these powers had now jointly agreed to discard their policies of invasion. It said that in 1901, an understanding had been reached between England, Germany and France whereby England agreed to open the Yangtze region to the powers. Also, the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been concluded with a view to guaranteeing the "open door" in China and giving all the powers equal rights in that country. Nevertheless, the problems which China had brought about in international relations must be removed by herself. If the Chinese leaders remained unawakened and persisted in their unenlightened policies, then the respite in the Far East which the powers had helped to bring about would not last long and China would still find herself in deep waters. The Chinese government and people must exert themselves so as to prevent any calamities which might affect countries which had friendly relations with them.(63)

(62) Sydney L. Gulick, The White Peril in the Far East, New York, 1905, p.65.

(63) "On the self-awakening of the Chinese government leaders", TNNS, 4th March, 1902, p.2.

This relaxed attitude towards the Western nations can also be detected in the "Objectives of the China Association", a document relating to the establishment of the Shina Kyokai in 1902. The professed goal of this Association of which Konoe Atsumaro was a founding member, was to spread education which would "renovate civilization in China" and promote trade between Japan and China with a view to strengthening the friendship of the two countries. The document said it was to the credit of the Western countries that they had endeavoured to assist in the development of China. The least that Japan could do was to catch up with them,

"Universal brotherhood is the great moral obligation of the human race If nations cannot share their benefits and learn from one another to compensate for their own shortcomings so that civilization is attained to procure happiness for mankind, then 'universal brotherhood' has no real meaning. We have heard that the European and American nations are taking upon themselves the task of guiding and enlightening other countries and venturing into great difficulties to engage in the educational and exploratory activities in China. We must think highly of their chivalrous disposition. As there has been a historical and special relationship between Japan and China, the existing friendship of the two countries has to remain on such a basis. Would it not be improper of the Japanese if they treated [the development of China] with negligence, procrastination and hesitation? Should we not feel ashamed in front of those adventurous European and American peoples?"(64)

Some were beginning to have doubts about the case for the alignment of Japan and China based on the proximity of race and culture. The revival of the rumour of the yellow peril in the early twentieth century threatened Japanese political life in a new way. The Japanese who were emerging from Asian backwardness felt that they were being excluded from participation in international politics. Supporters of the argument for cooperation with the Western countries began to question

(64) "The purpose of establishing the China Association", collected in Nikki, op.cit., Fuzoku Bunsho, p. 415.

the theory of cultural and racial affinity between Japan and China. An editorial in the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun in late 1900 said the Japanese and Chinese peoples were no more affiliated to one another, racially and linguistically, than the Teutonic race was to the Latin race. The Chinese influence in Japan's education, the article pointed out, had diminished considerably over the past decade. The study of the Chinese language in Japan had declined in popularity and importance owing to the fact that it had contributed little to Japan's technological advancement which was vital to her in this competitive world. Even the validity of the belief that the two peoples had shared the same language was becoming more and more questionable and it was doubtful whether the traditional concept of cultural and racial affinity had any real importance in deciding the future relationship of the two countries:

"... We attach importance to the mutual benefits of a peaceful trading relationship with our neighbour; we value among the Chinese people talented businessmen who are trustworthy, hard-working, economical and skilful, those who excel in governing themselves in provincial politics and those who are brave, persevering and ready to embrace hardship in military affairs. As there has been thousands of years of friendship between Japan and China, there are natural sympathies between the two countries and we are deeply concerned about the future and destiny of China. Hence it is our long cherished hope that our friendship will grow so that Japan's rights and interests will not be opposed and advancement and progress will not be hindered. But we not only have to refute the narrow context of the outdated argument of China and Japan having a relationship comparable to that between the lips and the teeth, we must also expel the unnecessary fears which have been aroused by the idea of the 'yellow peril', an unenlightened concept entertained by the Europeans at the moment..."⁽⁶⁵⁾

(65) "On cultural and racial affinity", TNNS, 29th September, 1900, p. 2.

In face of the suspicion and fear which had been engendered in the West by the idea of ^{the} "yellow peril", many Japanese believed that they had to try still harder to make themselves accepted by the powers into their ranks. The de-emphasis on Japan's racial and cultural links with China was indicative of a widespread anxiety regarding Japan's future relationship with the West. The Jiji Shimbun which had described the decision of England to form an alliance with an Asian nation as "history-making" and expressed great satisfaction with Japan's achievement in the 1902 alliance said that Japan was more concerned at the possible continuation of the rumour after the Russo-Japanese war than with the outcome of the war itself. (66) The Nihonjin said in 1903 that the speculation of a Japanese victory had aroused a fear of Japan among the white nations. This was because the defeat of Russia would mean a loss of face and prestige for the "Aryan race". The Russians, out of self-interest, were spreading the rumour to prejudice the white people against Japan. Now that Japan had acquired a higher standing in international politics, she must try to remove this racial prejudice of the white nations. (67)

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(66) "The Manchurian question and the racial question", 11th October, 1903 and "Comments on Current Affairs Column", 29th November, 1903, Jiji Shimbun, quoted in Oka, op.cit., p.41.

(67) Susagawa Kiyoshi, "The need for paying attention to the development of hostility of the alien race", Nihonjin, 5th October, 1903, Oka, ibid., p.41.

The defeat which Japan suffered at the hands of the Western powers after the Sino-Japanese war led her to believe even more strongly in the need for cooperation with China to preserve Asian integrity. At the same time, she was aware of her superior strength and advancement in modernization among the countries in the East. Many Japanese believed that they were entitled to a leading role in the Asian struggle against Western domination.

As changes came over Japan's political life in the early twentieth century, however, Japan also became conscious of her changing status in Asia. Many Japanese began to see a better future for Japan in cooperating with the West. In aspiring to become an equal of the Western powers, they took a new view of China and Asia in general. The sense of community with Asia came to be challenged by a sense of detachment. These two seemingly conflicting views -- identification with Asia and alignment with the West -- were to be found in coexistence in the developing notion of Japan being a bridge between the Eastern and Western world.

CHAPTER THREE

CHINA'S IMAGE OF JAPAN AS AN ALLY, 1895-1904

European expansion in the Far East increased with the Russian penetration into Manchuria after the Sino-Japanese war. China's traditional attitude of condescension towards Japan had not been swept away by Japan's victory in 1895, but diplomatic necessity forced her to see that Japan would be a useful ally in her struggle against the West. The Chinese realized that Japan's victory had been made possible by modernization. And in face of growing pressure from the Western powers for concessions and spheres of influence, they began to turn towards Japan for support with their reforms and military defence.

Despite the enmity which the war of 1894-1895 had engendered, many Chinese realized soon after the war that they had to make up with Japan to counter the Russian threat. When Li Hung-chang negotiated a defensive alliance with Russia in 1896 against future Japanese aggression, many in China viewed the forthcoming Sino-Russian understanding with grave misgivings. Wang Chih-ch'un, another leading official in Peking, likened the Russians to the Mongols in the late thirteenth century who, after having suppressed the tribe of Chin with Chinese help, proceeded to conquer China. He feared that Russia, emboldened by her treaty with China, would first direct her blows against Japan, and then devour China. He believed that China had made a big mistake in making an alliance with Russia and advocated that an offer of alliance be made instead to Japan on China's initiative.⁽¹⁾

(1) Ch'en chi, "On Russian support for China", in Ch'en Chung-i, ed., Huang-Ch'ao Ching-Shih-wen San-pien (Supplementary collection of articles on social themes), Shanghai, 1898, Vol. 4, p. 18.

In fact, it was generally reckoned by the Chinese that it had been a mistake for China and Japan to go to war against each other. Cheng Kuan-ying, the scholar comprador, in one of his essays on frontier defence, said that as the two countries were both situated in Asia, fighting one another would only benefit a third power. He proposed that China profess her good will to Japan, forget the past enmity and cooperate with Japan to bring about the revival of Asia.⁽²⁾

Kung Hsin-ming suggested that in order to persuade Japan to accept the offer of alliance, China needed to emphasize Russia's ambition of engulfing East Asia and the urgency for Japan and China to end their disputes.⁽³⁾ Japanese attention would also have to be drawn to the imminent completion of the Siberian Railway. Kung also reckoned that this would strengthen the argument for a triple alliance between Japan, China and Korea to forestall any moves that Russia might make once her railway was completed.⁽⁴⁾

Chinese response to the Japanese overtures of 1897-1898

The Japanese mission headed by Kamio Mitsuomi to Hupeh in late 1897 evoked enthusiastic response from the group of Hunanese reformers led by K'ang Yu-wei. K'ang believed that the Japanese were sincere in their offer of friendship and assistance. He drew up a statement of his reasons for an alignment with Japan and England against Germany and Russia and went about among the high officials in the government urging them to accept such a policy. He also submitted a memorial

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- (2) Chang Kuan-ying, "On frontier defence, part six", in Ch'en Chung-i. ed., *ibid.*, Vol. 49, p. 7.
 (3) "Preface by Ts'ai Erh-k'ang", in Y.J. Allan and Tsai Erh-k'ang, Chung Tung Chan-chi pen-mo, op cit., Vol. 1. Part 1, p. 8.
 (4) "Preface by Kung Hsin-ming," *ibid.*, Vol. 1, Part 1 p. 10.

putting forward his argument:

"... We and Japan are interdependent, whereas Russia and Germany have ambitions in the Orient that are not to [Japan's] advantage. Because she was a small nation, long before the Sino-Japanese war, she had reformed her institutions and strengthened herself; and she sought to maintain her independence by increasing her prestige. Although by her victory [over us] she acquired Liaotung, she was unable to hold on to it. Under such circumstances she cannot but detest Russia and Germany, and is therefore sincere in asking to join with us and to give us assistance..."⁽⁵⁾

Central to all Chinese reformers' themes of defence against foreign aggression was the need for reforms and reconstruction to be carried out in the country. Aside from the Russian image of a strong Western power threatening to invade China, the hope and belief that China could learn from Japan in the way of modernization were equally important factors which increased the weight of the argument for cooperation with Japan. As T'ang Tsai-ch'ang, a follower of K'ang Yu-wei, pointed out in an essay, "On China should form an alliance with England and Japan":

"... Cooperation with England and Japan is the way to cure the symptoms, if not the cause of China's illness The way to make England an ally is through Japan and the way to make Japan an ally of China is through learning And the only way for China to acquire practical knowledge is through learning from Japan."⁽⁶⁾

It was widely accepted among the reformers that "organizations which sought to revive Asia" had their origins in Japan and those organizations had the objective of making China strong so that Japan could look to China for support in keeping the Western powers out of East Asia. Some maintained that Japan had fought the war with China out of self-defence. And if China would exert herself and carry out reforms to

(5) K'ang Yu-wei, K'ang Nan-hai Tzu-p'ien Nien-p'u (Chronological autobiography of K'ang Yu-wei), collected in Wu-hsü Pien-fa op.cit., Part 4, pp. 138-139, 144.

(6) T'ang Tsai-ch'ang, "On China should form an alliance with England and Japan," Wu-hsü Pien-fa, ibid., Part 3, pp. 103-105.

strengthen the country, then there was little doubt that Japan would be willing to become her ally. Failing this, China would sooner or later be engulfed by Russia.⁽⁷⁾ Again, the Sino-Japanese war was viewed by many as a lesson for China because it had the effect of making the government and people aware of the need to exert themselves and make a strong nation out of China.⁽⁸⁾

The Chinese reformers' favourable response to the Japanese overtures can be explained by their anxiety about the threat of Russian and German aggressions in early 1898. At the same time, their interests in and admiration for Japanese success in modernization led them to view Japan as more than a powerful country that might be of passing assistance to China in the current crisis. For them, Japan was an example of an awakened Asian nation. China should learn and draw strength from Japan's experience in reforming her institutions.

The need to cooperate with Japan was also appreciated by Chinese officials, especially those in the provincial governments. Chang Chih-tung responded favourably to the Japanese approach but he had reservations about including England in the understanding.⁽⁹⁾ He reckoned that all foreign powers were taking advantage of the fact that Germany had occupied Kiaochow Bay to further their aggressive policies against China. Entering into an understanding with some of these powers was, in his opinion, only to temporize and avoid making more

(7) "On the necessity for Asian countries to retain a close relationship as that between the lips and the teeth", in Yu Pao-hsien et al. (ed.), Huang Ch'ao Hsü-ai Wen-pien (A collection of essays by writers of the reform movement), Shanghai, 1902/3, Vol. 58, p. 28.

(8) Huang Ching-lan, "On the benefit which has been done to China by the war with Japan", in Ch'en Chung - i, ed., Huang Ch'ao Ching-shih-wen San-pien, op.cit., Vol.5, pp. 23-25.

(9) Despatch from governor-general of Wuhan Chang Chih-tung to Tsungli Yamen, I, 17th January, 1898, Ch'ing Kuang-hsü-ch'ao Chung-Jih chiao-she shih-liao (Documents on Sino-Japanese relations in the Kuang-hsü period), Peking, 1932-3, Vol.51, p.12. This source will hereafter be cited as Documents: Kuang-hsü.

enemies than necessary.⁽¹⁰⁾ He stressed that if, however, China was to include England in the entente, she would have to do so through Japan. He hoped that Japan would mediate between England and China and act as a restraining influence on the former, "cutting down her greed and aggressive designs in any demands that she might make on China."⁽¹¹⁾

Liu K'un-i, governor-general of Nanking, on the other hand, saw England as a more suitable ally than Japan. He was of the opinion that while Russia, Germany and France all harboured covetous designs on Chinese territories, England was a "commercial power" which was only interested in expanding her trade with China. Nevertheless, he accepted Chang's view that China needed Japan's cooperation and advocated that an agreement of cooperative actions be made between China, Japan and England, thus enabling England, on the one hand, to protect her commerce in China, and Japan and China, on the other hand, to safeguard their territories.⁽¹²⁾ In January, 1898, Liu sent a despatch to the Ministry of Defence supporting Chang Chih-tung in the latter's proposal to accept the Japanese offer of cooperation.⁽¹³⁾ Ch'en Pao-chen, governor of Hunan, thought the matter could not be delayed. Like Chang, he thought that the inclusion of England was more a matter of necessity than desirability as he was afraid that England would soon join in the scramble for territories if China did not enter into any agreement with her. He also believed that Japan could counteract England's influence and he was hoping that Kiaochow Bay would be saved by Anglo-Japanese intervention.⁽¹⁴⁾

(10) Despatch from Chang Chih-tung to Tsungli Yamen, 16th January, 1898, Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'üan-chi (collected memorials, works and papers by Chang Chih-tung). Peking, 1937, Vol. 79, p. 25.

(11) *ibid.*

(12) Despatch from Liu K'un-i to Ministry of Defence, 17th December, 1897. Wang Liang (ed), Ch'ing-chi Wai-chiao Shih-liao (Documents on the foreign relations of the last two reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty), Peking, 1932, Vol. 127, pp. 33-34.

(13) Despatch from southern commissioner Liu K'un-i to Ministry of Defence, 25th January, 1898, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol. 51, p. 14.

(14) Despatch from the governor of Hunan Ch'en Pao-chen to the Tsungli Yamen, 18th January, 1898, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol. 51, p. 13.

But the idea held by the provincial governors of forming an alliance with England was soon discarded. England's offer of a loan to construct the Canton-Hankow Railway aroused suspicions and was seen as an attempt to consolidate her stronghold in the Yangtze region. Chang Chih-tung felt that if China accepted the English loan, ~~then~~ the partition of the country would become a fact rather than just a threat.⁽¹⁵⁾ Even Liu was convinced that such a move on the part of England was indicative of her intention to occupy the Yangtze area and that she was acting beyond the limits of a "commercial power". He went as far as to fortify the region for the purpose of defending the Yangtze region against England's "penetration".⁽¹⁶⁾ The minister of trade, Sheng Hsüan-huai, however, felt that China should accept the loan for the construction of railways. He insisted that Chang and Liu reconsider cooperating with England. His argument was that China should cooperate with the powers - America, England and Japan - to expand trade.⁽¹⁷⁾ The Chinese government decided to accept the loan but the talk of making England an ally lost its popularity.

Moreover, the Chinese government had reservations about entering into a formal alliance with any one country in particular. It had to take care not to offend Russia. In reply to Chang Chih-tung's proposal that China enter into a cooperative relationship with Japan, the Ministry of Defence warned,

"The government advises against your making any ill-considered promises to the Japanese for fear

(15) Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'üan-chi, op.cit., Vol.79, p. 20.

(16) Liu K'un-i I-chi (Collection of works by Liu K'un-i), Peking, 1959, Vol.5, p. 2211.

(17) Wang Wen-chih (ed.), Yu-chai Ts'un-kao Ch'u-kan, (A collection of memorials, telegrams and letters by the Chinese industrialist Sheng Hsüan-huai), Shanghai, 1939, Vol 32, p. 2.

of invoking Russian invasion. Although a cooperative relationship with Japan, in its own rights, is not a disadvantage to China, it is feared that a catastrophe will inevitably result on China's northern frontiers... once the Sino-Japanese entente is made..."(18)

And the Tsungli Yamen said,

"Russia's ferocity is getting more intense every-day and all countries fear her England and Japan are soliciting China's cooperation merely because they want to use her as a bulwark against Russia; they have no intention of helping us..."(19)

When appealed to by Liu K'un-i to consider the policy of cooperating with England, the Chinese government had this to say,

"The English offer of friendship cannot be accepted at face value The government is aware of England's intention [to first enter into some sort of agreement with China and then proceed to occupy Chinese territories].... For the time being, we can only temporize affairs with the powers. If China enters into cooperative agreements with only one or two countries and neglects the rest, she will be creating a situation in which the powers will be roused to disputing with one another. The government does not think this is a wise move..."(20)

It is appropriate to reflect here that the Tokyo government was not disposed towards the idea of a rapprochement with China over the 1897 - 1898 period. Itō who was prime minister from January to June 1898 hoped to see a progressive government in China but his government was cautious in its use of diplomacy over the period of the powers' "scramble for concessions" in China. The hope for an alliance between the two countries was entertained by Japanese military agents and diplomats on the one hand and Chinese provincial governors and reformers on the other. The fact that neither group was in the centre of power largely accounted for the failure in implementing the plan for closer Sino-Japanese cooperation in the face of increasing Western encroachment.

(18) Despatch from Ministry of Defence to Chang Chih-tung, 4th January, 1898, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.51, p. 9b.

(19) Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'üan-chi, op.cit., Vol.79 pp. 26-27.

(20) Ch'ing-chi Wai-chiao Shih-liao, op.cit., Vol.127, p. 34.

Nevertheless, one can still say that during the period from the German occupation of Shantung to the eve of the coup d'état in September, 1898, the sense of urgency surrounding the need for cooperation with Japan reached a peak in China. This was also indicated by the state of euphoria caused by the visit of Itō to China in September, 1898, just over two months after he had ceased to head the government at home.

Before Itō set off from Japan, he had been granted an audience by the Meiji Emperor.⁽²¹⁾ His visit to China, though unofficial, was one of observation. In July, 1898, the Japanese Chinsai Jihō wrote about the forthcoming visit,

".... Prince Itō is one of the top figures in East Asia at the present time. Being mindful of the past and looking with great insight to the future, he works towards the maintenance of peace in the East. He has expressed regrets that the political leaders in China are still living in a dream and now he is travelling to China to discuss a plan of safeguarding East Asia with the Chinese government"⁽²²⁾

Certainly, it was viewed by the Chinese as more than an unofficial tour. It was seen as a gesture on the part of Itō to foster anew relationship which had been lost between the two countries. Itō himself said, in a poem which he had composed on his way from Korea to China, that he was going to Peking with the "humble and loyal intention of re-establishing the old tie which had existed between Japan and China".⁽²³⁾ And as Mori Taijiro, one of the men who travelled to China with Itō, put it:

"... Part of Asia is occupied by Europe. What but conscientious cooperation between Japan and China can prevent the catastrophe which will soon befall Asia...."⁽²⁴⁾

(21) *ibid*, Vol. 134, p. 19.

(22) Chinsai Jihō, 21st July, 1898, reprinted in the Tientsin Kuo-Wen-Pao, 30th August, 1898, collected in *Wu-hsü Pien-fa*, op.cit., Part 3, p. 395.

(23) Itō's poem, translated and printed in the Tientsin Kuo-Wen-Pao, 15th September, 1898. Collected in *Wu-hsü Pien-fa*, *ibid* Part 3, p. 404

(24) Poem by Mori Taijiro in a banquet given in honour of Itō in Tientsin on 12th September, 1898, reprinted by Kuo-Wen-Pao, 14th September, 1898, Collected in *Wu-hsü Pien-fa*, *ibid.*, Part 3, p. 403.

On reaching Tientsin, Itō was rather overwhelmed by his reception from Chinese of all positions who greeted him with requests that he give assistance to China.⁽²⁵⁾ A few days later, on his arrival in Peking, he was welcomed by a memorial to the Emperor, praising his capabilities and requesting the Emperor to grant Itō an audience in which an alliance between the two countries might be discussed.⁽²⁶⁾ One enthusiastic memorial suggested that the Emperor employ Itō as adviser to the Chinese government, since with his precious experience he was easily the man best qualified to assist China in carrying out reforms.⁽²⁷⁾ During the audience, Kuang Hsü asked Itō to enlighten him on the methods of carrying out reforms in China. Itō, however, declined the request saying that he felt he was not in a position to oblige and insisted that his visit was a personal and unofficial trip.⁽²⁸⁾ Nevertheless, in various conversations with the Chinese government officials, Itō talked about China's land-use, industries, commerce and the need to introduce a new military system.⁽²⁹⁾

But no official negotiations were undertaken for a Sino-Japanese alliance. Itō's "mission" of "re-establishing the old tie" between the two countries probably consisted of no more than a wish to see reforms carried out in China as the necessary step towards restoring stability in the Far East.

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- (25) Itō's letter to an unidentified friend, dated 13th September, appears in Komatsu Midori, ed., Itō Kō Zenshū, Tokyo, 1928, Vol. I, p. 178. See Richard C. Howard, "Japan's Role in the Reform Movement of K'ang Yu-wei" in Lo Jung-pang, ed., K'ang Yu-wei, a Biography and a Symposium, op.cit., p. 301.
- (26) The memorial was submitted by Ch'en Mou-ting on 14th September, 1898. Ch'ing-chi Wai-chiao Shih-liao, op.cit., Vol. 134, pp. 19-20.
- (27) The proposal was made by Fu K'uei, a chu-jen of Kuei-chow province, Wang Yün-sheng, Liu-shih nien lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen (Relations between China and Japan in the past sixty years). Tientsin, 1932-34, Vol. 3, pp. 267-272.
- (28) Itō was probably not prepared for the honour of an audience with the Chinese Emperor and felt that he could not 'advise' Kuang-hsü on the matter. "Conversation between Prince Itō and the Emperor", report in Ch'ang-Yen-Pao, 30th October, 1898, Wu-hsü Pien-fa, op.cit., Part 3, p. 447.
- (29) Reports in Kuo-Wen-Pao, 21st and 29th September, 1898, Collected in Wu-hsü Pien-fa, ibid., Part 3, pp. 425-426

However, the arrival of Itō in Peking and the Emperor's readiness to grant him an audience may well have been a decisive factor in persuading the Empress Dowager to carry out the coup d'état that brought the reform movement of 1898 to a sudden end. Throughout 1897 and 1898 when Chinese reformers responded readily to the Japanese offer of official friendship, the Tzu Hsi faction had viewed the situation with disfavour. Tzu Hsi and Li Hung-chang were particularly uneasy about the possibility of Kuang Hsü becoming an object of Japanese sympathy under the influence of K'ang and his party. Rumour to the effect that Itō had come to China at K'ang's request and was in Peking for the purpose of plotting against her could only have convinced Tzu Hsi that prompt action was necessary to protect her position of power.⁽³⁰⁾ Thus the day of the Emperor's audience with Itō was followed almost immediately by the enforced seclusion of the Emperor and in a few days, by the decapitation and imprisonment of those reformers who had not fled the country.

Chinese efforts to foster an alliance with Japan after the coup d'état

After having fled to Japan, K'ang and Liang began to make reckless and desperate appeals to Japanese leaders to intervene in restoring the Emperor to power. They hoped to solicit help from Japan to save China from the unenlightened rule of the conservative faction in Peking. As Liang Ch'i-ch'ao saw it, Manchu-Chinese rivalry in the government was the main factor which had caused the coup. According to him, the basic difference between Kuang Hsü and Tzu Hsi was that the Emperor

(30) On 17th September, the Manchu princes Ch'ing and Tuan warned the Empress Dowager that Itō's audience with Kuang Hsü on 20th September would endanger her position. The Empress Dowager was also supposed to have discovered a secret edict from the Emperor to K'ang Yu-wei urging K'ang to secure the help of England and Japan in rescuing him from the Empress Dowager's faction. See Su Chitzu, Ch'ing-ting Wu-hsü Ch'ao-pien chi in Wu-hsü Pien-fa, *ibid.*, Part 1, p. 344.

wanted to appoint Chinese with progressive ideas to the government while Tz'u Hsi insisted on using reactionary Manchu officials. The progressive Chinese faction aimed at reforming the country and tended to look to England and Japan which it believed would support China's struggle for national independence, whereas the Manchus depended on Russia for protection and support to remain in power. In this way, the rivalry was extended to China's policies. He intimated to Ōkuma that if the Tz'u Hsi government remained contented to be Russia's puppet, then the 'balance of power' in the Far East would soon be upset and the partition of China would follow. When this happened, the most that Japan could get out of the partition was Fukien and it would even be doubtful whether she would be able to keep the province. Should the European powers take concerted action to invade the East, the entire Asia would be engulfed and Japan would not be able to preserve her own national independence. China could only be saved by reforms and as long as the Emperor remained in confinement, this could not materialize. Hence the safety of Japan was closely linked with the return to power of Kuang Hsü. As China was at the moment threatened by grave danger from the West, she had to "look to Japan, a friend, for support to combat her foreign foes".⁽³¹⁾ Wang Chao who had also fled to Japan as a result of the coup told Konoe Atsumaro that it was largely owing to the Manchu government's fear of Japan that it had turned to Russia for support. He also warned that while the Emperor was in captivity, and hence no longer in a position to counteract the influence of Tz'u Hsi's faction, it was to be expected that more agreements would be sought by Peking with Russia.⁽³²⁾

(31) Letter from Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to Ōkuma, 26th October, 1898, NGB, Vol. 31, Part 1 (1954), No. 601. pp. 696-698.

(32) Conversation between Wang Chao and Konoe Atsumaro, 13th February, 1899, collected in Nikki, op.cit., Vol. 2, p.273.

The Chinese reformers argued that the question of China's national independence, and hence the safety of the Far East was inseparable from her reconstruction. That Japan had a special role to play in guiding China towards reform was given further emphasis by K'ang Yu-wei and Wang Chao in their separate conversations with Konoe, who maintained that Japan had a duty to lead Asian countries towards enlightenment. Wang requested Konoe, who was shortly to visit China, to advise the Empress Dowager and Yung Lu to refrain from taking extreme measures against Kuang Hsü. He and K'ang thought that Konoe's visit to China would enhance Japan's influence against Russian dominance in China's foreign relations. (33)

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao confided to Shiga Shigetake, writer and official at the Gaimushō, that he had reckoned, immediately after the coup, that Japan alone was enough to "put things right" in China, that is, see to it that Kuang Hsü was restored to the throne. But by the end of October, however, he realized that this was impractical and that it had to be done with the cooperation of Japan, England and America. He also expressed his hopes that this cooperative effort would eventually lead to a quadruple alliance between Japan, China, England and America. Liang told Shiga that once he secured Japan's agreement, he would travel to England and America to solicit help. He hoped that Japan, England and America would apply diplomatic pressure on Tzu Hsi to restore Kuang Hsü to power and impose an order on the Chinese government that 5,000,000 taels of gold be given annually to the Empress Dowager to keep her from meddling with government affairs. (34)

(33) *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 273-274. For discussions between K'ang and Konoe in November, 1898, see Vol 2. pp. 195-197.

(34) Interpreted negotiation between Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Shiga Shigetake, supplement to letter from Liang to Ōkuma, *NGB*, Vol. 31, Part 1, pp. 703-705. Liang also told Shiga that there was a revolutionary force brewing in southern China which aimed at overthrowing the dynasty. This revolutionary party also wanted a reconstruction of China. But Liang thought a revolution in China would inevitably invite foreign intervention and eventually partition. He would, as he told Shiga, rather resort to the diplomatic intervention of Japan which, in his opinion, would save the dynasty on the one hand and enable China to follow a line of reform on the other. p. 704.

There was little evidence to show the coup d'état of 21st September, 1898 had been effected with any support from a foreign power. Although K'ang Yu-wei suspected that Tzu Hsi had made an agreement with Russia whereby she promised Russia preferential rights in Manchuria in return for Russia's support to keep the Manchus in power, he did not think that any foreign power, including Russia, had played any part in the coup.⁽³⁵⁾ The motive was to eliminate from the government all 'radical elements' which were driving at a reformed and new policy. The killing of six radical members of the reform party and the expulsion of several progressive officials from the government seem to indicate this. The coup was hence a purely domestic affair in Chinese politics. The reformers' intimation to the Japanese leaders of the government's pro-Russian leanings embarrassed the Peking government in its relations with the Japanese authorities. Requests were repeatedly made by Peking to the Japanese government to expel K'ang and his party.⁽³⁶⁾

This delicate situation which had arisen immediately after the coup was also viewed with concern by Chang Chih-tung. Although Chang saw merit in and was sympathetic to some of the reform ideas advanced by K'ang, Liang and other reformers, he also disagreed with elements of their philosophy and method. During the Hundred Days Reform, he had remained relatively aloof from the activities of the reform party and had not been considered by the latter as one of their affiliates.⁽³⁷⁾

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- (35) Henry Cockburn "Memorandum of Conversation with K'ang Yu-wei on voyage from Shanghai to Hongkong, 27th-29th September, 1898," in Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence respecting the affairs of China, presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty the Queen, March, 1899, China No. 1, Inclosure 2 in No. 401, Vol. CIX, pp. 308-310.
- (36) In fact the Chinese government had sent a telegramme to Li Sheng-to, minister to Japan, to have K'ang and Liang assassinated in Japan. Wang Shu-huai, op.cit., p. 231.
- (37) For Chang Chih-tung's relations with the reformers in the pre-coup period, see William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China, Harvard East Asian studies, series 54, 1971, pp. 138-145.

When Kamio Mitsuomi was sent by the Japanese Army General Staff to China, he specifically went to Hupeh with a view to discussing Sino-Japanese cooperation with Chang Chih-tung. As Chang believed that China needed to strengthen herself, he welcomed the Japanese proposal to train Chinese students in Japanese military, agricultural and technical schools. By the time the coup d'état took place, Chang had made arrangements with Kamio and the Japanese chargé d'affaires in Shanghai, Odagiri Masunosuke, that the Japanese would supervise the training of Chinese troops in Hupeh. He therefore viewed the activities of the reformers in Japan with misgivings as he feared that the Japanese might be led to suspect him of being pro-Russian and this would adversely affect his plans. In November, 1898, he requested Segawa, the Japanese consul in Hankow, to inform the Japanese government that the stay of K'ang and his party would not only "injure the good feeling of friendship which existed already between both countries" but also prevent him from carrying out his plan to employ Japanese military instructors to train Chinese troops in Hupeh. (38)

At the same time, Chang feared that the delicate situation in the relations between the two governments which had resulted from the reformers' desperate appeals to Japanese leaders might make the Empress Dowager suspicious of any dealings between himself and the Japanese. He thus told Segawa that he wished the Japanese government would request the Tsungli Yamen to authorize the southern trade commissioner, the northern trade commissioner and the governor-general of Wuhan (who was

(38) Chang's message was passed in Segawa's letter to Aoki, 2nd December, 1898, NGB, Vol. 31, Part 1, No. 612, p. 723. In a letter written to a friend, Ch'ien Hsün, in Shanghai on 23rd January, 1899, Chang also expressed his anxiety and regrets over the activities of K'ang and his party in Japan - activities which, in his words, were responsible for "jeopardizing the liaison between Japan and China", Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'üan-chi, op.cit., Vol. 157, pp. 31-32.

then Chang himself) to send out students to Japan as soon as possible. He had acted with caution, as he told Segawa, because he had hesitated to "act on his own authority" for fear of incurring "the suspicion of those in power." (39) Chang's hesitation in implementing his plan was also related by Odagiri in a letter to the deputy foreign minister in Tokyo. Odagiri described Chang as a "leading figure of the group advocating moderate reforms" whose actions had become "more and more cautious since the coup." (40)

Chang's attitude towards Sino-Japanese cooperation had not changed since the Japanese military mission approached him with an offer of assistance in late 1897 - one that was in favour of overcoming China's backwardness with the help of Japan without emphasizing the role of Japan as the guardian of Asian enlightenment. After the coup, Chang persistently urged the Japanese authorities to expel K'ang and the other reformers. This could have been due to his anxiety to act in accordance with the wishes of Tzu Hsi so as not to jeopardize his relations with the conservative faction in Peking. But a more important reason was that he genuinely believed that in doing so, he was acting in the interest of friendship between the two governments. Moreover, Chang was convinced that better and closer relations between Japan and China could be fostered on the governmental level. In securing his position in the government, Chang was not acting purely out of self-interest. He also hoped to use his influence with the Tzu Hsi faction to further his plan for a Sino-Japanese alliance.

Chang believed that there were those among the 'reactionary' officials in Peking who could be persuaded to accept his views regarding

(39) NGB, Vol. 31, Part 1, No. 612, p. 723.

(40) Odagiri's letter to deputy foreign minister in Tokyo, 21st December, 1898, NGB, Vol. 31, Part 1, No. 616, p. 725.

the rapprochement between China and Japan. He once told Odagiri,

"... The minister of defence, Yung Lu, is a wise man who is capable of seeing reasons in important matters. If he should secure friendship with the Japanese ministers, then the relations between China and Japan will be greatly benefited."⁽⁴¹⁾

Having secured the expulsion of K'ang from Japan in March, ^{betw}⁽⁴¹⁾ 1899, Chang proceeded to bring about a closer Sino-Japanese understanding. In early 1899, the Chief of staff of the Japanese army Kawakami Sōroku had sent his military officers to talk to provincial governors in southern China about the need for preparing the Chinese army for an eventual war with Russia. Kawakami's diary recorded that an understanding had been reached between his military emissaries and Chang Piao, a subordinate of Chang Chih-tung, on the "urgent measures" to be taken by the governor-general of Hukuang (Chang Chih-tung) and Liang-kiang (Liu K'un-i). It was agreed that in the interest of the country, the two governor-generals would exhort the Peking government to support their schemes of training 100,000 troops in their provinces and building torpedo-boats to fortify the Yangtze.⁽⁴²⁾ In April, the Japanese Army Colonel Fukushima Yasumasa visited Liu K'un-i at Nanking and Chang Chih-tung at Wuchang. During their meeting, Chang arranged with Fukushima that the latter would meet with Yung Lu to discuss matters relating to both countries. It was at Yung Lu's invitation that Fukushima, accompanied by Odagiri, arrived in Shanghai on 5th May.⁽⁴³⁾ Fukushima's decision to make the trip had also been made on the strength of foreign minister Aoki's approval.⁽⁴⁴⁾

(41) *ibid.*, p. 728.

(42) *Tōa Dobun Kai, Taishi Kaiko-Roku*, (Collection of materials about Japanese involved in China) Tokyo, 1936, 1941, part 2, p. 276.

(43) *Gaimushō Gaikō Bunshoka Shozō Bunsho*, Ōden, (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents kept in the Bureau of Foreign Affairs Papers, outgoing despatches) 13th April, 1899, Cited in Teshirogi Kinsuke, "Bojutsu Yori koshi ni itaru Kakumeipa to Henpōpa no Kōsho", *op.cit.*, pp. 246-247.

(44) *Taishi Kaiko Roku*, *op.cit.*, Part 2, p. 278.

That Odagiri had accompanied Fukushima on his visit to China was no coincidence. Odagiri had in fact left for Japan a short while ago to discuss his own mission to China with Aoki.⁽⁴⁵⁾ It was possible that he had taken Chang Chih-tung's hint that closer relations between the two governments could be cultivated through Yung Lu and made the trip to Tokyo to consult Aoki about the matter.

Soon after the arrival of the Japanese in China, Yung Lu arranged that Odagiri be given an audience with Tzu Hsi during which Odagiri would make an attempt to "obtain the Empress Dowager's consent to a plan which would bring about a secret liaison between Japan and China."⁽⁴⁶⁾ After this audience, Tzu Hsi appointed Liu Hsün and Ch'ing K'uan as emissaries to go to Japan on 8th July. News of the coming of the Chinese secret mission led to the rumour in Japan of closer military and economic cooperation and an alliance between the two countries.

There is no evidence to show that the question of a liaison between Japan and China was discussed between the Chinese emissaries and the Japanese government. It is even doubtful whether the Chinese mission was received by Japanese governmental leaders. Yamagata's reservations regarding the idea of a Sino-Japanese alliance⁽⁴⁷⁾ leads one to conclude that in 1899 the hopes for closer relations between the two countries vis-à-vis the Western powers were no more than wishful thinking on the part of some Chinese - and Japanese - officials. On the other hand, the hitherto pro-Russian attitude of Tzu Hsi and her supporters including Yung Lu raises doubts as to the sincerity of the Chinese mission in offering the Japanese government an alliance.

(45) Gaimushō Gaikō Bunshoka Shozō Bunsho, Ōden, 13th April, 1899. Cited in Teshirogi Kinsuke, op.cit., pp. 246-247.

(46) Taishi Kaiko Roku, op.cit., Part 2, p. 416.

(47) See previous Chapter.

Perhaps with the expulsion of K'ang Yu-wei from Japan and the safe confinement of the Emperor, Tzu Hsi's suspicion of a plot against her hatched by the Chinese reformist party with the help of the Japanese had subsided by the latter half of 1899. And it was just possible that she was beginning to come round to Chang Chih-tung's view that China needed Japanese help to reform her economic and military institutions.

What was important about this episode in Sino-Japanese relations was that some Chinese leaders saw in Japan an ally for China. They urged cooperation with Japan because they wanted Japanese help to strengthen Chinese defence. Chang Chih-tung's hopes for an alliance had little to do with the fact that the two countries shared a cultural and racial relationship. He was more concerned with China needing an ally against the Western powers especially Russia.

Chinese provincial leaders and the Tōa Dōbun Kai

The activities of Odagiri and Fukushima on the one hand and Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i on the other to bring about an alliance between the two countries had ended in failure. Yet the policy of friendship and assistance to China that had been inaugurated by Kawakami in late 1897 was not entirely without result. In early 1899, Chang Chih-tung sent to Japan his first contingent of Chinese students including his grandson Chang Ho-k'un. While the students were sent to military schools, Chang's grandson was sent to the School of Learning for Peers (Kizoku Gakushuin). This arrangement had been made between Chang and Odagiri who persuaded Chang that not only would Chinese officials have to send their subordinates abroad to study but they would also have to send their own relatives to Japan. In this way, they could be given the opportunity of receiving education alongside the ordinary students. This would enable them, when they finished, to inspire,

encourage and lead their subordinates. This, according to Odagiri, was the short-cut to making the nation strong.⁽⁴⁸⁾ This was, in fact, the first time that a Chinese student was admitted to the Kizoku Gakushuin. Konoe, who was at that time principal of the School, expressed his willingness to "undertake the responsibility of educating three to four students from the Chinese upper classes in the Gakushuin."⁽⁴⁹⁾

It was at about the same time that Konoe founded the Tōa Dōbun Kai with the objective of promoting cultural understanding between Japan and China. Tōa Dōbun Kai schools were set up in both countries. Konoe and his supporters were aiming at the cultivation of Sino-Japanese friendship on the unofficial level.⁽⁵⁰⁾ But the Society's activities were mainly supported by Chinese provincial government officials especially in Kiangsu and Hunan.

In fact, it had been the policy of the Tōa Dōbun Kai, since its foundation, to promote cooperation with Chinese officials. The Society was formed by the combination of Inukai Ki's Tōa Kai and Munakata Kotarō's Dōbun Kai. Inukai, the 'brain' of China policy in Ōkuma's cabinet from June to November, 1898, had always sympathized with Chinese reformers and revolutionaries. After the coup of September, 1898, he wanted to give support to K'ang and his party in restoring Kuang Hsü to power. Inukai had hoped that by cooperating with the "progressive elements" in China, he could bring about a new Sino-Japanese relationship in the interest of both countries.⁽⁵¹⁾ Munakata, on the other hand,

(48) "Correspondence between Odagiri and Konoe relating to the application of Chang Ho-k'un, grandson of Chang Chih-tung, to enter the Japanese Gakushuin", 7th January, 1899, Nikki, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp. 256-257.

(49) ibid.

(50) For activities of the Tōa Dōbun Kai, see Chapter Six.

(51) See M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. 3-4, 75-77.

did not think that the K'ang-Liang group could save China and he favoured gaining the friendship of the Peking government through Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i. He was of the opinion that in affording K'ang and Liang asylum, the Japanese government was not handling the China question to the advantage of Japan.⁽⁵²⁾ Munakata and his supporters in the Dōbun Kai believed that the activities of K'ang and his party were hazardous for the stability of the Manchu dynasty. The Japanese government, however, should try to preserve the Manchus and prevent the partition of China by the powers.

At a conference held in preparation for the amalgamation of the Tōa Kai and the Dōbun Kai on 24th October, 1898, the two divergent views were put forward. Konoe, founder of the future Tōa Dōbun Kai, proposed that the two parties compromise their differences and put an emphasis on the need to preserve China.⁽⁵³⁾ As a result, the Conference resolved that the Tōa Dōbun Kai be established with the objective of upholding the "preservation of Chinese integrity". With this vague declaration, the China policy of the Tōa Dōbun Kai was directed towards supporting the Tzu Hsi government with a view to maintaining the status quo in China.⁽⁵⁴⁾ The promotion of cooperation with Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i in the training of Chinese students became

(52) Taishi Kaiko Roku, op.cit., Part 2, p. 380.

(53) Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden (Meiji hyakunen-shi Shōsho, Nos. 22-24), Tokyo, 1966, Part 2, p. 601.

(54) In fact, when immediately after the coup K'ang and the other reformers appealed to Konoe for protection and help, Konoe had said that Japan should refrain from taking any course of action so long as Tzu Hsi's policy towards the reformer refugees in Japan remained undecided. See Nikki, Vol 2, p. 156. Moreover, when K'ang was sent away from Japan under the order of the Japanese government, Konoe raised no objection. He even intervened to have K'ang given financial assistance in order to facilitate his departure. Nikki, Vol. 2, pp. 238, 239, 293, 294.

the Society's main concern. And during the first decade of its existence, the Society's educational programme benefited primarily the scholars and gentry classes in China.

Liu K'un-i wrote in response to Konoe's "Principal objectives of the Tōa Dōbun Kai" which was published in late 1898:

"The Tōa Dōbun Kai works towards the reconciliation and cultivation of friendship of the three countries [of Japan, China and Korea] for the purpose of confronting the powerful West. Guided by Heaven, it upholds and expresses truth and righteousness. Is this not the opportunity for the East Asian countries to change from a state of disunity to one of alliance and from a state of adversity to one of peace...? Prince Konoe's declaration speaks the truth by appealing [to us] to cooperate in one spirit and with one objective, to give one another encouragement and advice. If we can always give our word in honesty and act in the name of justice, then no discord will arise among ourselves and we shall be able to fight the external foe and cooperate to safeguard peace in the East.... And dare I not pledge my support for and uphold this cause?"⁽⁵⁵⁾

The establishment of the Nanking Dōbun Shoin evoked encouraging response. Liu thought that it was a timely move which served to remind the Chinese of the conflict between the yellow and white races. He especially applauded the "loyal and sincere" intentions of the Tōa Dōbun Kai for "remembering what Japan had owed China in the way of cultural guardianship." He reckoned that the school was established with a view to try to "save China from her present plight"⁽⁵⁶⁾ Much optimism was expressed regarding the future of the School. Wang Chia-t'ang, another Chinese official, said,

"One can foresee the day when the governments and peoples of Japan and China see eye to eye and work hand in hand towards the goal of enlightenment...."⁽⁵⁷⁾

(55) Letter from Liu K'un-i, written in reply to Konoe's announcement of the objectives of the Tōa Dōbun Kai, Nikki, op.cit., Vol.3. pp. 29-30.

(56) Letter from Liu to Konoe, *ibid.*, Vol.3, p. 221.

(57) Letter from Wang Chia-t'ang to Konoe, *ibid.*

Renewed hopes for a closer relationship with Japan in the early
twentieth century

Japanese influence in Chinese political thinking greatly increased towards the end of the nineteenth century. By contrast, the Chinese had become more and more hostile against Russia since the latter's seizure of Port Arthur. Even at Peking, the Russian influence was on the decline. Hayashi Gonsuke, deputising for Yano Fumio as Japanese minister to China in 1898, observed with complacency that "apart from Li Hung-chang, no other official in the Chinese government has pro-Russian views."⁽⁵⁸⁾ As a result of Russia's penetration into Manchuria soon after the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, hopes were once again raised in China for a strengthening of relations with Japan.

Throughout the Boxer crisis, Japan acted alongside the powers in sending troops to China. Japanese activities, however, were seen by the Chinese as efforts undertaken to restore peace in the Far East. It was hoped that Japanese mediation in the settlement between China and the powers would bring about a situation in which China's territorial integrity would be respected. In fact, in the early stage of hostilities between the allied powers and China, the Chinese had sought to separate Japan from the Western powers and the Chinese Emperor made an appeal for help to the Japanese Emperor on 3rd July, 1900:

"... China and Japan have always been interdependent and friendly with one another The killing and rioting which have been taking place recently are due to religious differences among the people and yet the Western powers suspect the government

(58) Hayashi Gonsuke, Talking of the seventy years of my life, excerpt translated and collected in Wu-hsü Pien-fa, op.cit., Part 3, p. 578.

In September 1898 immediately before the coup, Li was expelled from the Tsungli Yamen. It was not until 1899 that he was appointed to the governor-generalship of Canton. From 1900-1901, he was re-appointed as governor-general of Tientsin. According to Hayashi, Li had fallen from power because he could not get enough support from his subordinates in his anti-Japanese manoeuvres. p. 569.

of being responsible for inciting the people to engage in anti-foreign activities. This had led to the seizure of the Taku Forts and the outbreak of conflicts, resulting in a confusion which is worsening every minute. If one looks at the situation of the world to-day, the East and the West are in confrontation with each other. In the East, there are only two countries - China and Japan - to keep up the front. Are the strong and powerful countries in the West casting hungry looks on China alone? Once China is no longer able to hold her own, it is feared that Japan too, may not be able to stand by herself. Our well-being or plight is contiguous with one another; we should put aside our small differences and cooperate to maintain peace on all sides. At the moment, China can hardly manage to muster military forces against the rebels within the country. As for the task of sorting out the differences and appeasing all parties among the powers, she has to rely on the support of Japan. We hope that Japan, which belongs to the same continent as ourselves, will act in earnest to the benefit of all. It is our sincere hope that Japan will assume the leadership in bringing back a peaceful situation in the Far East."(59)

While the Empress Dowager and some of her Manchu supporters were alleged to have encouraged the Boxers in their anti-foreign activities, the Yangtze regional officials had resorted to diplomacy to mitigate the catastrophe. Liu K'un-i in Nanking, Chang Chih-tung in Wuhan and Yuan Shih-k'ai in Shantung had ignored the dynasty's declaration of war in June and on their own initiative, negotiated with the powers for a rapid restoration of peace. The war was, by this agreement, confined to northern China. Nevertheless, Liu K'un-i was inclined to think that the fault lay with the Western missionaries and that the Boxers had been driven to violence by the infringement of the missionary activities on the culture, traditions and lives of the Chinese people. In a letter which he wrote to Konoe, Liu said:

"The catastrophe in northern China is a result of

(59) Documents: Kuang-hsü Vol. 53, p. 34b. Imperial message to Emperor of Japan, 3rd July, 1900.

the conflicts between the Boxers and the Christians Missionaries especially the Catholics from the West have disturbed the lives of the local people. Their activities constituted a threat to the peace in the localities. These Western missionaries testify to their false beliefs and exasperate the Chinese people to the point of breaking out in violence...."(60)

What China hoped, according to Liu, was that Japan, which had not engaged in missionary activities, would assume the leading role in restoring peace. (61) He said,

"If Japan would act on behalf of China, keeping in mind the close relationship between the two countries, then China would see the day when she would abundantly repay Japan's magnanimity." (62)

In a despatch which he sent to the Tsungli Yamen in April, 1901, Liu said that Japan had sent the largest number of troops to China but had demanded an indemnity smaller than those demanded by Russia, Germany and France. He believed that those were Japan's gestures of friendliness and encouragement to the Chinese government and people. He also believed that Japan had expressly sent the largest army to intervene on behalf of China in her negotiations with the Western powers. He urged the Tsungli Yamen to enlist Japan's support in requesting the powers to reduce their demands. (63)

That Japanese popularity was greatly increased during the Boxer crisis was reflected in a letter written to the leaders of the Kokumin Dōmei Kai (Peoples' League) in 1902 by a Chinese whose identity remained

(60) Letter from Liu K'un-i to Konoe, August, 1900, Nikki, op.cit., Vol.3, pp. 268-269.

(61) ibid. It was not strictly true that Japan had not engaged in any missionary activities in China. The Tōa Dōbun Kai itself, especially in the early days of its existence, was connected with the missionary activities of the Hongwanji in China and Korea. See Nikki, Vol. 2. pp. 237, 241, Vol.3, p. 44. It would seem that in 1900, the Chinese did not regard the activities of Japanese Buddhist monks as an imposition of an alien culture on Chinese life. Certainly, most Chinese would have liked to think that Japan had received the Buddhist cult as part of the cultural heritage from China.

(62) ibid. See also reply from Liu to Konoe, January, 1901, Vol.4, p. 25.

(63) Despatch from Southern Commissioner Liu K'un-i to the Tsungli Yamen, 30th April, 1901, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.62, pp. 32b-33a.

obscure. The writer said he was convinced that Japan did not wish to see a war being waged in China and that she had moved her troops into China solely for the purpose of defending the lives and properties of Japanese nationals. He commended the "disciplined behaviour" of the Japanese troops which was "unrivalled by those of any other country". "The Chinese local people in Peking and Tientsin" were able, in fact, to "see justice done only in the Japanese government offices in China". He proposed that the leaders of the Kokumin Dōmei Kai use their influence with the Japanese government and urge it to mediate on behalf of China in the treaty that was being negotiated in Peking. Only a treaty by which China was spared "excessive compensations" to the powers could ensure the rapid recovery of stability and the introduction of a new reform policy in China. He summed up his letter saying, "Benevolence on the part of Japan is China's great fortune; it is nevertheless, to Japan's own advantage."⁽⁶⁴⁾

The negotiations for the International Protocol were complicated by Russia's activities in Manchuria. By October, 1900, Russian troops had occupied Mukden and a separate agreement between Russia and China was being negotiated by Li Hung-chang. Early in November, the Russian commanders on the spot made an agreement with the Tartar general at Mukden, Tseng Chi. The so-called Alexiev-Tseng Agreement, signed on 9th November, 1900, provided that the civil administration of Manchuria should be restored to the Chinese, but that Russian troops should remain stationed at Mukden and other point along the railways. Soon after the agreement was made known to the world in early 1901, the

(64) Letter from unidentified writer to leaders of the Kokumin Dōmei Kai, 1902? Nikki, Supplementary Volume, (Fuzoku Bunsho), pp. 695-696.

Japanese government "confidentially advised" the Chinese minister in Japan against cessation of any territories to any power. It also warned the Chinese government not to permit any power to station her officials or troops in any Chinese territories as this would "set a precedent which would inevitably be used by the other powers to justify similar actions on their parts". And in the event of China being coerced into yielding any of her rights or territories, she could reply that any demands made on her would have to be referred to the International Protocol, thus saving China from incurring any loss or disadvantage to herself.⁽⁶⁵⁾

Within the Chinese government, Li Hung-chang, with the almost single-handed support of Prince Ch'ing, proposed that China yield to the Russian pressure. He also urged the Chinese government to give priority to the settlement with Russia so that Sino-Russian relations could be saved from jeopardy as a result of the representations from the powers especially Japan.⁽⁶⁶⁾ The Ministry of Defence was concerned at the admonition from the Japanese government but could not decide on any course of action. It reckoned that the Chinese government had to follow a cautious line of policy as it could "afford neither to incur the wrath of Russia nor arouse the anger of the powers". As Li Hung-chang was "familiar with China's stand as regards Russia", the Ministry of Defence saw fit to depend on Li to "make the best of the situation by exercising his influence with the Russians".⁽⁶⁷⁾ Meanwhile, the Chinese ministers in Germany, England, America and Japan were ordered to appeal to the respective governments for "mediation".⁽⁶⁸⁾

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- (65) Despatch from Chinese minister in Japan Li Sheng-to to Ministry of Defence, 15th February, 1901. Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.60, p. 15.
- (66) Despatches from Prince Ch'ing and Li Hung-chang to Ministry of Defence 27th February, 1st March, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol.60, pp. 27b-28a, 29b, respectively.
- (67) Imperial order forwarded by Ministry of Defence to Prince Ch'ing and Li Hung-chang, 25th February, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol. 60, p.26.
- (68) Imperial orders forwarded by Ministry of Defence to Chinese ministers in Germany, Japan, England and America, 28th February, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol.60, p. 29.

However, the regional governments especially the Yangtze provincial governor-generals vigorously opposed Li's dealings with the Russians. They regarded the Japanese admonition as urgent and sincere. Liu K'un-i argued that the fact that Japan and the other powers had so far refrained from using military means to stop Russian ambitions showed that they still hoped China would stand firm in resisting the Russian pressure and that Russia would eventually step down. It would, therefore, be wise of China to accept the Japanese admonition so that the partition of Chinese territories would be prevented.⁽⁶⁹⁾ He urged the Ministry of Defence to appeal to the Japanese government for further support in resisting the Russian demands.⁽⁷⁰⁾ Chang Chih-tung acknowledged that Japan's effort to stop the negotiations between China and Russia showed a genuine desire to preserve China's territorial sovereignty.⁽⁷¹⁾ The same view was shared by the Chinese minister in Japan, Li Sheng-to, who stressed that Japan's admonition had been motivated by her desire to "maintain good relations with China" and was not to be construed as having other motives.⁽⁷²⁾

By April, when the Russians had begun to back down as a result of the protests from the other powers especially Japan, the Chinese Ministry of Defence had taken a clearer stand. It thanked the Japanese government for its support which was "responsible for the slowing down of the Russo-Chinese negotiations" and appealed to Japan to stand firm on this line of policy in cooperation with England so that China's sovereignty as regards Manchuria would be safeguarded in the actual agreement to be concluded between China and the powers.⁽⁷³⁾

(69) Despatch from Liu K'un-i to Ministry of Defence, 28th February, 1901, *ibid.* Vol. 60, pp. 28b - 29a.

(70) Despatch from Liu, 6th March, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol. 61, p. 1.

(71) Despatch from Chang Chih-tung, 25th February, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol. 60, pp. 25b-26a.

(72) Despatch from Li Sheng-to through Sheng Hsüan-huai to Ministry of Defence, 26th March, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol. 61, p. 34.

(73) Draft despatch from Ministry of Defence to Chinese minister in Japan, 22nd April, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol. 62, p. 24a.

Japanese intervention seemed to have convinced China that she could rely on Japan's influence in saving Manchuria from Russian ambitions. Liu K'un-i believed that China could rely on Japan's promise to pressure Russia to withdraw her troops from Manchuria.⁽⁷⁴⁾ He also discredited the rumour that Japan was contemplating recognition of Russia's preferential rights in Manchuria in return for Russia's recognition of Japan's freedom of action in Korea - the Manchuria-Korea exchange. Liu also maintained that Japan could not have harboured any designs on Manchuria itself, or she would not have urged China to entrust the issue of Russo-Chinese disputes over Manchuria to the joint arbitration of the powers.⁽⁷⁵⁾

By November, 1901, the death of Li Hung-chang removed the most influential opponent of the pro-Japanese arguments in the Chinese government. Chang Chih-tung thought that there remained no reason for China to enter into further bilateral negotiations with Russia. He urged the Tsungli Yamen that any moves on the part of the Chinese government to enter into any agreement with Russia be referred to the Japanese government in advance. Japan's support, he said, had to be appreciated and China could not afford to act rashly, or Japan might take a similar course of action as that of Russia and this would lead to the partition of China.⁽⁷⁶⁾

The ~~pro~~-Japanese attitude of the provincial government leaders was significant as it threw light on the policy of "liaison with the southern governor-generals" of the Tōa Dōbun Kai during the Boxer crisis. As has been mentioned, the Tōa Dōbun Kai since its establishment

(74) Despatch from Liu K'un-i to Ministry of Defence, 22nd October, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol. 65, pp. 12-13.

(75) Despatch from Liu K'un-i to Tsungli Yamen, 4th April, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol. 62, p. 12.

(76) Despatch from Chang Chih-tung to Tsungli Yamen, 11th November, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol. 65, p. 15.

had had considerable influence with the Southern Chinese provincial leaders and it had been the policy of the Society to consolidate Japanese influence in China by cooperating with Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i. Soon after the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, a Conference of the executives of the Society was held on 20th June, 1900 in which a "Plan of Policy" was drafted recommending six steps of action for Japan in dealing with the current crisis in China. Firstly, Japan should try to enlist the support and sympathy of the people in Southern China for the principle of preservation of China. Secondly, if anti-foreign activities broke out in the South, the Tōa Dōbun Kai should try to enlighten the people, either through the press or by other means, on the danger of such activities, but no military action should be taken. Thirdly, should the Peking government collapse or lose its power to administer its orders to the country, Japan should act before the powers in helping to establish a new government in the South. Fourthly, Japanese troops outnumbering those of the powers should be sent to put down any resistance offered by the Chinese government armies. But the Japanese troops must not wage a war against the Boxers. Fifthly, once any power or powers began taking actions with a view to devouring China, Japan would immediately launch an operation to occupy Korea. Finally, if the Chinese government left Peking in exile and the powers then proceeded to divide the territories into their respective spheres of influence, Japan should not hesitate to occupy a large area for her own sphere of interests. (77)

As a result of much debate, it was agreed by the members of the conference that only step one and two be incorporated into the "Policy

(77) Nikki, Vol. 3, p. 190.

of the Society", with the added resolution to "help to reform the Chinese government".⁽⁷⁸⁾ Konoe recorded in his diary later that his associates and himself concurred on the need to implement the plan of approaching and securing the cooperation of the Southern governor-generals but they believed it was as yet premature to deliberate on the plan for the establishment of an independent government in opposition to the "reactionary faction" at Peking.⁽⁷⁹⁾

The "Plan" threw light on the Tōa Dōbun Kai's anxiety for the "preservation of China." Leaders of the Society feared that in the event of a partition of China, Japan would be disadvantaged owing to her inferior military strength compared to those of the powers. They therefore proposed that Japan take independent action to secure her influence in southern China before the powers began to carve up China. For the Japanese - the leaders of the Tōa Dōbun Kai notwithstanding - the "preservation of China" was more a necessity than an act of altruism.

In the years immediately before the Russo-Japanese war, the Chinese were also drawn closer to Japan by Japanese anti-Russian activities. The Kokumin Dōmei Kai, a pre-dominantly Dōbun Kai organization, won high acclaim in China. Founded in 1900 by a group of politically active people who were particularly interested in China, the Kokumin Dōmei Kai aimed at unifying Japanese public opinion without distinction of political party and official or civil standing in support of a solution to the Far Eastern question on the basis of "maintaining the integrity of China" (Shina Hōzen) and "upholding Korea" (Chōsen Yōgo). Its immediate objective was to urge the government to send troops to

(78) *ibid.*, Vol.3, p. 191.

(79) *ibid.*, Vol.3, p. 202.

Korea to check Russian ambitions in Manchuria. Konoe who headed the organization was hailed by the Chinese as the saviour of their country. Chu Hsi-lin, an official in the government, reckoned that Konoe was "the only person in both the East and the West who has a genuine desire to see the preservation of China become a reality".⁽⁸⁰⁾ Once again, emphasis was put on racial and cultural affinity and expectations were raised of the establishment of a special and permanent relationship between the two countries.

Liu K'un-i said he hoped Konoe's Kokumin Dōmei Kai would influence the Japanese government to follow "a policy of chivalry" and act in the name of justice so that peaceful order in the Far East would be maintained.⁽⁸¹⁾ He reckoned that the Kokumin Dōmei Kai, being founded at the height of Russian penetration into the Far East, had the objective of cultivating a special relationship between Japan, China and Korea to resist this pressure. Konoe's effort in rallying Sino-Japanese cooperation at this juncture showed him to be "a man of great wisdom and well-versed in the affairs of the world".⁽⁸²⁾ Equally enthusiastic response came from the Ministry of Defence. In their replies to Konoe's letter appealing for China's support in thwarting Russian penetration, Yung Lu and Wang Wen-shao hailed Konoe's aspirations as those of "a gentleman of great sincerity and benevolence" and his actions those of "a man of high purpose."⁽⁸³⁾

These Chinese officials, however, were also realistic about the Far Eastern situation. Liu was aware that China's claims to Manchuria, if not backed up by Japan, were as good as lost. But he also feared

(80) Letter from Chu Hsi-lin to Konoe, July, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol.4, pp. 232-233.

(81) Letter from Liu K'un-i to Konoe, 1902, *ibid.*, Fuzoku Bunsho, p. 689.

(82) *ibid.*, p. 690.

(83) Draft despatch from Ministry of Defence to Chinese minister in Japan Li Sheng-to, 10th June, 1901, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.63, p. 25a.

that Japan alone would not be enough to withstand Russia. She would have to cooperate with England and America in pressuring Russia to evacuate Manchuria. Liu had especially appealed to Japan for help because he was unsure of the support of England and America whereas he felt that a Sino-Japanese liaison was justified by "both countries' reverence for the Confucian ethics, geographical proximity, contiguous interests and aspirations and the need to defend themselves from foreign aggression."⁽⁸⁴⁾ Chang Chih-tung^{also} saw the need for Japan to cooperate with England and America in preserving the East Asian order. Moreover, he was enthusiastic about Konoe's proposal to open Manchuria. He felt that China should lose no time in introducing new methods of administration to the area as an experiment of reform policy for the whole country.⁽⁸⁵⁾ In a letter to Konoe, Wang Wen-shao and Ch'ü Hung-chi, too, said that China needed the joint efforts of Japan, England and America to enforce the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria and refer the Manchurian issue for international settlement.⁽⁸⁶⁾

Such was in fact the objective behind the Kokumin Dōmei Kai's "Shina Hōzen, Chōsen Yōgo". Konoe and his supporters realized that Japan alone could not withstand Russia and that only by rallying the other countries to the cause of preserving China could Japan hope to secure peace in the Far East and independence for herself. In the face of Russian aggression, Japan and China needed to stand together but the Kokumin Dōmei Kai did not pursue a policy of bilateral alliance between the two countries. In fact, Konoe was anxious that the Western powers should not be misled into thinking that Japan and China were conspiring against them by

(84) Letter from Liu to Konoe, 1902, Nikki, Fuzoku Bunsho, pp. 688-689.

(85) Letter from Chang Chih-tung to Konoe, 1901, *ibid.*, Fuzoku Bunsho, pp. 636-637.

(86) Letter from Wang Wen-shao and Ch'ü Hung-chi to Konoe, 1902, *ibid.*, Fuzoku Bunsho, pp. 521-522.

forming a racial alliance. His speech given at the first meeting of the Kokumin Dōmei Kai was revealing:

"... As for [the talk of the Dōmeikai being] an alliance of the yellow peoples against the white peoples ... not only has such an idea not been put forward in the Society's 'Declaration' but it has never entered into the conversations between myself and my colleagues at our various meetings Although we recognize the necessity for friendly relations [between Japan, Korea and China], it is not true, however, that the interests of these three countries alone are being affected in the Far East today. Russia, England, France and Germany too [have their stakes in this part of the world]. Even America and Italy ... are involved in one way or the other. Not only is the exclusion of and discrimination against these countries an impossibility, but it is also unnecessary. At the moment when all the European countries are advocating 'preservation' [of China]; Japan must depend on and cooperate with them to attain this goal. If one will insist on putting forward the idea of discrimination against the white peoples, then one would arouse the suspicion of the white nations and the important plan of [the Dōmei Kai] would be jeopardized."⁽⁸⁷⁾

A lack of diplomatic realism, however, was apparent in the attitude of those Chinese further from power. Many in China, especially those who felt strongly that China needed vigorous reforms and a new political system saw the Kokumin Dōmei Kai as more than an anti-Russian, or indeed, anti-government organization. They saw the establishment of the Kokumin Dōmei Kai as a message to both the Japanese and Chinese peoples that there had always been a special relationship between them and that they would have to develop it further to safeguard their independence and sovereignty in the Far East.⁽⁸⁸⁾ The racial factor was conveniently used to emphasize the need for China and Japan to

(87) Konoe's inauguration speech at Kokumin Dōmei Kai, *ibid.*, Vol.3, pp. 339-340.

(88) Letter from Wang I-cheng to Konoe, July, 1901, *ibid.*, Vol.4, pp. 231-232. Wang I-cheng who described himself as a Chinese official whose political views were not recognized owing to his low position in the government thought the Kokumin Dōmei Kai shared the same objective as the "Society for the promotion of mutual benefits for China and Japan" which he had tried unsuccessfully to organize in China five years earlier.

cooperate. No distinction was made between Russia and the other Western powers. Chao Erh-sun, governor of Hunan wrote to Konoe in 1903:

"Japan and China are situated in the same part of the world, they belong to the same race and share the same culture and philosophy and they are as close to one another as the teeth are to the lips. Even if they cooperate and mutually support one another, it is still feared that they are not strong enough to confront the expansions of the Teutonic and Slav races. If they still persist in engaging in hostilities against one another, thus weakening their strength and finances, then it is only to be expected that the other races will seize the opportunity to further their aggression " (89)

Distrust of Russia , in particular , was shown in a letter written in the name of three hundred and eighty-five "men of high purpose " in Shanghai who had "formed themselves into a society" under Wang K'ang-nien and other reformers who had been active in the 1898 period. The 'society' had been formed to "awaken the entire nation to the fate of the Far East". The letter said that the powers in Europe were all persuaded by the sweet word of Russia, just as children were tempted by sweets; but soon they would discover that Russia would come out on top of all the powers in a partition of China. (90)

Anti-Western feelings were amply expressed in the words of Wang Yü-jun, an official in the Kwangtung government who was about to take up office in Manchuria. Wang was a severe critic of Western missionary activities and the Chinese government's policy of assimilation which enabled the Catholic hierarchy, in particular, to gain official status. According to Wang, many Chinese were attracted to the Catholic Church as the converts always managed to get the missionaries to intervene

(89) Letter from Governor of Hunan Chao Erh-sun to Konoe, 3rd October, 1903, *ibid.*, Fuzoku Bunsho, pp. 638-639.

(90) Letter from Wang K'ang-nien etc. to Konoe, 1901 *ibid.*, Fuzoku Bunsho, pp. 522-523.

and help them win their disputes. The Chinese community became divided and the people "caused to suffer" during the Boxer riots. He also attacked the agreement made by the government and the powers allowing Westerners to live in mixed-residence among the Chinese as "much harm would be done to the lives of the Chinese people". Under those circumstances, Wang maintained, the Chinese people needed guidance and protection. While the Western countries such as England, Russia, France and Germany were only concerned with territorial and financial gains, Japan wanted to befriend China to fight the foreign foe. Besides, countries in Asia sharing the same culture and belonging to the same race should sweep away their differences and build on their past friendship.⁽⁹¹⁾

Emphasis was put on the Confucian tradition shared by both Japan and China as opposed to the Christian religion of the West. Wang's proposal of the method to implement Sino-Japanese cooperation was that Konoe would solicit the support of the Japanese government in sending Japanese personnel to China to establish a "Common-cultural Society for the Protection of Confucianism". The "Society" would in fact carry out anti-Russian activities under the façade of preaching the Confucian philosophy. He even suggested that in the event of an outbreak of hostility between Japan and Russia, Chinese members of the society could be sent to the battlefields disguised as Japanese soldiers. This, Wang believed, was "the first step towards the right direction of linking China and Japan together."⁽⁹²⁾

As a war between Russia and Japan became imminent, the Chinese applauded Japan's action in holding out against Russia on the diplomatic front. Many believed that Japan could deliver the Far East from the catastrophe of Russian engulfment. The Hsin Min Ts'ung Pao (New People's

(91) Letter from Wang Yü-jun to Konoe, December, 1901 *ibid.*, Vol.4, pp.354-355

(92) *ibid.*, p. 355.

Miscellany), a reform journal founded by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in 1902, pointed out that as the safety of Manchuria and Korea directly affected Japan's national safety and progress and as neither China nor Korea was in a position to defend herself, Japan had taken upon herself the task of confronting Russia. She was in fact "protecting herself as well as safeguarding the well-being of all in keeping with the spirit of altruism." China could not but be sympathetic towards Japan and welcome her actions. (93)

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The Chinese were awakened by their defeat in 1895 to their own weakness and the superior military power of Japan. Their sense of urgency surrounding the nation's independence was heightened by the Western powers' "scramble for concessions" in the post-war period. Many Chinese came to look upon Japan as more than just a possible ally. Chinese reformers who had advocated reform measures to be carried out on the Japanese model were even more convinced that China had to obtain help from Japan in order to strengthen herself. They saw that the war with Japan had been a mistake and that the two countries needed to strengthen their ties to form an Asian front against Western aggression. In late 1897, Hunanese reformers responded with vigorous enthusiasm to the Japanese offer of friendship. Chinese reformers saw a Sino-Japanese alliance as more than a political union. They looked upon Japan as the leader of the "Asian awakening" which would soon be followed by a general Asian revival.

(93) "Review of the political situation: documents relating to the Russo-Japanese negotiations", 2nd December, 1903, Hsin Min Tsung Pao, reprinted in Taipei, 1966, Vol.7, No. 42-43, p. 153.

Many progressive Chinese provincial governors shared the reformers' belief that Japan had something to offer China. Chang Chih-tung readily accepted the Japanese offer of assistance. If Chang did not share K'ang Yu-wei's enthusiasm about a union between Japan and China based on idealistic and sentimental grounds, he still saw that the lingual and cultural similarities between the two countries would be assets for Chinese students in acquiring methods of modernization from Japan. Moreover, Chinese provincial governors were convinced that forming an alliance with Japan was a political necessity. Chang's efforts in bringing the Tzu Hsi government closer to the Japanese indicated his belief in the vital importance to China of Japan's friendship. Tzu Hsi's appointment of a Chinese mission to Japan with an offer of an alliance also reflected Chang's success in overcoming contrary influences within the government.

Apart from the Japanese military mission of late 1897, events in 1898 also appeared to augur well for closer cooperation between the two countries. Japanese government leaders appeared to take an interest in fostering closer relations with China. Ito's visit to Peking and Konoe's establishment of the Tōa Dōbun Kai inspired hopes in the Chinese for an alliance with Japan. One must not forget that in the same year Ōkuma had promised in his "doctrine" to offer China help and guidance. These events helped to build up the Chinese image of Japan as a friend and ally which had remained outside the imperialist camp of the Western powers.

During the Boxer Rebellion, the Chinese faced the greatest danger of a partition and many believed that their only hope for survival lay in a racial alliance with Japan. The emphasis on the racial and cultural affinity between Japan and China was never stronger in the Chinese argument for closer cooperation between the two countries. In the years immediately before the Russo-Japanese war, China was drawn still

closer to Japan by the Russian threat. Some even believed that Japan was to fight China's war and regarded Japan as the saviour of Asia from Western engulfment. The Chinese appeals to Japan to cooperate on racial grounds were never more urgent. It was at the same time characterized by impractical considerations. By 1902, Japan had already established herself as an ally of one of the strongest Western powers of the time. Some opinions in Japan - those of Konoe notwithstanding - were gradually changing towards a de-emphasis of the racial and cultural factor in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Yet many in China at that time would have found it hard to accept the Japanese prime minister, Katsura's statement about the Russo-Japanese war - "no war of race, no war of religion".

CHAPTER FOUR

EMERGING CHINESE NATIONALISM IN FACE OF GROWING JAPANESE POWER,
1904-1911

Japan defeated Russia in the war of 1904-1905. Elated by Japan's victory, the Chinese gradually acquired a sense of nationhood and talked about the recovery of their national rights. At the same time, the war made Japan a world power and this entailed changes in her role in world politics. These two phenomena — emerging Chinese nationalist aspirations and expanding political opportunities for Japan — had important implications for the idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation in the post-war period.

Continuation of the pro-Japanese policy of Chinese provincial leaders

In December, 1903, rumour had it that China was making moves to form an alliance with Japan and that Yuan Shih-k'ai, governor-general of Chihli and Peiyang Commissioner, was its chief advocate.⁽¹⁾ The rumour was not only widespread in China but was also noted by the Russian and Japanese press. One Russian newspaper warned that the impending Sino-Japanese alliance was unlike ordinary alliances made between countries for specific purposes. It was an alliance of the yellow race against the Western world.⁽²⁾ Around July and August, 1904,

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- (1) O Shih Ching Wen (Russian Alarm), (facsimile, Taipei, 1968), No. 14, 28th December, 1903. This was one of the first revolutionary newspapers published in Shanghai. It ran for just over one year from 15th December, 1903 to 25th February, 1904. It was founded at the height of Russian penetration into the Far East, designed to protest against Russia's occupation of Manchuria and belabour the Manchu government for permitting Chinese territories to be violated. This paper will hereafter be cited as OSCW.
- (2) "The instigatory argument of the Russian press", article in Jiji Shimpō, translated in OSCW, *ibid.*, No. 46, 29th January, 1904.

a proposal was made by some government officials to send an emissary, Chang Po-hsi of the Board of Census, to Japan to express the Chinese government's gratitude for the chivalrous part played by Japan in the war. But the proposal was not taken up owing to the opposition of some officials who advised against such an overtly friendly gesture towards Japan. Such a gesture, they said, was premature at a time when the outcome of the war was not yet predictable.⁽³⁾

Since the nineteenth century, this kind of split among Chinese officials both in Peking and in the provinces into two factions, one pro-Japanese and the other pro-Russian, had been a recurrent phenomenon. Although Russian influence in the Chinese government had declined considerably by 1903, the pro-Russian sentiment of the Empress Dowager was still to be reckoned with. Furthermore, some officials, notably the minister of defence Wang Wen-shao, were suspicious of Japanese motives in going to war with Russia. In November, 1904, an alliance with Russia was contemplated by the pro-Russian faction led by Li Lien-ying.⁽⁴⁾ But Yuan Shih-k'ai, who had succeeded Li Hung-chang as governor-general of Chihli since the latter's death in 1901, had amassed great influence and was keen on winning the friendship of Japan. He had the support of Chang Chih-tung, governor-general of Hunan-Hupeh, Shen Chun-hsüan, governor-general of Canton and Ma Yu-k'un, general of Chihli. During the course of the Russo-Japanese war, Yuan and his supporters managed to exert great influence on the government's decisions regarding China's relations with the belligerent

(3) "The disposition of the Chinese government and people towards Japan after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war". Tōa Dōbun Kai Kankei Zassen (Miscellaneous documents relating to the Tōa Dōbun Kai), Section 1. 1899-1910, Tokyo, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M.T. Series (1868-1945), Reel No. 773, pp. 196-197.

(4) Ching Chung Jih Pao (Warning Bell Daily), (facsimile, Taipei, 1968). "The confirmed news of the government's move to ally itself with Russia", Vol. 4, 5th November, 1904, P. 1, and "Review of Current Events", Vol. 4, 10th November, 1904, P. 1. After the Russo-Japanese war, there seemed to be little reason to write any more on the subject of Russian occupation. The O Shih Ching Wen changed its name to Ching Chung Jih Pao and ran for one year from 26th February 1904 to 28th January, 1905. The paper concentrated on the threat posed to China's independence by foreign powers including Japan. This paper will hereafter be cited as CCJP.

powers.

Although there was general acknowledgment of Japan's bravery in declaring war on Russia, thus blocking Russia's attempt to engulf Manchuria, some Chinese officials were concerned about the effects of a Japanese victory on China's relations with the Western countries. Yang Chao-yün, Chinese minister to Belgium, for example, thought that the European countries and America viewed the Russo-Japanese war as a racial conflict the outcome of which would directly affect the relations between Europe and Asia. These Western countries would become wary of the "yellow nations" if Japan won the war. A Japanese victory therefore, according to Yang, would make the West suspicious of China as well. To prevent such a misunderstanding, he proposed that China strengthen her relations with the powers in the midst of the Russo-Japanese conflict by sending missions abroad to improve Sino-Western understanding.⁽⁵⁾

Others were concerned that a Japanese victory, no less than a Russian victory, would affect Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. Shortly after the outbreak of the war and China's declaration of neutrality, Chang Jen-fu of the Censorate (Tu Ch'a Yuan) proposed that China mediate to stop the Russo-Japanese conflict before it became a major war. He believed that this gesture on the part of China would serve to secure for her the rightful claims to Manchuria and forestall severe reprimand from either side in the eventual settlement.⁽⁶⁾

(5) Despatch from Chinese minister to Belgium Yang Chao-yün suggesting that China send special missions to the Western countries which had a treaty relation with China. Received by Waiwupu on 4th June, 1904, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.68, pp. 12b-13a.

(6) Despatch from Chang Jen-fu of the Tu Ch'a Yuan to Waiwupu, 29th February, 1904, *ibid.*, Vol.68, pp. 3b-4.

The same outlook was adopted by the Waiwupu which shortly before Port Arthur fell into the hands of Japan in January, 1905, advocated that China assume a peace-making role to stop the war before either power came out with decisive victory. The Waiwupu was also in favour of asking other powers to intervene in the war. It was suggested that an emissary Wu T'ing-fang, one time minister to America, be sent to America and the European countries with this mission. Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, opposed the suggestion. He stressed the importance of cooperation with Japan to settle the Manchurian question and maintained that Japan had not acted in any way contrary to the spirit of the declaration of war which would justify intervention on China's part. The decision to send Wu to the West was thus reversed.⁽⁷⁾

Conflict between the Waiwupu on the one hand and Yuan and his supporters on the other again arose as the end of the war drew near. The Waiwupu decided that in order to safeguard her own rights, China had to participate in the peace conference and insisted on sending envoys. Hopes were also entertained for an international conference to be held should Japan make excessive demands in Manchuria. The British and American ministers in China were approached. Yuan Shih-k'ai and his supporters from the provincial governments, however, believed that only by cooperating with Japan could the Manchurian problem be solved and that it would be to neither China's nor Japan's advantage to invite the intervention of the Western powers in the settlement. Yuan, however, was not strong enough on this occasion to influence the Waiwupu into changing its plan. The proposal to

(7) Toa Dōbun Kai Kankei Zassen, op.cit., pp. 211-215. The report mentioned that this move to send Wu abroad proposed by the "less enlightened Chinese officials" had been prompted by the rumour started by the Russian minister in China and the minister in China of "one other country" that Japan despised China. The rumour was apparently circulated with a view to causing discord between Japan and China. p. 199.

send envoys was rejected by the British and American ministers. And the Waiwupu withdrew its proposal only on the protest of the Japanese minister in China.⁽⁸⁾

Neither of the two incidents was strictly a confrontation between the pro-Russian and pro-Japanese factions. There were officials in the Waiwupu including Ch'ü Hung-chi, minister of foreign affairs, who were friendly towards Japan. Nor was either decision of the Waiwupu anti-Japanese in nature. They, however, brought to light the significant fact that some provincial governors were willing to cooperate with Japan over the Manchurian question. The influence of this group of people was being felt increasingly in Peking and this foreshadowed some kind of cooperation between Japan and China on the governmental level. This was particularly noticeable in China's reform programme which the Ch'ing government had taken into its own hands since the turn of the century. However, as at the end of the nineteenth century, this kind of relationship was not destined to evolve into a formal alliance between the two countries. One must also bear in mind that reforms especially those effected in Manchuria had been introduced with a view to counteracting the influence of Japan.

There were signs that the Chinese government was more resolved than at any time before to recover possession of the Manchurian provinces after the Russo-Japanese war. To this end, it pursued a policy of appeasement towards Japan. Attempts were made to adjust matters amicably with Japanese authorities. The appointment of the Chinese bannerman Chao Erh-sun to the governor-generalship of Manchuria in late 1905 marked the beginning of some efficient administration in that

(8) "The opinion of political circles at Peking regarding the Manchurian question", report from the Peking correspondent of the Tōa Dōbun Kai. Received 4th August, 1905. *ibid.*, pp. 258-281.

area. Chao was also anxious to obtain Japan's cooperation in settling affairs in Manchuria. A meeting was held between Chao and Saionji, then prime minister and foreign minister, in May, 1906 during which discussions were undertaken relating to the withdrawal of Japan's military office from Hsin-min-tun, the return by Japan of Yingkow to China, the cooperative project of afforestation in eastern Manchuria between Japan and China and other matters.⁽⁹⁾ In August, 1906, the Waiwupu recommended that members of the Japanese delegation to the post-war conference between Japan and China be given the imperial award by the Chinese Emperor for their "services rendered in concluding the agreements concerning Manchuria and their efforts made towards the preservation of friendship between Japan and China as well as peace in the Far East."⁽¹⁰⁾

The Chinese government's attempt to carry out reforms on the Japanese model

The post-war years saw the Chinese government making concrete attempts to effect reforms in the country's administration, education and army. Strides were also made towards the establishment of a constitution. When Japan's constitutional monarchy defeated Russia's Tsarist autocracy in 1905, constitutionalism seemed to have proved its efficacy as a basis for unity between rulers and ruled in a national effort. Sentiments within China were for a more liberalized and more independent regime. The Japanese victory had given the Chinese an

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- (9) According to Chao, Saionji had stressed that this episode of Sino-Japanese cooperation was not to be made known to the powers and that the negotiations were to be kept confidential. Despatch from governor-general of Sheng Ching Chao Erh-sun to Ministry of Defence and Waiwupu, 2nd May, 1906, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.69, pp. 27b-28a.
- (10) Waiwupu's recommendation of the Imperial Star Award to be given to the Japanese delegation to the treaty conference, 12th August, 1906, *ibid*, Vol.69, pp. 32b - 33b.

elated feeling and many felt that China could achieve as much. There was an urge to catch up with Japan. The central government had to satisfy the demand from the radical-minded for a strong China which could withstand the onslaught of Western aggression. Within the country, there was a growing provincial interest in having a share in the government. Two official missions in the first half of 1906 were sent to study constitutionalism abroad. One, led by Tuan Fang, visited mainly Germany and the United States and the other, led by Tsai Tse, visited Japan, England and France. The commissioners returned in August, 1906 and recommended that the Japanese constitution serve as model, conditions in that country being far more comparable to those in China. Tsai Tse's report on the investigation in Japan was one of praise for Japanese institutions. Tsai expressed admiration for Japan's achievement in her legal and educational systems, her navy and army, her agriculture, industries and commerce and recommended that China use them as models.⁽¹¹⁾

Tsai Tse was not the first Chinese official to recommend that China could benefit from modelling her reforms on the Japanese version. Shen Chia-pen and Wu T'ing-fang of the Board of Punishments, for example, had commented in October, 1905, that it was an advantage for China to be able to learn from Japan's experience in developing her judicial institution and that China should send specialists to investigate Japan's legal and prison system.⁽¹²⁾

The result of these recommendations was that in the few years immediately after the Russo-Japanese war, Chinese missions were sent

(11) Report from Tsai Tse on the investigation in Japan, 13th February, 1906, *ibid.*, Vol.69, pp. 25b-26a.

(12) Memorial from ministers of law Wu T'ing-fang and Shen Chia-pen to send missions to Japan to investigate Japan's legal system and criminal law, 15th October, 1905, *ibid.*, Vol.69, pp. 18-19a.

to Japan. In turn, memorials were submitted by the Board of Punishments, the Board of Education, the Board of Trade, the Waiwupu and individual Chinese officials recommending that the imperial awards be given to Japanese officials of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education (Mombushō), the Imperial Household Department (Kunaishō) and the Tōa Dōbun Kai for their services and help given to Chinese missions during the latters' courses of investigation.⁽¹³⁾

It is hard to determine to what extent these exchanges helped to improve relations between the two countries. They probably amounted to little more than a mutual expression of good-will on either side. But concrete reforms were carried out especially in education and the army under the leadership of Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-k'ai. Japanese instructors were hired in increasing numbers to train Chinese troops and Chinese officers were sent to military academies in Japan. Chang Chih-tung was now able, with the central government's backing, to send missions to study the Japanese school system, import Japanese teachers and send larger numbers of students from his provinces to study in Japan.

Cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese governments in controlling Chinese students in Japan

Japanese influence in the late Ch'ing reform movement was perhaps greatest in the field of education. Cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese governments in this area was two-fold. The first was in providing the Chinese students who had gone to Japan in rapidly growing numbers between 1903 and 1906 with education. The other, perhaps

(13) See Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.69, and 70 for scattered references.

unforeseen by both governments at first, was in controlling and later, suppressing the political agitation of Chinese students in Japan.

After the turn of the century, the Chinese diplomatic representatives ^{in Japan} were invested with the added duty -- not required of Chinese missions in other countries -- of coping with the presence of a rapidly growing Chinese student population and their increasing interest in political activity. The Russo-Japanese war had aroused a sense of political consciousness in the Chinese students. The weakness of China contrasted sharply with the power of Japan. Chinese students became discontented with the state of affairs at home. They agitated for changes in the home government and rallied to the support of reformist and revolutionary leaders in Japan such as L'iang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen. Privately supported students, in particular, viewed the restrictions imposed on their activities as an extension of the unenlightened rule of the Manchu government.

In July, 1902, Chinese students demonstrated and protested against the refusal of the Chinese minister in Tokyo to recommend nine students for the Seijō military school.⁽¹⁵⁾ Realizing that the student affairs in Japan needed more direct and stringent control, the Chinese government authorized that the office of controller-general of students be set up in Japan on 1st January, 1903. This office carried the same rank as the minister and all students affairs were placed under its control.

In the same year, the Empress Dowager ordered Chang Chih-tung to draft a set of regulations to reduce "corrupt practices" among the Chinese students in Japan. Chang negotiated with the Japanese minister, Uchida Yasuya, on those regulations that would require commitment by

(15) Despatch from Chinese minister in Japan, Ts'ai Chün, to Waiwupu, 31st July, 1902 and 8th August, 1902, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.66, p.15, 16.

the Japanese government or Japanese school authorities. After receiving a promise of cooperation from the Japanese, Chang formally presented the regulations to the throne on 6th October, 1903. In accordance with these regulations, only a limited number of Chinese students would be admitted to Japanese schools each year for the study of government law or military matters and no privately supported students would be permitted to receive military training in Japan. All Chinese students, government or privately supported, would be required to register with the Chinese minister to Japan and the newly established Chinese office of controller - general of students in Japan. Students could enter only those private schools recognized by the Japanese Mombushō as maintaining standards equal to those of government schools. They could, however, enter special preparatory schools established for Chinese students, providing these, too, were regulated by the Mombushō. Japanese school authorities would be responsible for grading the conduct of Chinese students within the schools. In cases of proven serious offence (both within and outside the schools) which included writing and printing inflammatory essays, issuing newspapers and meddling in politics, or engaging in "active disruption of peace and order", the Japanese educational authorities would honour requests from the Chinese minister or controller-general to expel and deport guilty students from Japan. Reports on the cases of all deported students would be submitted to the Waiwupu and the authorities of their home provinces. (16)

Chang's regulations were accepted by the throne and late in 1903, at the request of the Japanese authorities, a set of rules for the discipline ~~for~~ and encouragement of Chinese students were added. The

(16) For details of the regulations, see Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'üan-chi op.cit., Vol.61: pp.1-10. See also W. Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China, op.cit., pp.193-195.

method of encouragement specified was the conferral of Chinese civil service degrees on graduates returning from Japan.⁽¹⁷⁾

The Chinese government's regulations of 1903 was a step forward in the direction of closer cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese governments in tightening control of Chinese students. It was, therefore, not surprising that in November, 1905, the Japanese Mombushō promulgated a series of regulations of its own restricting the students' choice of schools and lodgings and requiring a letter of recommendation from every Chinese student.⁽¹⁸⁾ There was evidence to show that the Chinese minister in Japan, Yang Shu, had conferred with the Mombushō about the regulations before they were put forward. Yang had apparently heard that the Japanese authority intended to issue the regulations and asked to see a draft of the proposed contents. He found it entirely satisfactory and told the Waiwupu later in a despatch that he could find nothing prejudicial to the interests of the students, and that he was satisfied with the regulations "since they concerned the control of schools and indirectly the control of students."⁽¹⁹⁾ In view of the fact that it had attempted to tighten its control over student affairs in Japan two years earlier, the Chinese government too, would have welcomed the Mombushō's regulations.

In 1907, both governments felt the need to expel Sun Yat-sen from Japan and stringent measures were passed by both governments to control revolutionary activities. The Chinese government set up stricter rules regarding student travel to Japan, and the Japanese government took repressive measures against Chinese students' publishing activity and meetings. The post-war era saw the rapid growth of

(17) Ayers, *ibid.*, p. 195.

(18) Sano Keishū, Chūgokujin Nihon Ryūgakushi (A history of Chinese students in Japan), Tokyo, 1960, pp. 463-467.

(19) Yang Shu to Waiwupu on Chinese students' boycott of classes, 17th January, 1906, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol. 69, pp. 23b-24b.

unrest in Chinese society. Chinese dissidents, be they reformists or revolutionaries, launched their campaigns to "save China" from abroad and Japan became a centre of their activities. They were, however, seldom able to obtain the sympathy of the Japanese government. Increasingly, the Chinese government relied on the Japanese authorities to put down these subversive activities. The Tokyo government, unwilling to involve itself in any movement in China which threatened to topple the Manchu dynasty, responded readily to the requests from Peking to clamp down on the student unrests. But perhaps this cooperative attitude towards the Manchus indicated a concern for the need to maintain the status quo rather than a desire to foster closer relations with Peking.

Comments of the Chinese press on Japan's role in the "revival of Asia"
after the Russo-Japanese war

Chinese opinions were unanimous in praising Japan's bravery in entering into military confrontation with Russia. A more enthusiastic response to Japanese chivalry came from the literary and press circles which openly acknowledged that Japan was motivated by altruism no less than the need to defend herself against Russian aggression. The Hong Kong Hua-Tzu Jih-Pao condemned the "aloofness" and "acquiescence" on the part of the strong Western powers towards the Russian penetration into Manchuria. On the other hand, it expressed admiration for Japan which had acted "in the name of justice" despite the disparity between herself and Russia in terms of size and strength. (20)

(20) "The difference in the orientation of Japanese and Russian policies" in Hong Kong Hua Tzu Jih Pao (The Chinese Language Daily News), 20th March, 1905. Established in Hong Kong in 1864/5, this was one of the earliest and longest running Chinese newspapers. It began as the Chinese edition of the British Daily News but later came under Chinese proprietorship. Being published in Hong Kong, it reflected the relatively progressive attitudes of the Southern Chinese and was critical of the corrupt and ineffective Manchu government. But it did not openly express sympathy for the revolutionary cause. This paper will hereafter be cited as H.K. Hua Tzu Jih Pao.

The Ching Chung Jih Pao commented that Japan was acting in accordance with international law. Firstly, Japan was fighting out of self-defence as the common interests which she shared with China were being threatened by Russia. Secondly, Japan was fighting for justice because she could not condone Russia's violation of China's sovereignty. Thirdly, Japan was fighting to preserve China and Korea and to maintain peace in the Far East in keeping with her friendship with those two countries.⁽²¹⁾

The Chinese government's declaration of neutrality on 12th February, 1904 was criticized throughout the country. Emotional letters from readers were written to the O Shih Ching Wen expressing willingness to fight on the side of Japan. The "Women's Society of Resistance against Russian Aggression" volunteered to help the Japanese Red Cross Association in giving aid to wounded Japanese soldiers.⁽²²⁾ Petitions were sent to the Waiwupu from Chinese residents in America, Australia, Africa and other parts of Asia urging the government to fight alongside Japan. Chinese merchants in America offered to contribute to the military expenses of the Chinese army. Japan, they said, was fighting for justice and China could not step aside and watch Japan fight the war for her.⁽²³⁾

The friendship of Japan was given a high value. The rumour of a government move to form an alliance with Russia roused much disquiet in the Ching Chung Jih Pao. Such a step, it commented, would make Japan see China as her enemy and this was particularly ill-advised as Japan had declared war on Russia in the name of preserving Chinese

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- (21) "On the right of intervention in international law", editorial in CCJP, op.cit., Vol.1, 5th April, 1904, p.2.
 (22) "A tribute to the Women's Society of Resistance against Russian Aggression", OSCW, op.cit., No.43, 26th January, 1904.
 (23) Petition from Chinese residents in America, Australia, Asia and Africa to the Waiwupu, 16th February, 1904, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.75, pp. 5-6. Also CCJP, op.cit., Vol.1, 27th February, 1904, p.3.

territories.⁽²⁴⁾ According to the Ching Chung Jih Pao, China should reform her internal affairs and cooperate with Japan. It said it was important that China take the initiative, or Japan would have to align her policies with those of the white powers for her own national safety.⁽²⁵⁾ The Tung Fang Tsa Chih, however, did not accept that Japan was at the cross-road of either cooperating with China or joining the Western imperialist camp. It believed that China could either be strengthened with Japanese help or partitioned by the Western powers. Should the latter happen, Japan, not yet a world power, would find herself isolated. Hence the Tung Fang Tsa Chih believed that not only China, but Japan too could benefit from closer cooperation with one another. In view of this, it was unwise of China to declare herself neutral instead of joining forces with Japan against Russia.⁽²⁶⁾

During the war, there was an overwhelming wish in China for a Japanese victory. There were three elements central to this sentiment. The most important was related to the post-war repercussions which would directly affect China. It was believed that a Russian victory would arouse the envy of the other big powers. Russian monopoly in the Far East would hence be challenged and a war of partition of China would be fought among the powers. The prospect of survival for China would hence be one of pessimism whereas with a Japanese victory, some hope for China's future independence were entertained.

Secondly, it was believed that the outcome of the war would have

(24) "The repercussions of forming an alliance with Russia", editorial, CCJP, Vol.4, 14th November, 1904, p.1.

(25) "The unpredictability of present day diplomacy", Review of Current Events, *ibid.*, Vol.5, 11th December, 1904, p.4.

(26) "The relationship of estrangement and rapprochement between Japan and China", editorial, Tung Fang Tsa Chih (Eastern Miscellany), No.1, 11th March, 1904, p.1. The journal was founded in 1903 in Shanghai. It set out to discuss international politics in the Far East and constantly harped on the theme of the confrontation between the East and West. It attributed the inefficacy of the Manchu government to the monarchical system and was in favour of the establishment of a constitution and a reform programme for China. But its emphasis was put on the diplomatic relations between the powers in the Far East. This work will henceafter be cited as TFTC.

a great psychological impact on China. China's defeat by Japan in 1895 had made her acutely aware of her weakness. The Chung Wai Jih Pao, (Universal Gazette), pointed out that China could not confront Russia militarily owing to the inefficiency of her forces. It regretted that this was the reason why Japan demanded the declaration of neutrality of China so that Japan would not be impeded by an ineffective ally.⁽²⁷⁾ While the progress made by Japan in technological and political areas was admired by most Chinese, it was still believed that Japan was a weak nation especially when compared with Russia. Since the encroachment of the Western powers in East Asia had begun, the independence and national safety of Asian countries had been threatened as a result of this weakness. The Russo-Japanese war was seen as a war between the strong and the weak.

From the time when the idea of "yellow peril" had been revived among the Western powers towards the turn of the century, the Chinese press had reacted against it. It was seen as a vicious attempt on the part of the West to justify their imperialistic activities in the Far East. The Russian threat to Manchuria, in particular, was conceived of as the apex of the "white peril", a term which had come to be used to describe Western expansion in East Asia. Many Chinese saw the Russo-Japanese war as a racial conflict between the white race and the yellow race. The Tung Fang Tsa Chih thought that a Russian victory over Japan would make the Chinese people believe that it was the wish of Heaven that the yellow race be doomed, and that not even a conscientious and patriotic people like the Japanese could fight against it, to say nothing of China.⁽²⁸⁾ On the other hand, the Chung Wai Jih Pao thought

(27) "The present political situation in China", Chung Wai Jih Pao (Universal Gazette), April, 1904, reprinted in TFTC, ibid., No.3, 10th May, 1904, pp. 47-50.

(28) "On the Russian influence in China", editorial TFTC, No.2, 10th April, 1904, pp. 36-38.

that a new phase in world politics would emerge with a Japanese victory over Russia and no one need believe any longer in the superiority of the white race.⁽²⁹⁾

The third implication of a Japanese victory for the Chinese especially the more informed and politically - minded was that it would give weight to their argument that China needed a constitution. Attention was drawn to Japan's achievement since the Meiji Restoration and the fact that China had accomplished almost nothing during the preceding decades. They argued that the establishment of a constitution was the heart of the matter. This was the only way to save China from her journey towards gradual destruction.⁽³⁰⁾ A Japanese victory would reveal the inferiority of the Russian autocracy compared to the Japanese constitutional monarchy.

The hopes that were attached to a Japanese victory were extended to a new phase of Sino-Japanese cooperation after the war. As the Hsin Min Tsung Pao put it,

"... The Russo-Japanese war marks the beginning of the expression of nationalism by the peoples of East Asia. It strengthens the mutual understanding and united effort of the Japanese and Chinese peoples. As most of our students going abroad receive their education in Japan and as many Japanese scholars pay their visits to China, there is boundless scope for the unity of thought and ideas of the two peoples..."⁽³¹⁾

(29) "On the hopes that lie ahead of China," Chung Wai Jih Pao, reprinted in TFTC, No.3, 10th May, 1904, pp. 53-55.

(30) "The need for the government to reform its national policy as a prerequisite for survival," in Shih Pao, 7th August, 1904, reprinted in TFTC, No.7, 4th September, 1904, pp 144-148.

(31) "The future of the Russo-Japanese war" in Hsin Min Tsung Pao (New People's Miscellany) 1902-1907, facsimile, Taipeh, 1966, Vol.8, No. 44-45, 1st January, 1904, pp.14-15. Founded in Yokohama, a twentieth century version of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's reform journal of the post-1895 period. While in the latter half of the 1890's, Liang's advocacy of reforms was considered in many ways revolutionary, his argument for a constitutional monarchy and opposition to a republic made him a target of attack by the revolutionaries. Although Liang himself had become somewhat disillusioned after the 1898 coup, up to 1907, he still believed in saving the nation by modernization and had little animosity against the Manchu dynasty. This work will hereafter be cited as HMTP.

Chinese writers outside the government regarded the Russo-Japanese war with sanguine expectations. They believed that the war was about to determine the questions of the glory or decline of Asia and Europe, the rise or destruction of the yellow and white nations and the victory or defeat of despotism and constitutionalism. They observed with optimism that if Japan won, obstacles in the way of the yellow race would have been removed and the situation in Asia would gradually improve. The Chinese should do what they could, in the meanwhile, to reform their institutions, extend their knowledge, recover national power and seek independence and strengthening of the country. To them, the Russo-Japanese war was a turning point in the history of Asia and China. At last, the tide seemed to be turning against the Western domination of Asia, and in favour of political reform at home. Japan's role in China's reform was well recognised and now that China was undergoing reform so as to become like Japan, the two countries should foster a closer relationship by building on their common interests.

It was on the strength of this argument that some emphasized the need for China to 're-cultivate' a post-war friendly relationship with Japan. The Tung Fang Tsa Chih criticized the government for rejecting Japan's "good-will" and her offer of a coalition after the Sino-Japanese war. It also attacked Li Hung-chang's pro-Russian policy after the war and held him responsible for inducing Russian penetration into Manchuria which in turn caused the scramble for concessions by the Western powers in the 1898 period. This, it maintained, was a result of the government's mistake in rejecting Japan's offer of friendship.⁽³²⁾

It was also believed that Japan herself stood to benefit from a

(32) "The harmful effects of China's dependence on a third party", editorial, TFTC, No. 8, 4th October, 1904, pp. 158-161.

closer relationship with China after the Russo-Japanese war. Much emphasis was laid on the insecurity of Japan's position in international politics in the Far East. It would seem that those who believed in Sino-Japanese cooperation in the post - 1905 period did not reckon that Japan had attained the goal of national independence with her victory in the war. The Hong Kong Hua Tzu Jih Pao said that as Russia's defeat was unexpected and it was a blow to her pride, Japan would be wise to prepare for a war of revenge as Russia would not accept defeat at the hands of a small country such as Japan. An alliance with China, according to the Hua Tzu Jih Pao, was the answer to the threat of a second military confrontation with Russia. It would also provide a permanent basis on which Japan and China could cultivate their future friendship.⁽³³⁾ The Tung Fang Tsa Chih believed that though the victory of Japan might give her the status of a great power, she would not be accepted by the Western powers. Hence Japan still would not have secured her national independence. China should make use of this psychological moment to form a cooperative relationship with Japan. She should seize this opportunity to carry out reforms and strengthen herself as Japan would then be willing to offer her help and support. If, however, China perpetuated her backward state of affairs and remained unaware of the Western expansion, then she would become isolated as Japan would have her own national independence to think of.⁽³⁴⁾

Others were more cynical about the post-war situation. The Wai Chiao Pao thought that it was only because the Russo-Japanese settlement was a diplomatic failure for Japan that China would be affected beneficially for she could then look forward to peaceful coexistence with Japan in future. It commented that Japan's attitude towards China

(33) "On the relations between Japan and China", H.K. Hua Tzu Jih Pao, 30th June, 1905.

(34) "International diplomacy of the present day", TFTC, No.1, 28th February, 1905, pp.4-5.

had seen several changes during the preceding decade. Such changes had been the results of Japan's successes and failures in her dealings with the Western powers: After the Sino-Japanese war, for example, Japan reacted against the joint intervention by Russia, France and Germany and offered China her friendship, arguing for a liaison based on racial and cultural affinity. In 1902, she concluded an alliance with England and was jubilant over her association with a white nation. She rejected the theory that Japan and China belonged to the same race and argued that Japan should alienate herself from the yellow race. During the early part of the Russo-Japanese war, Japan was very cautious and adopted a friendly and peaceful disposition towards China. Soon after the fall of Port Arthur, however, she offended China's feeling when she proposed plans for settling the Manchurian question. The *Wai Chiao Pao* premised that had Japan reaped a diplomatic victory from the Portsmouth Treaty, her future policies towards China would be one of furthering her ambitions in that country. This diplomatic setback therefore, might make her realize that rapprochement with the white race was not feasible and that it would be more realistic to cooperate with China. (35)

Some genuinely believed that the racial implication of the Russo-Japanese conflict would be carried over into post-war international politics and that the future would see an endless confrontation between the yellow and white races. This was held as sufficient reason by the *Fukien Jih Jih Hsin Wen* to believe that Japan had a genuine desire

(35) "Further discussion on the Russo-Japanese peace treaty", *Wai Chiao Pao* (Diplomatic Review), No. 122, 23rd September, 1905. pp. 2-3. This is a privately owned publication which was founded in late 1901 in Shanghai. Its objective was to overcome China's inefficiency in dealing with foreign countries by keeping Chinese diplomatic circles informed of foreign news and ideas. It proposed to rectify the situation in which China was gradually losing her sovereignty through a lack of any policies towards the foreign powers. It also aimed at enlightening the Chinese public on foreign affairs and especially the futility and danger of anti-foreignism. It was, by and large, a scholarly and learned journal widely read in government circles and was, in fact, taken over by the *Waiwupu* in 1906.

to support China.⁽³⁶⁾

Emergence of Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialist feeling after
the Russo-Japanese war

Optimism and euphoria were not the only sentiments surrounding the future of Sino-Japanese relations. Few were so naive as to overlook what Japan, if victorious, might do after the war. Throughout the same period, doubts and suspicions of Japanese intentions were not discarded. The revolutionary newspapers in Shanghai such as the O Shih Ching Wen and later, the Ching Chung Jih Pao, saw little difference between Japan and the Western powers in their policies towards China. Even Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's constitutional journal, the Hsin Min Ts'ung Pao, was none too reserved in its criticism of Japan's intentions towards Manchuria. It is important to note here that the coincidence of the Russo-Japanese war with the increasing tempo of political reform at home had aroused the interest of the Chinese in external affairs. The newspapers and political publications had been trying to awaken the people to the danger that was threatening the country and for the first time, public attention had been drawn to the foreign menace since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war giving impetus to the movement for constitutionalism, reform and nationalism. The "recovery of national independence and right" became widely-accepted slogans among the public. Increasingly virulent attack was directed at the Manchu government for its being too weak to resist foreign aggression and too ineffective in recovering China's national rights from the foreign powers. These two issues: the need to preserve Chinese independence and

(36) "On the question of Japan having a monopoly of control in East Asia", 8th July, 1905, Fukien Jih Jih Hsin Wen, reprinted in TFIC, No. 9, 23rd October, 1905, pp. 179-181. The view expressed by the Fukien Jih Jih Hsin Wen might have reflected the influence of the Tōa Dōbun Kai in the province.

the unsuitability of the Manchu rule for the Chinese nation became inseparable. And in the early half of the first decade of the twentieth century, anti-Manchu hostility remained largely within the confines of anti-imperialism.

As has been noted, the O Shih Ching Wen (Russian Alarm) changed its name to Ching Chung Jih Pao (Warning Bell Daily) soon after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, the purpose being to make the Chinese people aware of the new source of threat — Japan.⁽³⁷⁾ To the editors of these newspapers, Japan's successive victories in Manchuria seemed to pose an added cause for alarm. The Ching Chung Jih Pao commented that the Russo-Japanese conflict in Manchuria was a case of "driving the tiger out through the front door and letting the wolf in through the back door."⁽³⁸⁾ As early as at the outbreak of the war, the Hsin Min Tsung Pao gave one of the reasons for Japan insisting on Chinese neutrality as the unwillingness on her part to commit herself in an alliance with China which would give the war a racial connotation. According to the Hsin Min Tsung Pao, Japan was anxious not to arouse the disapproval of America and the European countries.⁽³⁹⁾ Suspicion of Japanese intention to align her policies with the West accounted for the wariness regarding Japan's intentions towards Manchuria. Many suspected that the Russo-Japanese war was one fought by both powers for imperialistic ends.

One of the reasons for the criticism of the government's declaration of neutrality was that by so doing China had tacitly relinquished her

(37) "The epilogue of the O Shih Ching Wen" in concluding issue of the newspaper, OSCW, 25th February, 1904.

(38) "The question which has arisen with the fall of Port Arthur", editorial, CCJP, Vol.3, 4th September, 1904, p.1.

(39) "Why did Japan want China to become neutral?", Review of ^{the} Current Political Situation in HMTF, Vol.7, No. 40-41, 2nd November, 1903, pp.122-123.

claims to Manchuria.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Japan's negotiations with Russia for the latter's recognition of her political, commercial and industrial interests in Korea in exchange for her recognition of Russian influence in Manchuria in July, 1903 had provoked criticism from the O Shih Ching Wen which maintained that Japan's hidden motives could be seen from those negotiations.⁽⁴¹⁾ The Ching Chung Jih Pao said that both China and Korea were the real losers in the Russo-Japanese war.⁽⁴²⁾

The Ching Chung Jih Pao was particularly critical of Japanese activities in Manchuria during the war: Japan had deprived China of her "financial sovereignty" when she appropriated the customs and revenues in Yingkow.⁽⁴³⁾ Her intention of introducing constitutional government in Manchuria, far from being a genuine wish to improve the political system of Manchuria, was merely a desire to alienate the people living in Manchuria from the Peking government.⁽⁴⁴⁾ When Nakamura Shingo's "Proposed plan of remedial policy towards Manchuria" appeared in the Gaikō Jihō, advocating nominal return of Manchuria to China but de facto Japanese control in the area, Chinese fears of Japanese ambitions in Manchuria were confirmed. The plan provoked widespread criticism from the Chinese press. Anti-Japanese hostility was aroused particularly among the northern Chinese public when the issue was debated in the Tientsin Ta Kung Pao, the officialized Shih Pao and the Chung Wai Jih Pao (Universal Gazette).⁽⁴⁵⁾

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- (40) "The extraordinary reasons given for China's declaration of neutrality": Review of Current Events in OSCW, No.68, 20th February, 1904.
- (41) Editorial article written on the occasion of the expansion of the O Shih Ching Wen, *ibid.*, No.68, 20th February, 1904.
- (42) "Both Japan and Russia are to gain from the war", editorial, CCJP Vol.1, 3rd April, 1904, p.2.
- (43) "The great misfortune which has befallen China": Commentary of Current Affairs, *ibid.*, Vol.3, 31st August, 1904.
- (44) "The vanguard movement of establishing a constitution in Manchuria," editorial, *ibid.*, Vol.3, 8th September, 1904, p.1.
- (45) See Toa Dobun Kai Kankei Zassen, *op.cit.*, pp. 210-211.

Attention was also drawn to the infiltration of Japanese influence in China. Again, the Ching Chung Jih Pao said that this was as much a cause for concern as that of the Western powers in other spheres of Chinese affairs as it facilitated Japanese annexation of China in the near future. The paper warned that the Japanese had succeeded in intercepting Chinese control over the education of Chinese students. She had encountered little difficulty in this enterprise because many radical-minded Chinese had come to regard Japan as an advanced country in Asia and therefore had warmed towards Japanese help. This, however, was a real danger to China, the editorial said, as it would lead to total acceptance of the Japanese culture and the undermining of the Chinese heritage.⁽⁴⁶⁾

As a warning to the Chinese leaders, the Ching Chung Jih Pao said that there were three arguments in Japan regarding her policies towards China. The first was for the expansion of imperialistic activities in China to catch up with the Western powers by annexing Manchuria and increasing her influence in Fukien in order to prey on other areas in China. This, according to the Ching Chung Jih Pao, was in fact currently being carried out by the Japanese government. The second policy was to support and cooperate with China so that together they might confront the West which had been much alarmed by Russia's propaganda of the "yellow peril". The paper argued that this was only a face which the Japanese turned to China and there was little sincerity behind it. The third policy was to deal a fatal blow to the "sleeping tiger" to forestall all future misfortune which she might cause Japan through her weakness. This policy, the Ching Chung Jih Pao warned, presented the greatest threat to China and it should be brought to the notice of those Chinese government leaders who were at the

(46) "On the Japanese control over Chinese education", editorial CCJP Vol.4, 14th September, 1904, p.1.

moment disposed to a pro-Japanese policy.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Attitudes of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries in Japan towards Sino-Japanese cooperation after the Russo-Japanese war.

The few years immediately after the Russo-Japanese war also saw the propaganda struggle between the Chinese reformers and the Chinese revolutionaries. An editorial battle was waged between Liang Chi-ch'ao of the Hsin Min Tsung Pao on the one hand and Hu Han-min, supported by Wang Ching-wei and Chang Ping-lin of the Min Pao on the other. The 'battle' took place in Japan as the Hsin Min Tsung Pao was published in Yokohama and the Min Pao in Tokyo. As both publications were smuggled into and circulated in China, it is thought that their ideas and theories reached a fairly large section of the reading public. The main substance of the dispute was the pros and cons of a republic and a constitutional monarchy for China. The issue of Sino-Japanese relations also made up an important part of their discussions. Their attitudes towards cooperation between the two countries were influenced by their political views on the Chinese government and their own relations with the Japanese authorities and individuals.

One of the major issues debated by the reformers and the revolutionaries was whether a revolution in China would invite the intervention of foreign powers. In its anxiety to convince the Chinese public that a revolution would not induce the dismemberment of China, the Min Pao emphasized that the nature of the revolutionary movement, unlike the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, was anti-Manchu and not anti-foreign.

(47) "Is there any sense in relying on a foreign power?",
Commentary on Current Events, *ibid.*, Vol.2, 4th June, 1904, p.1.

While the revolutionaries' attack on the Manchu government before 1905 tended to focus its weakness vis-à-vis the foreign powers, this kind of argument was rarely heard after the establishment of the Tung Meng Hui in Tokyo in 1905. Compared with the decade of 1895-1905, the threat to China's independence after 1905 probably seemed less immediate and the revolutionaries tended to minimize the current danger from the foreign powers. Wang Ching-wei insisted that the situation in the Far East had changed since Japan had won the war. Russia and her 'allies' — France and Germany — were beginning to feel uncertain about a dismemberment of China after Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan. Japan, supported by England and America, he maintained, only wanted to preserve China's integrity and maintain the "open door" in Chinese territories. Wang emphasized that Japan had shown her pacific intentions when she ^{did} not try to take advantage of China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion. (48)

But the Chinese revolutionaries in Japan had little support of Japanese government circles which much preferred the conservatism of the reformers. Ōkuma, in particular, had since 1898 cast his lot with the reform party and he distrusted the Chinese revolutionaries. In a speech which he gave at the Tōhō Kyokai soon after the Sino-Japanese settlement was negotiated, he criticized the Manchu government for losing its control over the Chinese people who were agitating to recover

(48) Wang Ching-wei, "Refutation of the theory that a revolution will induce the dismemberment of China", Min Pao (People's News), photographic reprint, Peking, 1957, Vol.1, No.6, January, 1907, pp. 18-26. Founded in 1905 in Tokyo, the journal was the organ of the Chinese revolutionary party, the Tung Meng Hui. Its editors and contributors were mostly students studying in Japan who had rallied to the revolutionary cause. It was antagonistic to the Manchu government for its "inadequacy of diplomacy", "corruption" and "misgovernment", and propagated the idea that nothing short of the downfall of the ruling dynasty could save China from destruction.

Chinese rights which had been lost as a result of the weakness of the Manchu government. Echoing Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's note of caution, Ōkuma warned that subversive elements in society were undesirable as they would lead to unrests which in turn would encourage the aggressive intentions of foreign powers. He advocated that Japan adopt a strong attitude in her future policies towards the Manchu government as well as the Chinese revolutionaries.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The lack of sympathy on the part of Japanese government leaders was a source of frustration for the Chinese revolutionary leaders. They were convinced that the Japanese government did not know what was good for China and hence did not understand the importance of a revolution for China. Commenting on Ōkuma's speech, Hu Han-min regretted that Ōkuma had not made any distinction between the Manchu authorities and the Chinese people in his criticism. He argued that the Manchu government had been responsible for upsetting the balance of power among the foreign countries but he maintained that revolution and independence for China would soon change all that.⁽⁵⁰⁾

Many Chinese revolutionaries who found in Japan a haven for their political activities were also hopeful for help and cooperation from Japan. They believed that China needed Japan for her national survival but not until she had achieved as much as Japan in the way of self-strengthening and renovations could she hope to cooperate with Japan on an equal basis. As long as China remained under Manchu rule, such hopes would never become a reality. Ch'en T'ien-hua, the revolutionary student who killed himself in protest against the Mombushō regulations

(49) Hu Han-min, "Commenting on the most recent Sino-Japanese negotiations", *ibid.*, Vol.1, 26th November, 1905, pp. 102-108.

(50) *ibid.*

of 1905 said in his "Last Message",

"... It is only because of Japan's war [with Russia] that China has been able to survive. Although it is a shame for China that she has been saved by Japan, [the Chinese] must acknowledge Japan's efforts towards the preservation of East Asia. If [the Chinese] feel ashamed of themselves [for having had to turn to Japan for protection], they can do no better than make themselves strong, improve their foreign relations, change their national polity and strengthen their military defence in the coming decade. Then the Japanese will certainly welcome China as an ally. One must not, however, confuse 'alliance' with 'protection'. If a country needs 'protection' from another, it means that she is powerless and entirely at the mercy [of her protector]. One can find such an example in Korea. Countries which are allies with one another are equal in strength. They offer one another help and assistance. England and Japan [have such a relationship with each other].... The basis for an alliance is common interests and not racial and cultural affinity China and Japan have common interests but are not equal in strength Hence if China formed an alliance with Japan at the present moment, she would only become [a second] Korea. And yet if she detached herself from Japan now, East Asia would be destroyed...."(51)

One of Min Pao's six objectives called for cooperation between the Japanese and the Chinese people. It is perhaps worth noting that the statement did not call for an alliance. Hu Han-min explained this point in an editorial,

"There are two schools of thought about China in Japan. One advocates conquest by force, the other favours close guidance and ultimate assimilation. Not many people hold the first view. The policy it advocates is military-centred and is unpopular with diplomatic circles and hence it is unimportant. The second school has more influence. However, the idea of assimilation implies an unequal relationship between the two peoples. There are those among the four hundred million Chinese who can discern the lack of sincerity in this argument and are therefore cautious and suspicious about it. In this way, the peoples of Japan and China cannot

(51) Hsin-hai Ko-ming Lieh-shi Shi-wen Hsüan (Selection of revolutionary literature of the 1900's), Peking, 1962, p.103.

cooperate with one another. There are also two views held by the Chinese — the anti-Japanese and the pro-Japanese. The anti-Japanese attitude is unwise ... but the pro-Japanese attitude is dependent on Japan's support and is one of resignation to the present situation in which China is unable to defend herself against foreign invasion. What we want is a strengthening of friendship between the two peoples. China should reform and strengthen herself in order to secure a status which will enable her to negotiate with Japan on an equal footing and not to subject herself to any more humiliation. Japan on her part should give up her ambitions. She owes her culture to China and she must not try to take advantage of her now The Manchu government cannot represent the Chinese people. Japan will benefit if she forsakes the Manchus to ally herself with the Chinese people...." (52)

In the post-Russo-Japanese-war years, such views as were expressed by the Min Pao editors could be expected to cause grave reservations among many Chinese, not least of all their counterparts in China, the editors of the O Shih Ching Wen and the Ching Chung Jih Pao, for example. But as Jansen puts it, "The Min Pao performed a valuable service for the cause of Sino-Japanese relations. Its services were needed for there was much to arouse suspicion and dislike among the Chinese students in Japan" (53). A month after its publication, the Japanese Mombushō put out rules regulating activities of Chinese students. The students boycotted classes and demonstrated. Some advocated that the entire student population leave Japan and go back to China, others wanted to stay. The split extended to the editorial board of Min Pao. Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min insisted on staying and the journal resumed publication until October, 1908. Had Min Pao and its leaders been removed from the Japanese setting in 1905, its revolutionary movement might have become thoroughly anti-Japanese.

(52) Hu Han-min, "The six points of the Min Pao", Min Pao, op.cit., Vol.1, No.3, April, 1906, p.18.

(53) Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, op.cit., p. 121.

It would be appropriate to mention here that Chinese revolutionary leaders found sympathisers in Japanese liberal politicians, activists and nationalists who shared Sun Yat-sen's ideology of pan-Asianism — all Asian countries to unite together in fighting Western domination. Inukai Ki was a genuine supporter of the 'progressive' Chinese who agitated for reforms and changes in China. As a liberal parliamentarian, he was opposed to the oligarchic government at home and devoted to the struggle for representative government in Japan. He was also conscious of the necessity for Asian unity and often attacked the government if its policies seemed too pro-Western. Japanese nationalist societies notably the Kokuryūkai had a keen interest in Asian expansion and shared the hopes, plans and activities of the Asian revolutionaries. These nationalist adventurers drew a parallel between Japan at the end of the Tokugawa period and Asian countries during the Meiji period and would like the same — overthrow of the government in Tokugawa Japan — to happen in contemporary China and Korea. Miyazaki Torazō, more of a radical liberal than patriot, was motivated by a genuine fear of Western imperialism and wanted to bring about the regeneration of Asian countries as the first steps towards attaining independence for Asia. (54)

The Meiji adventurers believed in Japan's superiority and seniority in reforms over the rest of Asia. They felt it their duty to guide Asia towards prosperity. This attracted the Chinese revolutionaries especially Sun Yat-sen. Sun told Miyazaki that the deliverance of the four hundred million Chinese people, the vengeance of the yellow race of East Asia and the recovery of the human rights of the universe

(54) For a detailed study of the history of cooperation between the Chinese revolutionaries and their Japanese sympathisers, see Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, op. cit.

depended on the outbreak of the revolution and Miyazaki should back him and his supporters to their success which realization would solve all other problems.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Sun's hatred of Western imperialism steered him towards Japan as a logical ally. In 1905, he and his revolutionary supporters many of whom were students in Japan organized themselves into the T'ung Meng Hui in Tokyo with funds and help from their Japanese friends. The formation of the T'ung Meng Hui, however, marked the beginning of a declining friendship between the Chinese revolutionaries and the Japanese. As the revolutionary movement became more organized and gained in momentum, it swung more to Chinese goals and Chinese nationalism. Anything short of cooperation on terms of equality was likely to be rejected. On the other hand, by 1905, growing Japanese power and complications in Japan's foreign relations had ruled out the possibility of an equal partnership between the two countries. Moreover, the Japanese government had misgivings about the revolutionary movement which threatened to overthrow the Manchu government. Sun Yat-sen, however, was for Sino-Japanese cooperation at all costs. In January, 1907, he intimated in a speech given at a meeting of Chinese students in Tokyo that since the revolution was aimed at the Manchus and the revival of China, he would have no complaint if Japan felt she deserved territory north of Changchun for her help.⁽⁵⁶⁾ This, ironically, convinced the Tokyo government that Sun's presence in Japan was embarrassing and undesirable for its policy of propping up the Manchu government in China. When Peking

(55) Ch'en Ku-t'ing, Kuo-fu yü Jih-pen yü-jen (Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his Japanese friends). Taipei, 1965, p.5.

(56) This was recorded in Toa Senkaku Shishi Kiden, op.cit., Vol.II, pp. 435-436. See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen p. 122.

requested the Japanese expulsion of Sun later that year, the Tokyo government promptly obliged.

It may be true that the danger from Japan made China's situation after 1905 hardly less precarious, but the revolutionaries, with their headquarters in Tokyo and anxious for Japanese help, were in no position to make an issue of Japanese imperialism. It was the reformers who tended to emphasize the international situation after 1905. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, for one, had doubts about Min Pao's point on Sino-Japanese friendship. According to him, cooperation on an equal basis was a political unreality. Japan, he said, would not be willing to assume any other role except the dominant one in the relationship, while to subject the Chinese people to the minor role in the partnership would entail the loss of Chinese sovereignty.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Liang's reservation on this point indicated that a change had occurred in his attitude towards Sino-Japanese cooperation since the 1898 reform era. In 1898, he founded the Ch'ing I Pao (China Discussion) in Yokohama, a leading reform journal of the time, and one of its professed goals was the "exchange of aspirations and voices of China and Japan and the unity of the two in friendship."⁽⁵⁸⁾ At that time, Liang was convinced that what China needed was a government reform programme along the lines of the Japanese constitutional monarchy. He regarded Japan as the ideal. His hopes for Japanese guidance in leading China towards reforms, his emphasis on relationship between the two countries being as "the lips to the teeth" and his enthusiasm about cooperation between Japan and China were repeatedly expressed throughout

(57) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "An elaborate discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of a racial revolution and a political revolution", HMTP, Vol.14, No.76, 9th March, 1906, p.38.

(58) "Preface to the Yokohama Ch'ing I Pao", Ch'ing I Pao (1898-1901), facsimile Taipeh, 1967, Vol.1, No.1, 23rd December, 1898, pp.3-5.

his writings.⁽⁵⁹⁾

However, Liang's writings after the turn of the century carried a rather different flavour. His expulsion from Japan in late 1899 was in part responsible for his disenchantment with the idea of a special relationship between Japan and China. During the Russo-Japanese peace talks, he spoke in favour of China calling an international conference to settle the Manchurian question. He criticized Yuan Shih-k'ai and Yang Shu, Chinese minister to Japan, for their insistence on China settling the Manchurian problem with Japan alone. A bilateral settlement, in Liang's opinion, would only result in the secession of Manchuria to Japan.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In October, 1904, Ōkuma, at a meeting of the Shinkan Kyokai (Association of China and Korea), gave a speech in which he reiterated his "Doctrine" and stressed that Japan was best suited to lead China towards enlightenment on racial and cultural grounds.⁽⁶¹⁾ An article which Liang wrote for the Hsin Min Ts'ung Pao commenting on Ōkuma's speech revealed his doubts about the practicability of the "Ōkuma Doctrine". While he acknowledged Ōkuma's "sincere concern" for China's territorial integrity, he maintained that there were those in Japan who had ambitions towards China. Liang said that power politics had little regard for ethics. Ōkuma's sincerity and eloquence could not cover up the facts. No country could hope to achieve independence by relying

(59) See, for example, various articles by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in the Ch'ing I Pao: "On the advantages of learning Japanese", Vol.2, No.10, 1st April, 1899, p.589, "China's strength to become independent and Japan's policy in the Far East", Vol.4, No. 26, 5th September, 1899, pp. 1684-1685, "The best policies of the powers towards China in the present time," Vol.7, No.53, 5th August, 1900, p.3429 and Vol.7, No.55, 24th September, 1900, p. 3555.

(60) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Criticism of the steps taken by the government in the Russo-Japanese peace settlement", HMTF, op.cit., Vol.13, No.68, 4th May, 1905, pp. 81-85.

(61) See following Chapter.

on the support of other powers and China would be well-advised not to depend on Japan for her independence.⁽⁶²⁾ It is not surprising that in 1906 he attacked the Min Pao for being too naive in believing that there was hope for a Sino-Japanese cooperation on an equal basis.

Fear of Japanese 'encirclement of China', 1907-1908

Any hopes for an alliance with Japan all but disappeared when Japan reinforced her diplomatic position in the Far East by concluding a series of agreements with the Western powers — France and Russia in 1907 and America in 1908. Each of these agreements pledged the signatories to respect the independence and integrity of China, the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry as well as the rights and interests of the other party in that country. The Franco-Japanese agreement asserted that the two countries possessed a special interest in preserving peace and order especially in the regions of the Chinese Empire adjoining the territories where they had rights of sovereignty, protection or occupation. In the ~~secret convention of the~~ Russo-Japanese agreements, both parties agreed on the line of demarcation in Manchuria by which they were to sustain their mutual interests in each sphere of influence. By the exchange of the Root - Takahira notes, America acquiesced in Japan's claim to a special position in Korea and Manchuria in return for Japanese recognition of America's interests in the region of the Pacific Ocean.⁽⁶³⁾

The reaction of the Chinese minister to France, Liu Shih-hsün, to

(62) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "The so-called Ōkuma Doctrine", HMTF, Vol.11, No.57, 21st November, 1904, pp. 59-73.

(63) For details of the agreements, see Morinosuke Kajima, The emergence of Japan as a world power, 1895-1925, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 171-189.

the news of the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese agreement was perhaps not uncharacteristic of Chinese diplomacy of the period. In a despatch to the Waiwupu on 19th June, 1907, Liu reported that, by implication, the agreement infringed on China's territorial integrity. He asked the Waiwupu whether he should obtain an explanation from the French and the Japanese governments of their positions or just pretend to be unaware of the implication so that China could refuse to acknowledge both powers' strengthened positions in China.⁽⁶⁴⁾

The matter was soon taken up with more urgency, however, by the imperial inspector-general of Kiangsu, Shih Li-chin, who urged the Waiwupu in a memorial to take preparatory measures in face of the new threat to China's national security which had arisen with the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese agreement. Shih reported that knowledge of a secret agreement had been withheld from the Chinese government by France and Japan designating Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kwantung and Fukien as spheres of influence of the two countries. He warned that the rest of the powers had all acquiesced in Japan's activities, recognized Japan's special position in China and placed their trust in Japan to respect their own spheres of influence in China. If China still pinned her hope on Japan to preserve her territorial integrity, she would only degenerate to the same position as Korea. Shih also reported that an agreement would soon be made between Russia and Japan whereby the two countries would recognize each other's exclusive influence in Mongolia and Manchuria respectively. He said that the foreign powers were using different parts of the Chinese territories as gifts to gratify one another's greed. China could no

(64) Despatch from Chinese minister to France Liu Shih-hsün to Waiwupu, 19th June, 1907, Documents: Kuang-hsü, op.cit., Vol. 70, pp. 32b-33a.

longer sit back and watch without making any protest.⁽⁶⁵⁾

The Chinese public was even more alarmed by Japan's new diplomatic successes. It believed that Japan had come to terms with the Western powers to control China's destiny. Japan's rapprochement with France and Russia was seen as part of a general trend towards the combination of forces among the big powers. England and France had already formed an entente in 1904 and in August, 1907, England and Russia entered into an understanding. Through these alignments, the Anglo-Japanese and Franco-Russian alliances become interconnected in East Asia. An article in the Hsin Min Tsung Pao entitled "The Franco-Japanese agreement and its relations with China" said,

"... the earth is being explored everyday and [the big powers of] the world are daily expanding [their influences], leaving no room for colonization for the late-comers. Japan has washed the fields of Manchuria and Korea with her blood and expended her entire energy on operations in these areas because there is no other land which she can treat as her colonial territory. Is Japan, however, entirely to blame for defending herself at the expense of others in this world of 'survival of the fittest'? One can only blame [the people of] Manchuria and Korea for having failed to explore and develop their own wealthy resources and educating their own people, thus allowing those tasks to fall into the hands of Japan which is becoming more ambitious everyday At the moment, both France and Japan are anxious to expand their influences in China The so-called 'preservation of China' is none other than a jargon in international politics with which they hope to fool the world while they plunder and enrich themselves [at the expense of China]"⁽⁶⁶⁾

The Chung Wai Jih Pao and Shanghai Shen Chow Jih Pao warned that "preservation" had come to mean "peaceful partition". By declaring to the world that they wanted to uphold the principles of open door

(65) Appeal from imperial inspector in Kiangsu Shih Li-chin to Waiwupu to make plans for defending China from the imminent danger to the country's security, 28th July, 1907, *ibid.*, Vol.71, pp. 2b-3a.

(66) "On the Franco-Japanese agreement and its relations with China" in *HMTP*, *op.cit.*, Vol.17, No.94, 15th August, 1907, p.7.

and equal opportunity , the powers were aiming to expand their interests in China and eventually carve up that country.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The Wai Chiao Pao had similar misgivings regarding the agreement between Japan and America concluded in late 1908. It said that the so-called equal opportunities and protection of common interests of the two countries were none other than "means of peaceful invasion" of China. Japan and America would use their mutual agreement to expand their respective rights in commerce which would lead to the gradual depletion of China's financial resources.⁽⁶⁸⁾

In explaining the new development in Japan's foreign relations, the same journal said,

"Since the idea of ^{the} 'yellow peril' has been created by the German Emperor ... the Japanese have been resentful of the stigma and worked hard to disassociate themselves from it. By overcoming China and defeating the Russians, Japan has become a world power Since last year (1907), she has abandoned the old argument of racial and cultural affinity with China and refuted the idea that China and Japan shared a relationship as that between the lips and the teeth Is it true that she holds a grudge against China? One is inclined to think that she [does not but] wishes to catch up with the Western powers. The rumour of the 'yellow peril' has awakened the Japanese to the overwhelming pressure of the West in the East and she is afraid that the Western powers will outstrip her on the Asian continent"⁽⁶⁹⁾

The Min Pao became bitterly disappointed with Japan. An article called for an alliance between the countries in Asia without Japan:

"... the brother countries in Asia are suffering from the same fate. India is under British domination, Annam is colonized by France and China's Manchuria has been conquered At the present moment, the

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- (67) "The stage has been set for the partition of China by the powers", editorial, Chang Wai Jih Pao, 28th July, 1907, reprinted in the TFTC, op.cit., No.8, 2nd October, 1907, pp.144-145. And "On the conclusion of agreements between Japan, England, Russia and France and their relations with China", Shen Chow Jih Pao, 17th August, 1907, reprinted in TFTC, No.11, 29th December, 1907, pp.81-86.
- (68) "On the American-Japanese agreement and its relations with China's future", Wai Chiao Pao, No.228, 28th November, 1908, pp. 2-3.
- (69) "Impressions on the Western theory of the Yellow Peril", *ibid.*, No.204, 5th August, 1908, pp. 2-3.

Asian Continent is being preyed on by the ambitious powers. Japan alone is arrogant and conceited enough to see herself in the light of a Western power. She considers China as beyond salvation and wishes to share the spoils of a partition. Can we still contemplate allying ourselves with Japan? The peoples of India and Annam, however, are full of integrity and a sense of purpose We have faith in [their support for] the creation of a unified and harmonious Asia." (70)

Japanese rapprochement with the Western powers in 1907-1908 was a turning point in Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations as well as Chinese attitudes towards Japan. The Chinese government and public both saw it as a new threat to their country's security in the midst of Western encroachment in the East. To them, Japan had turned her back on her Asian neighbours and joined the Western powers in their imperialistic activities. The reaction of the Chinese was one of despair with regard to the future of their country. Although little had materialized from the idea of a special relationship between the two countries in the past, Japan's new friendship with the imperialist powers was, to the Chinese mind, nothing less than the abandonment of the cause of Sino-Japanese cooperation against the Western threat to Asian independence.

The Tatsu Maru incident and anti-Japanese boycott of 1908

Pessimism over the future of China further aroused national aspirations in the Chinese who since 1905 had resorted to political agitations with a view to enhancing the status of their country in the world. In 1908, for the first time, the Chinese boycotted Japanese

(70) "Hopes for harmony in Asia", Min Pao, op.cit., No.23, August, 1908, pp. 56-57.

goods in face of high-handed Japanese policy in the Tatsu Maru incident. In February, some Chinese officials had seized a Japanese freighter, the Tatsu Maru, loaded with a consignment of arms obviously intended for smuggling into China via Macao. While on board the Tatsu Maru, the Chinese officials lowered the flag of the Japanese vessel and hoisted the Yellow Dragon flag in its place when a Portuguese officers' boat was seen approaching the spot of trouble. The official explanation of the Chinese government was that the Chinese officials did not want a third party to intervene in the dispute. The Yellow Dragon flag had been hoisted in the hope that the Portuguese would not suspect anything unusual. The Japanese government and in particular, the Japanese public, however, would not accept the Chinese explanation and insisted that their national honour had been insulted.

The subsequent negotiations between the two governments were prolonged and Japan's main contention was that the freighter had been seized illegally by the Chinese on the sea near Macao which, the Japanese maintained, was Portuguese territorial waters and therefore outside Chinese jurisdiction. As compensations for the seizure, the Japanese government imposed harsh terms on China. It demanded that the Chinese government formally apologize to the owner of the Tatsu Maru by firing twenty-one times, release the freighter, purchase the consignment, punish the Chinese officials responsible for the seizure and pay compensations to the owner of the Tatsu Maru.⁽⁷¹⁾

Japan's demands aroused hostile reactions from the Chinese. The "Self-Government Association" in Canton resolved to boycott Japanese

(71) For Japanese documents relating to the incident, see NGB, vol. 41, Part 2, (1961), pp. 1-62. Fulllest coverage of the incident is found in Wang Yün-sheng, Liu-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen, op.cit., Vol. 5, pp. 175 - 198.

goods and services. The boycott was organized by some Cantonese who had strong political views. Hsü Ch'in, Ch'en Hui-fu and Lo Hsiao-ang were followers of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and K'ang Yu-wei. They intended the boycott to be a political action against Japan's high-handed policy and not a demonstration of anti-Japanese hostility. They stressed that the boycott was to be a civilized method of protests and enjoined the people not to resort to uncivilized tactics. As the movement spread to other parts of Southern China, however, it gradually got out of control. In November, 1908, a riot broke out in Hong Kong organized from Canton by the "National Disgrace Society" which had sent more than twenty people to Hong Kong with the objective of destroying the shops and goods of Chinese vendors of Japanese merchandise. Anti-Japanese hostility was evident among the Chinese in Southern China and the movement did enough harm to Japan's trade with that part of China to cause much concern on the part of the Japanese government.⁽⁷²⁾

The movement also had the sympathy of individual officials. Admiral Li Chun of the Kwangtung fleet indirectly encouraged the boycott by advising Chinese officials at the "Office responsible for the remedial settlement of the Tatsu Maru incident" in Canton against purchasing coal from the Mitsui company in the midst of the boycott. Governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Chang Jen-chün did not act on the order from Peking to take severe measures in suppressing the boycott movement.⁽⁷³⁾ When Chang did not carry out immediately the order from the Waiwupu to release the Tatsu Maru, the Chinese gentry and merchants in Hong Kong had rallied to his support. Chang was convinced

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- (72) For details of the anti-Japanese boycott, see NGB, Vol.41, Part 2, pp. 62ff. For organization of the boycott, see documents (nos.) 1099, 1114 and 1115. For riot in Hong Kong, see nos. 1117, 1146, 1147 and 1166.
- (73) Japanese consul in Kwangtung Ueno to foreign minister Hayashi, 30th April, 1908, NGB, Vol.41, Part 2, No.1113, p.74 and foreign minister Hayashi to Japanese minister in China Hayashi, 1st May, 1908, NGB, Vol.41, Part 2, No. 1115, p.75.

of the justice of the Chinese cause and insisted Japan be asked to express regrets as part of the settlement of the Tatsu Maru incident. He suggested that the Chinese officials directly involved in the seizure of the Japanese freighter be summoned to Peking to explain what had happened. But his suggestion was turned down by the Waiwupu which told Chang that China had been partially at fault and that at any rate it did not want trouble with Japan. Under this instruction, Chang reluctantly ordered his officials to prohibit the anti-Japanese agitation. He admonished the Cantonese merchants and gentry to forbear, since China had no choice but to succumb to Japanese pressure, given the fact that "our diplomatic effort is limited by our lack of power".⁽⁷⁴⁾

The boycott, however, did not have the support of revolutionary students. Chinese students in Japan were split into two groups on this matter. By and large, the split was between the constitutionalists and the revolutionaries. The latter blamed the Peking government for handling the Tatsu Maru incident badly and attacked the boycott movement as uncivilized and ill-conceived. At a gathering of Chinese students in May, some constitutionalists gave speeches declaring support for the boycott and tried to win over those who did not hold any particular view on the matter. A scuffling soon followed between the two opposing groups and as a result, the constitutionalist students left the place of gathering. The revolutionaries then passed a resolution to oppose the boycott by sending telegrammes and letters to the Kwangtung government and leaders of the boycott movement.⁽⁷⁵⁾

(74) Chang Jen-chün to Waiwupu, 7th, 13th, 19th March, 1908; Waiwupu to Chang Jen-chün, 4th, 7th March, 1908, Waiwupu archives at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Cited in Iriye Akira, "Public opinion and foreign policy: the case of late Ch'ing China" in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey and Mary C. Wright, eds., Approaches to Modern Chinese History, University of California Press, 1967, p. 236.

(75) "The anti-Japanese boycott and Chinese students (the agitation of Chinese students in Japan)". TNNS, 19th May, 1908, p.2.

One of the letters criticized the boycott as a mistake on the part of the members of the "Cantonese Self-Government Association" who had erroneously believed the boycott to be a demonstration of patriotic feeling. It said that the way the Chinese government had handled the Tatsu Maru negotiations revealed its lack of knowledge of international law — yet another example of its feeble diplomacy. It was now absurd to stage an anti-Japanese boycott to make up for the loss China had suffered on the diplomatic front as it would make both countries suffer losses as well as arouse criticisms from the rest of the world. It was only lately that China had become aware of the importance of sovereign rights and such foolish actions on the part of the Cantonese merchants would only arouse resentment and suspicions from the other countries and jeopardize China's chances of becoming a strong power.⁽⁷⁶⁾

It would appear that the revolutionary students' opposition to the boycott was another episode in the wrangle between the Chinese revolutionaries and constitutionalists. The organizers of the boycott movement were followers of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Cantonese Self-Government Association was formed by those who wanted provincial participation in a constitutional government. But the basic objection of the revolutionaries to the boycott, however, arose from the fact that they were not attracted to the cause of opposition to arms smuggling as they were the ones who were most anxious to obtain arms.

The boycott was confined to a very narrow scope, hardly extending beyond Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The Wai Chiao Pao which was published in Shanghai cautioned the Cantonese against their reckless protests,

".... As we are lacking in all kinds of defence, indulging ourselves in reckless arrogance will only incur the wrath of our strong neighbour.

(76) The letter was translated in the TNNS in an article entitled "The anti-Japanese boycott and Cantonese students in Japan", 3rd May, 1908, p.2.

Should our neighbouring country send an ultimatum, then our government will be in deep waters, and should she send a gunboat, then our territorial waters will 'shake' with fear, the entire Chinese nation will dissolve and great harm will be done to our national entity Diplomacy of to-day must be backed by a powerful navy and new weapons. If we still believe that victory or defeat can be decided by talks alone or that we can hold on to our aspirations and pride to defend ourselves, then we will only be ridiculed for ages to come"(77)

The Waiwupu, from the beginning, was opposed to the boycott. Yuan Shih-k'ai, its president, fearing that the boycott would complicate Peking's negotiations with Japan, instructed the provincial governors to suppress the anti-Japanese movement. As it became clear that Canton was the only centre of the boycott and that the movement was strongly influenced by followers of K'ang and Liang, the Waiwupu was all the more determined to crush it.⁽⁷⁸⁾ The Tatsu Maru incident coincided with an aggressive Japanese policy in Manchuria. In 1908, disputes between Japan and China which had been left unresolved in the 1905 treaty came to the fore, together with new problems such as the Chientao question. Japan's hardened attitude towards the negotiations presented a new threat to the security of Manchuria. The Waiwupu had to be extremely cautious lest an untoward incident occur during the anti-Japanese agitations be used by Japan as a protest to use force in Manchuria in retaliation.

On the other hand, Japanese aggressive policy in Manchuria heightened Chinese hostility. The riot in Hong Kong towards the end of 1908 was underlined by a good deal of anti-Japanese sentiment. It was not only a case of an orderly protest which had got out of control. As the Chung Wai Jih Pao put it,

(77) "On the Cantonese peoples' anti-Japanese boycott", Wai Chiao Pao, No. 203, 27th March, 1908, pp. 2-3.

(78) Waiwupu to Chang Jen-chün, 12th March, 14th April, 1908, Academia Sinica Archives, Taiwan, cited in Iriye Akira, "Public opinion and foreign policy", in Albert Feuerwerker et al, (eds), op.cit. p.235.

"Japan which belongs to the same continent and the same race as China and with which we have always had a special relationship like that between the lips and the teeth ... has since last year offended the pride of the Chinese people. In questions such as Chientao, the Hsinmintun - Fakumen Railway and the smuggling of arms in a commercial vessel into China, the Japanese have used threat and force to back their demands. The Chinese government may be cautious and reluctant to resort to force in the negotiations, the Chinese people are not as generous and long — suffering. The recent riot of the Southern Chinese in Hong Kong is indicative of such feelings on the part of the Chinese people".⁽⁷⁹⁾

The boycott of 1908 might not have had nationwide support owing to various reasons and it might have been the intention of the organizers merely to draw the world's attention to the fact that the Chinese expected their country to be taken more seriously as a political entity, it nevertheless demonstrated a considerably hostile and resentful attitude on the part of the Chinese who saw that Japan had emerged as an imperialist power threatening Chinese integrity alongside the Western countries.

The consolidation of Japanese power in East Asia, 1908-1911

Much of the negotiations between Japan and China in the 1908-1909 period centred on both countries' claims to railway, mining and lumbering rights in Manchuria. But it was the boundary dispute over Chientao which sparked off the beginning of a new era in Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria.

Since the late nineteenth century, a community of Koreans had grown up across the Tumen River in the Yenchi region of southeastern Manchuria

(79) "On the incident of the Chinese riot in Hong Kong," Chung Wai Jih Pao, 27th November, 1908, p.1.

near the Korean - Russian border. In late 1907, the Japanese government disputed China's sovereignty in the area, insisting that the region was Korean territory and that Japan had the right to protect the Koreans from the harassment of Chinese officials and residents in the area.⁽⁸⁰⁾ The Japanese challenge seemed to be closely linked with their claim to the right of mining silver in the T'ien Pao Shan area which was situated in Chientao. A contract for a joint enterprise in the silver mine had existed between a Chinese merchant Ch'ing Kuang-ti and a Japanese called Nakano Jirō. The Chinese government took a firm stand in maintaining its claim to sovereign rights over the Chientao region and in November, 1907, ordered the closure of T'ien Pao Shan to all mining activities. The Japanese consul in Manchuria protested, maintaining that as the sovereignty over the region had still to be decided, the Chinese government had no right to close the mine to the Japanese.⁽⁸¹⁾ The dispute lasted over two years during which time both parties sent troops to the region and firing incidents occurred.

The Chinese were greatly alarmed by the situation. The "Head-office of the Organization of Chinese Students in Japan" sent a telegramme to the Waiwupu appealing to the latter to tighten up Chinese naval defence in the face of Japanese aggression. Japan's recent action in Chientao, the telegramme said, showed that the Franco - Japanese and Russo-Japanese agreements had emboldened Japan and that she was leading the powers in partitioning China.⁽⁸²⁾ The Manchurian Daily News warned that the Chientao question was only the beginning of Japanese aggression. If Japan's ambition was not checked immediately, she would one day make claims to the rest of the Chinese territories.⁽⁸³⁾

(80) According to Chinese sources, the name Chientao was invented by the Japanese referring to the Yenchi region in Manchuria. See despatch from governor-general of Manchuria Hsü Shih-ch'ang and governor of Fengtien (Mukden) T'ang Shao-i to Waiwupu, 24th August, 1907, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.71, p. 10b.

(81) Despatch from governor-general of Manchuria Hsü Shih-ch'ang to Waiwupu, 3rd December, 1907, *ibid.*, Vol.72., pp. 7a-8a.

(82) Telegramme from the Head-office of Chinese students' organization in Japan to Waiwupu, 13th September, 1907, *ibid.*, Vol.71, p.15b.

(83) "On the indisputable fact that Chientao is Chinese territory" in Manchurian Daily News, 1908, reprinted in TFTC, No.5, 23rd June, 1908, p.7.

While it held its ground firmly with regard to the Chientao question throughout the negotiations, the Chinese government made considerable concessions to the Japanese government in the other areas of disputes in Manchuria. Early in 1909, the Japanese minister to China Ijuin was instructed to tell the Waiwupu that if the Chinese government would make compromise and concessions in the other unresolved questions in Manchuria, Japan would be prepared to recognize Chinese sovereignty in Chientao.⁽⁸⁴⁾ In the Sino-Japanese agreement signed in September, 1909, the Chinese government agreed not to construct the railway running between Hsin-Min-Tun and Fa-Ku-Men which Japan held to be prejudicial to the interests of the South Manchuria Railway. China also agreed that the route between Ta Shih Ch'ao and Yingkow — originally a route used for transporting coal to the Chinese Eastern Railway — be extended to join the South Manchuria Railway. Japan acquired the right to mine in the collieries in Fushun and Yentai, paying revenues to the Chinese government. All mining areas along the Antung-Mukden Railway and branches of the South Manchuria Railway were to be jointly operated by Chinese and Japanese concerns.

The agreement was a major setback for China in Manchuria. It is hard to specify what particular concessions China had made in return for Japanese recognition of her territorial claim to Chientao. Suffice it to say that the Chientao question was an important factor influencing the Chinese government's decision to come to terms with Japan in 1909. Throughout 1908 and 1909, the Chinese government was anxious to settle the Manchurian disputes peacefully with Japan, despite growing anti-Japanese hostility at home.

(84) Despatch from Waiwupu to governor-general of Manchuria Hsü Shih-ch'ang, 15th February, 1909, Ch'ing Hsüan-t'ung ch'ao Chung-Jih Chiao-she Shih-liao, (Documents on Sino-Japanese relations in the Hsüan-t'ung period), Peking, 1933, Vol.1, pp. 7a-7b. Hereafter cited as Documents : Hsüan-t'ung.

From about 1908, Russian and Japanese "special interests" in Manchuria became seriously challenged by American capitalists who intended to use the "open-door" as leverage especially on Japan to force her to let go her sphere of influence in that area. Willard Straight who was appointed American consul - general in Mukden in 1906 had found an influential friend in T'ang Shao-i, the Chinese governor of Fengtien. T'ang had granted Japan the monopoly of railway rights in southern Manchuria, but he was ready to use the power of American capital as a buffer against Japan.

In 1909, Straight proposed to England and the powers to cooperate in building a long railway from Chinchow to Aigun. This was to supplant his previous scheme to make a loan jointly with England, France and Germany to the Chinese government for the purpose of building two railways out of Hankow: one to Canton and the other into the Szechuan province. This was known as the Hukuang loan, covering the provinces of Hunan and Hupeh. It never materialized, however, because England did not want intruders in her sphere of interest in the Yangtze valley and refused to cooperate.

The Chinchow-Aigun project was only one of the two proposals made by America in 1909. The other one was to 'neutralize' the railways of Manchuria: Russia and Japan to transfer ownership of their respective lines to an international banking group. The scheme was rejected by Japan and Russia which jointly warned China that she must consult them before foreign capital was employed in Manchurian railway enterprises in the future. Partly owing to the remonstrance from Japan and Russia, France and England gave notice that they would not support America in the Chinchow-Aigun line. The neutralization proposal also drove Japan and Russia closer together. A second Russo-Japanese agreement was signed in July, 1910, secretly reaffirming the line of

demarcation between their spheres in 1907 and strengthening the right of each, within her own sphere, to take all measures necessary for the safeguarding and the defence of those interests.

To the Chinese, the second Russo-Japanese agreement meant that Japan and Russia no longer paid lip-service to the principle of "preservation of China". By this agreement, they had closed the door and upset the balance of power in Manchuria. The Chinese minister to Russia, Sa Yin-tu, told the Waiwupu that Russia and Japan were resolved to cooperate in advancing their interests in Manchuria with a view to excluding the other powers. China could no longer hope to regain her rights and interests with the help of the other countries. It would be difficult, for example, for China to recover her railways from Russia and Japan when the leaseholds expired. She therefore must reorganize her internal affairs in Manchuria, strengthen her defence and prepare for a confrontation with Russia and Japan when she reclaimed her railways in the future. (85)

The governor-general of Manchuria, Hsü Shih-ch'ang, also urged the Waiwupu to take immediate measures to fortify the area. The Manchurian region, he said, was the origin of the Manchus and the basis of the Ch'ing court. Once it fell into the hands of the enemies, the national independence of China as a whole would be lost. China could not sit back and await her own destruction. Manchuria was rich in natural resources and the Chinese government must develop them. Russia and Japan had both established their machineries to implement their colonial policies in that area. The Chinese must counteract their

(85) Despatch from Chinese minister to Russia Sa Yin-t'u to Waiwupu, 13th July, 19010, *ibid.*, Vol.5, p. 8.

influence. He suggested that the Chinese government set up a bureau for exploration purposes in Manchuria, encourage more people to settle in the area and promote development enterprises. He even suggested that the Chinese government resort to loans from the powers for those purposes. He also maintained that the government would be wise to go ahead with the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway in collaboration with America.⁽⁸⁶⁾

The Chinese press took a more alarmist view of the development in Russo-Japanese relations. An editorial in the Shanghai Hsin Wen Pao (Shanghai News) summed up the views of the Chinese newspapers on the latest Russo-Japanese agreement:

"... China has not been included as a party to the agreement despite the fact that she is the sovereign of Manchuria and possesses the largest stake in that area A new situation has arisen with the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese agreement. China's administration in Manchuria in future will come into conflict with those two countries. There is no hiding from the truth that she has lost her prestige and honour. Henceforth, China will no longer be able to look upon Manchuria in the same light as her other provinces. The fate of Manchuria is running parallel to that of Korea...."⁽⁸⁷⁾

The annexation of Korea by Japan in August, 1910 came as another blow to China. The Chinese press expressed pessimistic views on the future of China and warned of the imminent destruction of the country: Japan had forsaken her declaration to respect the independence of Korea and the powers seemed to be unperturbed by her action. Would not the powers follow Japan's footsteps and abandon their own promise to preserve China's integrity? It was time the Chinese people united their

(86) Governor-general of Manchuria. Hsü Shih-ch'ang's proposed plan of development in face of increasing danger threatening the safety of Manchuria, 16th August, 1910. *ibid.*, Vol.5, pp. 18a-19a.

(87) Telegramme from the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun Correspondent in Shanghai 15th July, 1910: "Comments on the Russo-Japanese agreement in China", *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 17th July, 1910, p. 2, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, (reproduced in microfilm form). Hereafter cited as TAS.

efforts and strengthened their determination to save their country. They must urge their government to carry out more vigorous internal reforms and press for an early opening of the parliament.⁽⁸⁸⁾

The Japanese annexation of Korea also gave rise to a sense of urgency on the official level surrounding the need for reform in the administrative system in Manchuria. In November, 1910, the new governor-general of Manchuria, Shih Liang, presented a series of proposals to the Waiwupu. The primary objective of these proposals was to invite foreign investment and trade with a view to counteracting Japanese influence in the area. Shih Liang suggested that the government abolish the tariffs in all the ports in Manchuria, introduce mixed-residence in the interior of Manchuria to counter-balance the large number of Japanese who, by passing off as Chinese, had been residing in territories outside the prescribed areas for foreigners, open the mining and lumbering enterprises to foreign investments, appeal to the powers for loans to launch development projects and begin work on the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. His aim was to restore the "open door" and balance of power in Manchuria.⁽⁸⁹⁾

The Waiwupu, after some deliberation, approved the opening of mining and lumbering industries to foreign investments but decided against the plans for free-ports and mixed-residence in the interior as it believed that both measures would benefit Japan more than America and the European powers. It also rejected the idea of borrowing money from the powers and maintained that China had to finance her own development of the area in order to forestall foreign incursions. The

(88) See various reports from Asahi Shimbun correspondents in Peking, Mukden and Shanghai on the reaction of the Chinese newspapers to the Japanese annexation of Korea, TAS, 30th August, 1st, 3rd, 4th and 18th September, 1910, all on p. 2.

(89) Report from governor-general of Manchuria Shih Liang to Waiwupu, 17th November, 1910, Documents: Hsüan-t'ung, Vol. 6, pp. 4b-5a.

construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway was believed to be too expensive and therefore unfeasible.⁽⁹⁰⁾

The Manchu government's hope for maintaining friendly relations with Japan, 1908-1911

According to the Waiwupu, the proposed plan to counter-balance Japanese influence in Manchuria was hard to implement because of the complications in the administrative structure in Manchuria. A more plausible reason, however, was that the Chinese government wished to maintain an amicable relationship with Japan. Throughout the Tatsu Maru incident and the anti-Japanese boycott in 1908, the Chinese government adopted a cautious and compromising policy. While he was visiting Japan in October, 1908, T'ang Shao-i, governor of Mukden, was anxious to impress upon the Japanese that China did not bear a grudge against Japan on account of the Manchurian question. He also said that any misunderstanding between the two countries had arisen from the lack of law and order in Manchuria. But as these were gradually being restored, he was hopeful that China and Japan were on the road to harmonizing their relations.⁽⁹¹⁾

During the prolonged negotiations with Japan over the various disputes in Manchuria, the then governor-general of Manchuria Hsü Shih-ch'ang, despite his alarm over the Japanese challenge to Chinese sovereignty in Chientao, had expressed his wish that Japan and China would come to an early settlement of the unresolved issues and resume

(90) Waiwupu's reply to Shih Liang, 15th January, 1911, *ibid.*, Vol.6, pp. 9a-11a.

(91) "T'ang Shao-i on the relations between Japan and China", *TNNS*, *op. cit.*, 29th October, 1908, p. 2.

their friendly relations so that Russia should not take advantage of the estrangement between Japan and China to further her ambitions in northern Manchuria.⁽⁹²⁾ In March, 1909, he submitted a memorial suggesting that Japanese civil and military officials who were connected with the South Manchuria Railway Company be decorated with Chinese imperial honours as a gesture on the part of the Chinese government to promote friendly relations between the two countries. These Japanese officials included the former president of the South Manchuria Railway Company, Gotō Shimpei and his successor, Nakamura who, according to Hsü, had endeavoured to maintain peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and China.⁽⁹³⁾ As has been mentioned, the Chinese government took a compromising attitude in the Sino-Japanese settlement in 1909. The fact that Japan had become a world power since the Russo-Japanese war played an important part in the Chinese government's decision-making in dealing with that country. There is little doubt that Peking did not want to antagonize Japan.

During all this time, Japan remained as the model for Chinese constitutional reforms. Official cooperation between the two countries continued in the field of education though by 1908, the number of Chinese students going to Japan had become considerably smaller. Japanese teachers in agricultural and police schools, Japanese doctors in hospitals and Japanese military officers were recommended for imperial awards for their services in Manchuria. As late as January, 1911, Li Chia-chü of the Board of Education and one time minister to Japan, was sent to Japan to investigate Japanese finances in preparation for

(92) Despatch from Hsü Shih-ch'ang to Waiwupu, 25th December, 1908, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol.74, p. 30.

(93) Memorial from Hsü Shih-ch'ang requesting the Chinese Emperor to give awards to Japanese officials, 6th March, 1909, Documents: Hsüan-t'ung, Vol.1, pp. 14a-16b.

constitutional reforms in China.⁽⁹⁴⁾ Japanese guidance which was part and parcel of the "special relationship" between the two countries was still given a high value by the Chinese government.

Moreover, as the revolutionary movement gathered momentum towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the Manchu government was able to find a sympathetic friend in the Japanese authorities. When Sun Yat-sen was expelled by the Japanese government in 1907 at the request of Peking, Itō and Yamaza Enjiro of the Gaimushō had decided that he be allowed to return in three or four years. But Sun was not officially readmitted before 1911.⁽⁹⁵⁾ With Sun out of Japan, the T'ung Meng Hui was left without a powerful leader and the Manchu government hoped that the revolutionary cause would lose much of its attractions for the Chinese students. But student unrest continued to challenge the Chinese authorities. In March, 1907, Chinese students in Japan demonstrated outside the Chinese legation in Tokyo. They alleged that the Chinese minister responsible for student affairs, Wang Ke-ming, had used spies to investigate their political activity. The incident ended with Wang's resignation.⁽⁹⁶⁾ Soon after this, the Chinese government stepped up its repressive measures against the revolutionary students. The Japanese authorities too, increased their surveillance and control.

The Manchu dynasty faced the most serious crisis in November, 1908 when the Empress Dowager Tz'u Hsi and Emperor Kuang Hsü died leaving

(94) Report of "Investigation officer of Constitutionalism" Li Chia-chü on Japanese finances, 19th January, 1911, *ibid.*, Vol.6, pp. 12a-19b. Li also edited and translated several papers on the Japanese tax and account systems supplied by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (Ōkurashō).

(95) Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*, *op.cit.*, p.123.

(96) Chung-kuo Jih-pao (China Daily News), Facsimile of a part-run of the Hsing Chung Hui newspaper issued in Hong Kong, (Taipeh, 1969), No.2098, 5th March, 1907, p. 3. This newspaper was distributed to Chinese communities in the Philippine Islands, Singapore, Tokyo, Honolulu and San Francisco.

a vacuum at the top of the government. Within and outside China, there were speculations on a power struggle among the high-ranking officials in Peking and a major reshuffle in the organization of the government. The critical situation gave rise to the danger that internal unrest in China would break out leading to the downfall of the Manchu regime. The Japanese government was particularly concerned and tightened its control over the activities of Chinese revolutionaries in Japan. In a conversation with Hsü Shih-ch'ang, the Japanese consul in Manchuria, Okabe said that Japan deeply grieved for China for her misfortune and was worried that the revolutionaries in China might seize the opportunity to create trouble. He told Hsü that the Japanese government had authorized its officials in various districts to prohibit all Chinese students suspected of engaging in revolutionary activities from leaving Japan with the intention of returning to China during the crisis and to prevent arms and ammunition from leaving Japanese ports for China. It had also ordered the governor-general of Taiwan and the Resident-general of Korea to take similar actions. Okabe said that it was the intention of the Japanese government to do all in its power to help China and those measures were evidence of its good-will towards the Chinese government. (97)

Chinese revolutionary publications also suffered as a result of the cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese governments. In October, 1908, at the request of T'ang Shao-i, the Japanese authorities ordered that the Min Pao, Szechuan and Yunnan, three leading revolutionary journals of Chinese students in Japan, be banned from publication. (98)

(97) Despatch from governor-general of Manchuria Hsü Shih-ch'ang to the Ministry of Defence, 24th November, 1908, Documents: Kuang-hsü, Vol. 74, p. 27.

(98) "The closure of Chinese student journals by the Japanese government", Chung Wai Jih Pao (Universal Gazette), Shanghai, 1st November 1908.

And as if to return the courtesy of the Japanese government, the Chinese government ordered the closure of the Min Hsü Jih Pao (Peoples' Plight), a sequel to the Min Hu Jih Pao (Peoples' Cry) - both Shanghai sequels to the suppressed Min Pao - in November 1909. The order had been made as a result of a protest lodged by the Japanese consul and vice-consul in Shanghai against the Min Hsü Jih Pao's remark on the assassination of Itō in late 1909. The paper had commented that the death of Itō was a triumph for the Chinese and Korean peoples whose aspirations for national independence had long been suppressed by the policies of "ambitious Japanese expansionists" like Itō. It was time for Korea and China to take joint action in redressing the situation in the Far East.⁽⁹⁹⁾ The Min Hsü Jih Pao's comment also aroused much concern on the part of the Japanese press. The Hankow correspondent of the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun expressed his wish that the Chinese authorities would take prompt action in suppressing the "subversive elements" attempting to jeopardize the friendship between Japan and China.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

In the post-Russo-Japanese-war era, the Manchu government, not sharing the aspirations of the Chinese nationalists, did not find Japan's imperialistic policy in East Asia particularly menacing or incompatible with friendship between the two countries. Its existence increasingly being threatened at home, the Manchu government could not afford to make external enemies. A friendly relationship with Japan which entailed the acceptance of harsh terms was necessary. It would not, so the Manchu government hoped, aggravate its precarious position.

(99) "The conspiracy of Itō's visit to Manchuria", editorial, 26th October, 1908, p.1, "On the assassination of resident-general Itō" editorial, 2nd November, 1909, p.1, Min Hsü Jih Pao. (Peoples' Plight), Facsimile, Taipei, 1969. Also, "Closure of the Shanghai Min Hsü Jih Pao, continued", TFTC, No.13, 4th February, 1910, pp. 463-468.

(100) "Special report from China by correspondent in Hankow", TNNS, 27th November, 1909, p. 3.

Growing Chinese hostility against Japanese imperialism 1910-1911

The gap left by the Min Hsü Jih Pao, an anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist newspaper, was soon filled by the Min Li Pao (the Democrat) which ran from October 1910 to September, 1913 as the most influential revolutionary paper in China of its time. Like its predecessors, the newspaper was published in the concession area at Shanghai. Its contributors included people like Sung Chiao-jen, a close associate of Huang Hsing and one of the founders of the T'ung Meng Hui. But the main body of the managerial and editorial staff had little connection with the revolutionary movement centred in Japan.

In the early days of its publication, the Min Li Pao was not a clear-cut revolutionary newspaper. Its main concern was that China was being threatened by imperialistic activities of the powers and the Manchu government was incapable of safeguarding the country's national independence. It was particularly hostile against increasing Japanese influence in Manchuria and Korea, denouncing Japan's "hypocrisy" in assuming the role of the champion of Far Eastern independence. It believed that Japan's aggressive activities in Manchuria were increasing rapidly in preparation for an eventual occupation of the area and Japan had forsaken all her promises to uphold peace and stand by China in face of foreign domination. It also stated that China and Japan were in a state of undeclared war. Japan would strike within five years' time and China must fight for her sovereignty over Manchuria. It would be wise of her to strengthen her military defence in preparation for this eventuality. (101)

(101) See "On the Far Eastern situation in the last twenty years", in instalments, 8th, 9th February, 1911, p.1, 25th, 27th March, 1911, p.1. "On saving China", editorial, 29th, 30th October, 1910, p.1. "A state of undeclared war between the two countries", 1st November, 1910. p.1, all in Min Li Pao, (Democrat). Facsimile, Taipeh, 1969.

The Min Li Pao also tried to play down Japan's growing influence with the powers. It wrote at length about Japan's "isolation" in the Far East and her "precarious position" among the Western powers. It said England had begun to see that her alliance with Japan did not benefit her position in India while Japan had used the alliance to annex Korea. Russia had always been an enemy of Japan. The Russo-Japanese agreement of 1910 had enabled Japan to expand her influence in Korea but did not help Russia to realize her ambitions towards Mongolia. Above all, the American proposals to neutralize the railways in Manchuria and construct the Chinchow-Aigun Railway had conflicted with Japanese interests. It was unlikely that Japan and America would come to friendly terms with one another. (102)

In particular, the Min Li Pao made much of the increasing incompatibility in the policies of America and Japan in Asia. It maintained that America seemed more and more interested in championing China's cause against Japan. There was hope that America, with her capital and power, would counter-balance Japanese influence in Manchuria. When Liang Ch'i-ch'ao expressed his disapproval of China borrowing loans from America and the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway, arguing that such moves would alienate China from England, France, Russia and Japan, he was bitterly attacked by the Min Li Pao as a traitor intending to sell Manchuria to Japan. (103)

The fierce attack on Liang Ch'i-ch'ao by the Min Li Pao was part of the quarrel between the Chinese constitutionalists and revolutionaries. The accusation was, moreover, not well founded as Liang himself was

(102) "A new and indisputable assessment of China's situation", *ibid.*, 23rd December, 1910, p.1.

(103) "New evidence against the traitor Liang [Ch'i-ch'ao]", in instalments, *ibid.*, 8th, 10th, 12th January, 1911. p.1. "Has Liang degenerated to this state?" *ibid.*, 10th January, 1911, p.2.

highly critical of Japanese imperialist activity after the Russo-Japanese war. The Kuo Feng Pao (National Custom), organ of Liang's constitutional party in the post-1907 period, was not slow to condemn Japanese policy in Manchuria. In January, 1911, it wrote,

"The new term imperialism is a policy in which a country seeks to expand her national power and livelihood outside her own territories Japan's recent activities indicate that she is gradually becoming an imperialist power ... Nowadays, those countries which carry out imperialistic activities are the same which preach peace. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that when a country expands her livelihood into another, she is practising 'peaceful imperialism' and when she expands her power [into the territories of another], she is practising 'aggressive imperialism'. But the two are inseparable and one leads to the other. From the establishment of the South Manchuria Railway Company to her recent activities in Manchuria, Japanese policy has undergone a change from peaceful imperialism to aggressive imperialism...."
(104)

Further suspicion of Japanese ambitions in China was aroused in 1911 by the rumour of a new agreement between Japan and Russia. In 1911, America made a proposal for an international banking loan consisting of American, British, French and German capital to be made to the Manchu government, designed ostensibly to reform and stabilize Chinese currency. To this end, China should be made to accept an American financial adviser. The plan alarmed both Russia and Japan which interpreted it as another cloak for American economic penetration of Manchuria. In June, the Japanese government approached Russia with the suggestion that the two countries take joint action in protesting against the preferential rights which the four powers had secured in Manchuria in their agreement made with China.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ The Min Li Pao,

(104) "Japan's foreign policy", Kuo Feng Pao, Shanghai, (1910-1911), No. 34, 11th January, 1911, pp. 21-22.

(105) Foreign minister Komura to Japanese minister in Russia Motono, 14th June, 1911, NGB, Vol.44, Part 2 (1962), No.682, pp. 356-357.

alarmed by the possibility of a new Russo-Japanese agreement, made a surprising appeal to Russia for an alliance:

"... An alliance between Russia and Japan will benefit Japan and not Russia. The Russian government will not be coaxed into such an unwise commitment. Instead, Russia should try to reach an understanding with China vis-à-vis Japan's continental imperialism. The day when Japanese aggrandizement on the continent materizes will see the destruction of the two old empires of China and Russia.... If China still [contemplated] cooperation with Japan against Russia and if Russia sat back and allowed Japan to invade China, then they would be exhibiting a negligence for the great moral principle of mutual dependence. The relationship between Russia and China are like that between the lips and the teeth. Once the lips are gone, the teeth will suffer from the cold...."(106)

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Only half a decade earlier, the same image of the lips-teeth relationship had been freely used by the Chinese to describe their relations with the Japanese when they talked about the need for China and Japan to unite their efforts against Russian aggression. This was when both the Chinese and Japanese thought they had something to offer each other in a cooperative relationship. But when China stood powerless watching Japan fight her war over Manchuria in 1904, she had tacitly given up hope for an equal relationship. This could not have been more obvious than when, soon after the outbreak of the war, she declared herself a neutral power on the insistence of Japan. The kind of relationship that China would, in future, have with Japan was to be decided by the outcome of the war; and by Japan, when she eventually won it.

(106) "On the Russo-Japanese alliance", Min Li Pao, 5th, 6th, August, 1911, p. 1 and 11. "Sincere admonition to Russia - revision of the commercial agreement between Russia and China", *ibid.*, 29th August, 1911, p.1.

This is not to say that the Chinese government had resigned itself to the dictates of Japan's wishes. Even while the Russo-Japanese conflict was going on, it still vacillated between a pro-Japanese and a pro-Russian policy. But the situation was very different from that of the late 1890's when Japan actually offered to cooperate with her and she was then in a position to choose her 'ally'. In fact, in 1904, an alliance with either power seemed to be out of the question. Russia had shown her ambitions in seizing Chinese territories and Japan preferred to fight the war on her own.

Meanwhile, growing unrest at home threatened to overthrow the existing order. As the Japanese government seemed to look with a suspicious eye on the 'subversive elements' which were using Japan as a base to build up their strength, the Manchu government had its reasons for maintaining the good-will of the Japanese government. But the post-war cooperation between the two governments was not of a kind that had any long-lasting effect on the friendship of the two countries. After the Russo-Japanese war, few Chinese leaders pursued a consistently pro-Japanese policy. The new generation of provincial and central government leaders led by Yuan Shih-k'ai took care to avoid trouble with Japan. But the active promotion of Sino-Japanese cooperation by Chinese officials had ended with the deaths of Liu K'un-i in 1902 and Chang Chih-tung in 1909. Moreover, the relationship of the 1890's in which both countries shared the fear of Western encroachment had also ended with Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war. Instead, China now had to accommodate another foreign influence in her territories, that of Japan in Manchuria.

Outside the government, attitudes towards Japan were not complicated by long-term political considerations. Sentiments were much more affected by events such as the war and Japan's activities in Manchuria.

For the Chinese, Japan's victory had done much to create a sense of emancipation from the enthrallment of Western domination of over half a century. The more restrained section of the public spoke of the need for future cooperation between Japan and China, the regeneration of the yellow race and the return of peace to the Far East.

But Japan's victory also filled the Chinese people with false hopes for their country. Suspicions of all foreign powers, not least Japan, went hand in hand with a growing sense of patriotism. A revolutionary press in China had existed soon after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war advocating the recovery of China's lost sovereign rights over her railways, China's education of her own students and China's own right to 'preserve' herself. They criticized the foreign powers for abusing the term "preservation of Chinese territories" which in their opinion, amounted to nothing less than the partition of China. In 1905-1906, the Chinese boycotted American merchandise in Shanghai. This was to spearhead further anti-foreign boycotts in the early twentieth century.

In the extremely anti-imperialist publications, there were severe criticisms of Japanese activities in Manchuria. Talk of China carrying out reforms with the help of Japan ^{was} ~~were~~ rarely heard. It would seem that the Chinese public was determined that China was not to place herself under Japanese leadership.

In Japan, nationalism in Chinese students was further aroused by the example of Japanese nationalism. More overtly than their counterparts at home, these students expressed their aspirations and hopes for China in anti-Manchu activities. They became increasingly hostile against Japanese power when their activities conflicted with Japanese authorities whose attitudes and policies towards Chinese students coincided

with those of the Manchu government. But outside the government, Japanese adventurers and idealists gave invaluable support to the Chinese revolutionary leaders. This accounted for the fact that Japan became a centre of Chinese revolutionary movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. Some of the Chinese revolutionary leaders thought they could extend the friendship existing between themselves and their Japanese friends to the Chinese and Japanese people at large. But after the Russo-Japanese war, the Tokyo government conducted an even more conservative policy towards the movements in China. Secure in the knowledge of a friendly Manchu government in China, Japanese government leaders were anxious that the Manchu dynasty should not be overthrown so that they could continue to maintain the upper hand in dealing with Peking. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao seemed to be aware of this when he criticized the revolutionaries for being too naive in believing that there were hopes for cooperation between Japan and China on an equal basis.

The year 1907 was viewed by many Chinese as a point of departure in Japanese policy and attitudes towards China. Chinese leaders and the public both alleged that Japan, by coming into a series of diplomatic agreements with the Western countries, had abandoned her role as the champion of Asian independence against Western encroachment. Many believed that Japan had turned her back on China and severed the historical and cultural ties between the two countries. It would appear that the Chinese had been slow in realizing that the Japanese government had since the turn of the century coordinated its policies and actions with those of the Western powers. Warnings of Japanese expansionist ambitions had in fact been made by nationalist writers soon after the Russo-Japanese war. But Japan's diplomatic measures in 1907 convinced the Chinese that henceforth there would no longer be any question of a special relationship between the two countries.

Aroused by Japanese high-handed policies in Manchuria and the Tatsu Maru incident, Chinese nationalism became more defined, finding its enemies in Japanese imperialism and the weak Manchu government. A few years earlier, some revolutionaries with their anti-Manchu organizations in Japan had had reservations about making an issue of Japanese imperialism. In 1907, however, their revolutionary cause suffered further from the cooperative measures of the Japanese and Manchu governments in suppressing their publications and expelling their leader. Many became totally disillusioned with the Japanese authorities. By the end of the decade, Manchu weakness and increasing Japanese power in the Far East aroused a fear that Chinese independence was being threatened in an unprecedented way.

CHAPTER FIVE

JAPAN'S NEW ROLE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, 1904-1907

After her victory over Russia in 1905, Japan's worries about the problem of national survival subsided. The Japanese came to look upon themselves as a member of the civilized community of nations. They began to talk of the necessity to secure their rights in China - rights which were due the status of Japan as a world power.

At the same time, the gradual awakening of the Chinese after the war evoked enthusiasm from the Japanese. Many were optimistic about the prospects of closer relations with a strong China. The readiness to recognize and sympathize with incipient Chinese nationalist aspirations can be explained by the fact that most Japanese, despite their consciousness of Japan's new power status, had not ceased to regard themselves as the leader of the "awakening of Asia". Increasingly, Japan, a Westernized Asian nation, saw herself as a link between the Eastern and Western world. The argument for Japan introducing China to Western civilization became more influential after the Russo-Japanese war.

Japanese determination to safeguard her post-war interests in China

For ten years since 1895, Japan had not recovered psychologically from the impact of Western imperialism. Having defeated Russia in 1905, she was determined to forestall all future harassment to her safety and peace in the Far East. The immediate step was to make Russia accept her demands.

Russia's refusal to pay a war indemnity and yield up the whole of the Sakhalin Island were accepted by Japan at the Portsmouth conference.

But the Japanese people at home were infuriated by the concessions which they thought did not do justice to their war efforts. They were also particularly sensitive about the ensuing negotiations between Japan and China. When China was slow to consent to the Russo-Japanese arrangements that Japan be given the construction right for the Kirin-Changchun Railway, when indeed, China actually refused Japan's request for several other rights in southern Manchuria, Japanese newspapers were very dissatisfied with China and severely critical of the Japanese government.

The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun attacked the Japanese plenipotentiaries in Peking for their neglect of the nation's honour, prestige and safety, reminding them not only that Japan had expended much money and manpower to uphold peace in the Far East and China's integrity but also that Japan had to establish her interests in Manchuria in order to safeguard that region from future Russian incursions. It urged the Japanese diplomats in China to put pressure on the Chinese government to recognize Japan's interests in Manchuria.⁽¹⁾ According to the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, the Chinese government had no right to insist, at that moment, on upholding China's prestige and honour as these had been lost before the Russo-Japanese war when she subjected herself to Russia's violation of her territorial integrity. It was Japan which had restored China's honour the maintenance of which, no less than Japan's own national independence, depended on the establishment of Japan's position in Manchuria.⁽²⁾

The Japanese press urged the government to force

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- (1) "Losing faith in the Peking Conference", editorial, TNNS, op.cit., 17th December, 1905, p.2 and Mochizuki Uguisukei, "The second Portsmouth - failure of the Peking negotiations", TNNS, 30th December, 1905, p. 2 and 31st December, 1905, p.4.
- (2) "The delay in the Sino-Japanese negotiations" editorial, TNNS, 19th December, 1905, p.2.

China to adopt an enlightened foreign policy and in particular, a cooperative attitude towards Japan. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said that Japan had fought to preserve Chinese territories, had encouraged self-strengthening reforms and had educated China's eight thousand students, she naturally expected gratitude from China. One characteristic of China's foreign policies, the newspaper said, was the willingness to submit to the strong and be contemptuous of the weak. Up to the Sino-Japanese war, China had looked down on Japan and been subservient to Russia. Li Hung-chang and his pro-Russian clique had repeatedly urged the government to take control of Japan.⁽³⁾ But after she had been defeated by Japan in 1895, relations between the two countries underwent a remarkable change. Japan's prestige greatly increased and the pro-Russian faction began to lose its influence. Now that Japan had won the war against Russia, influential Chinese officials like Yuan Shih-k'ai, Chang Chih-tung, Prince Ch'ing, Ch'ü Hung-chi and Natung were urging their government to enter into closer cooperation with Japan. However, said the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, despite this seemingly optimistic sign, it appeared that there was always a barrier between the two countries. Japan and China had never totally understood one another. Mutual doubts and suspicions existed under the superficial friendliness. And when it came to dealing with foreign countries, the Chinese government always came up with contradictory ideas and theories. It had no responsible party or parties to make decisions and it was unable to keep secrets. Compared with other powers in China, Japan's position was very poor. She had little influence on and little knowledge of Chinese affairs. The post-war situation urgently called for

(3) Chang Pei-lin was said to have advocated the invasion of Japan as the national policy at one time and according to the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, Li Hung-chang's Chihli Army, the North Sea Navy and the military defence installed at Port Arthur and Weihaiwei were for the purpose of the invasion. See "History of China's foreign relations - report from Peking by Peking correspondent", episode 4, TNNS, 5th November, 1905, p.1.

reorientations in the Japanese government's policies towards China.⁽⁴⁾

It was believed that pragmatism and not sentimental promises would have to govern Japan's future policies towards China. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun commented after the Peking Conference that the relationship between Japan and China since the war of 1894-1895 had been founded on empty words like "lips - teeth relationship" and "cultural and racial affinity" while all the time strong powers like Russia were reaping advantages through having a "proper" diplomatic relationship with China.⁽⁵⁾ Japan's prestige in China had suffered at the Peking negotiations and the Japanese government must not hesitate to apply necessary pressure on Peking in matters concerning Japan's interests as this would also benefit China and build up the foundation of permanent peace in East Asia.⁽⁶⁾

Japan's stake in Manchuria

When Japan acquired Russian rights in southern Manchuria, she also inherited the time limits placed upon the possession of the area. The twenty-five - year lease of the Kwantung territories including Port Arthur and Dairen was due to expire in 1923. It was an objective of Japan to lift this condition and extend the leasehold to ninety - nine years.

Some Japanese were convinced of Japan's claim to perpetual rights in southern Manchuria. In his "Theory of mandatory rule over Manchuria", written in 1905, Ariga Nagao, professor of international law at Tokyo

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- (4) *ibid.*, episodes 1-12, 2nd November - 12th November 1905, all on page 1.
 (5) "Japan's policies towards China", Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 31st December, 1905, p.2. Hereafter cited as TAS.
 (6) "Impressions in Shanghai on the peace-talk, continued", TAS, 27th September, 1905, p.3.

Imperial University, said that like the relationship which had existed between Japan and Korea, a definite relationship had grown up between Japan and Manchuria as a result of the Russo-Japanese war. Japan was prevented from annexing Manchuria only by the rules governing international relations. Nevertheless, as China had no power to stop Russia's violation of international law and as it was a matter of urgency for Japan to safeguard her national safety, she should at least obtain a mandate over part of Manchuria. Japan should exercise sovereignty for China over the Liaotung Peninsula so that any future Russian advances in the southern direction could be checked effectively. For this purpose, Japan's model should be England's rule of Cyprus for Turkey, Sudan for Egypt and Austro-Hungary's rule of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Turkey. However, as Japan had always upheld the policy of "open door" in China, she should adhere to the same principle in implementing her economic policy in Manchuria. She would be ill-advised to monopolize any interests as this would be following the Russian example in the pre-war period.⁽⁷⁾

Kokubu Tanenori's argument which was put forward in an article entitled "Non-recognition of the existence of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria" was even more flagrant in its disregard for Chinese sovereignty. He said that China's declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the war meant that she had given over Manchuria to be used as the war zone. By so doing, China had voluntarily given up her right to rule that area. Thus, whilst it had been necessary to respect China's territorial

(7) Ariga Nagao, "Manchū Inin Tōchi Ron", translated in HMTF, op.cit., Vol.12, No.65, 20th March, 1905, pp. 1-21. See also Sōmura Yasunobu, "Tairiku seisaku ni okeru imeeji no tenkai" (Changing images in continental policy) in Shinohara Hajime and Mitani Taichirō, eds., Kindai Nihon no Seiji Shido : Seijika Kenkyū II (Political leadership in modern Japan : studies of politicians, part II), Tokyo, 1965, pp. 268-269.

integrity before the war, after the war, there was no point in Japan's taking pains to recognize the so-called Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria as it no longer existed.⁽⁸⁾

The Taiyō, however, maintained that Japan must respect China's sovereignty and keep peace in the Far East or the world would never believe that she had fought the war with those intentions.⁽⁹⁾ The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun too, thought Japan would not have fought the war in vain even if she returned southern Manchuria to China:

"... The prompt return of southern Manchuria is a gesture of fairness by which Japan would gratify China, forestall suspicion on the part of Russia and win the confidence of the powers.... Apart from the rights and interests which Japan has acquired from the treaties, Manchuria remains outside Japan's territories and has not been drawn within Japan's sphere of interests in any agreement [made with China] But if another war should break out ... Japan, in order to safeguard her own safety, has every right to take the matter into her own hands...."⁽¹⁰⁾

This meant that Japan would also have to honour her promise to keep the 'open door' in Manchuria. This, however, need not be to Japan's advantage as her commerce and industries in Manchuria might suffer as a result of her inferiority in technology and lack of resources.

But despite anxiety caused by the disadvantages Japan faced in competing with the other powers, there was optimism regarding Japan's economic future in Manchuria. The Nihon Jitsugyō Sekai Taiheiyō, for example, said it could foresee Japanese economic ascendancy in the area.⁽¹¹⁾ Shiga Shigetake, geographer and journalist, urged the

(8) Kokubu Tanenori, "Manshū ni okeru Shinkoku shuken no sonzai o hininsu", quoted in Sōmura Yasunobu, *ibid.*, pp. 269-270.

(9) "On Japan's operations in Manchuria and Korea", *Taiyō*, translated in *Wai Chiao Pao*, No. 101, 28th February, 1905, pp. 7-11.

(10) "It is only a matter of course that Japan should return Manchuria to China", *TNNS*, 5th June, 1906, p.2.

(11) "The war and the economy", *Nihon Jitsugyō Sekai Taiheiyō*, translated in *CCJP*, *op.cit.*, Vol. IV, 18th November, 1904, p.1.

government to lead the nation in exploring the resources in southern Manchuria.⁽¹²⁾ The Taiyō believed that the Japanese people should be encouraged to settle in Manchuria, engage in agriculture and industries and develop the resources. According to the Taiyō, this was the only way in which Japan could secure her share of interests and stand up to the competition of the Western powers.⁽¹³⁾ And the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said,

"The exploration of mines and forests is the basis of Japanese enterprises in Manchuria The benefits [which will come as a result of developing these resources] are not only materialistic but also spiritual. The success or failure of the Japanese enterprises in Manchuria and Korea will determine whether or not the Japanese will become a great nation in the world...."⁽¹⁴⁾

Different theories on Japanese expansion in Manchuria at the end of the Russo-Japanese war ranged from respect for Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria to outright annexation. Most Japanese, however, believed that now that Japan had become a member of the community of Western nations, she had to abide by the rules of international politics. The principle of "preservation of China" still had to be observed, but it had a less emotional impact on Japan after the war. The Japanese now stressed the need for keeping the "open door" and improving trading relations in China. However, this brought Japanese economic ventures in Manchuria face to face with competitive Western enterprises. Thus in coordinating her policies with those of the Western powers, Japan's special position in Manchuria was challenged by Western activities in that area. This was to remain a central theme in Japan's relations with the West throughout the first decade of the twentieth century.

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- (12) Shiga Shigetake, "On developing Manchuria and the Kwantung Peninsula", in Kokumin Shimbun, 7th, 8th and 9th December, 1904, translated in Wai Chiao Pao, No. 101, 28th February, 1905, pp. 11-14.
- (13) "On Japan's operations in Manchuria and Korea", Taiyō, December, 1904, translated in Wai Chiao Pao, No. 101, 28th February, 1905, pp. 7-11.
- (14) "The Japanese people and the Liaotung Peninsula", TAS, 16th January, 1905, p.8.

Chinese and Western suspicions of Japan in Manchuria

The post - Russo-Japanese-war era also saw the beginning of a movement in China to recover the rights she had lost to the powers. Manchuria became a focal point of Sino-Japanese disputes. The Chinese public was highly critical of Japanese policy in Manchuria. Protests also came from the Western powers against Japan's disregard for the "open door" and her discriminatory activities against European and American merchants in Manchuria. In March, 1906, the British minister to China and the United States ambassador to Japan made their complaints to prime minister Saionji that Japan was unfairly exercising her authority in exempting her own merchandise from duties by importing them directly into Dairen whilst European and American goods had to go through customs in Shanghai, Chefoo and other ports before they reached Dairen. (15)

Itō, then resident-general in Korea, also received from the British chargé d'affaires in Seoul a note which warned that if Japan did not reverse her "closed door" policy with regard to trade in Manchuria, she would lose the sympathy of the European countries and America and would find herself isolated in the event of a future outbreak of military hostility between herself and Russia. (16)

As a result, on the initiative of Itō, a Conference of the genrō and cabinet members was called on 22nd May, 1906. It was decided at the Conference that Japan would respect China's sovereign rights and adhere to the principle of equal opportunity for all countries.

(15) "The question of the 'closed door' in Manchuria raised by England and America", 19th March, 1906, Nihon Gaikō Nempyō narabi ni Shuyō Bunsho (Chronological record of Japanese foreign relations and select documents), Tokyo, 1965-1966, Vol.1, pp. 258-259.

(16) "Manshū mondai ni kansuru kyōgikai", 22nd May, 1906, *ibid.*, p.261.

And in order both to forestall the possibility of military ascendancy in Manchuria and make Japan's intentions understood by the local people, it was decided that the machinery of the Kwantung governor-general be re-organized along the lines of peace-time establishments and the military authorities in Manchuria be abolished gradually.⁽¹⁷⁾

Itō who presided at the Conference argued that Japanese policies in Manchuria had unwisely provoked hostilities throughout China. He saw the movement to recover rights as a dangerous force which could erupt into another Boxer Rebellion. He said it was Japan's duty as a friend to lead China away from such extremities. Her goal should be to win the good-will and confidence of the Chinese people. Japanese military authorities in Manchuria, therefore, would have to be abolished. The responsibilities of administering and protecting the people in the area belonged to China. Japan could not take them into her own hands. Should China fail to carry out those duties, Japan would then have an obligation to help her insofar as such help and support were concomitant with her rights in Manchuria. An outbreak like the Boxer Rebellion would invite military intervention on the part of the powers and provide Russia with legitimate excuse to reoccupy Southern Manchuria. Hence it was unwise of Japan to incur the suspicions of the Chinese government and people and allow their dissatisfaction to grow into dangerous proportions. Furthermore, it was important that Japan regain the sympathies of the British and American peoples as Japan would need their support in the event of a war in the future.⁽¹⁸⁾

China's hostility and the Western powers' criticism caused much

(17) *ibid.*, p. 263.

(18) *ibid.*, pp. 262-264.

disquiet in the Japanese press. Many Japanese newspapers were of the opinion that Japan's intentions had been misconstrued. In refuting an allegation of the London Daily Mail in late 1906 that Japan had been taking advantage of China's state of unrest to consolidate and expand her own influence, the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said,

"... The rising tide of the rights recovery movement is accompanied by a sense of awakening in the Chinese people ... which gives rise to a resentment of the launching of Japanese enterprises in Manchuria.... For those Chinese who are ignorant we must excuse them for having suspicions. But for those who are intelligent we expect them to be cooperative towards Japan in developing Manchuria Far from having taken advantage of China's weakness to further her 'ambitious designs', Japan finds herself in the present position only as a result of China's short-sighted and corrupt policies over the years Japan has taken up enterprises in Manchuria so that by adhering to the principles of open door and equal opportunity, she will induce economic cooperation among the powers and open the way to further development of Manchuria....(19)

Disputes in Manchuria between the Japanese and Chinese came to a head in the latter half of 1907 when the negotiations between Hagihara, Japanese consul-general in Fengtien and Chao Erh-sun, Chinese governor-general of the area ground to a halt over the lumbering enterprise in the Yalu forests, mining in Fushun and other matters. Relations between the two governments seemed to be deteriorating rapidly. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun was critical of China's dilatory and unyielding attitudes, attributing them to her ingratitude for what Japan had done. But it was still hopeful of an amicable settlement with China. It advised the Japanese government against the use of force. Instead, it urged the two countries to reconcile their differences. In order that friendly relations might be maintained between the two countries,

(19) "The biased view of the foreigners", editorial, TNNS, 22nd November, 1906, p. 2.

Japan should express her trust in China and China should discard her reservations and suspicions.⁽²⁰⁾

The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said Japan had not entered the war against Russia solely for the sake of preserving China. She was neither strong nor rich enough to do so. The Russo-Japanese war had been fought because Japan's own safety was also at stake. Having defeated Russia, she had to secure the rights which had been held by Russia in China in order to safeguard her own interests and safety. It was unfortunate that the Japanese government had not been able to arrive at an all-out agreement with the Chinese government immediately after the war. Nevertheless, the Chinese government and people could hardly expect Japan to give up her rights that were due her as a result of the war. It was regrettable that some Japanese living in Manchuria were inclined to behave in an overbearing manner because they thought their country had done China a big favour. This only deepened the resentment of the Chinese people and did nothing to improve the relations between the two countries.⁽²¹⁾

Moreover, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun warned that Japan's prime concern should not be with Manchuria but with the entire China. It was ill-advised of the Japanese government to be obsessed with the consolidation of her influence and trivial gains in Manchuria. Instead, it should try to improve the overall relations between the two countries.⁽²²⁾

Most Japanese newspapers believed that the Chinese public's bitter reaction to the negotiations over Manchuria in 1907 was a force with

(20) "Japan's relations with China", editorial, TNNS, 3rd October, 1907, p.2.

(21) "The improvement of Sino-Japanese relations", editorial, TAS, 21st September, 1907, p.3.

(22) "Policies towards Manchuria and China", editorial, TAS, 15th October, 1907., p.3.

which Japan had to come to terms. This was also recognized by the genrō and cabinet members at the meeting in May, 1906. Japan could not afford to alienate the Chinese officials and people by ignoring their sense of awareness. She could, however, guide their nationalist aspirations in the right direction which for Japan in 1907, meant guiding China towards 'civilization' and making her realize the necessity of renewing friendly ties with Japan.

Japan's role in educating Chinese students

Soon after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan attempted to live up to the image of a Westernized Asian nation introducing civilization to the backward countries in Asia. Her role of a friendly neighbour giving guidance and direction became most obvious in educating Chinese students in the post-war years. Inspired by the Japanese example of an Asian country newly risen to the rank of a world power, Chinese students thronged to Japan soon after 1904. The question of these students soon became an important topic of discussion in Japan. It is worthwhile here to take a look at unofficial as well as official attitudes towards the question.

Aoyagi Atsutsure, educationist and China expert, had this to say,

"The knowledge which Chinese students acquire in Japan is to be used in politics, education and other fields of Chinese society. These students would hold the key to friendly relations between Japan and China and peace in the Far East if they made good use of the knowledge; but they would sow seeds of hostility and misunderstanding between the two countries if they abused it. This in turn depends on whether they receive a good or bad education when they are in Japan. The question of Chinese students in Japan is therefore, not only a problem for China, it is also a matter of concern for Japan. Furthermore, it is not simply an educational question, it is a matter of the greatest importance which affects the world...."(23)

(23) Aoyagi Atsutsure, "The question of Chinese students", TAS, 17th July, 1905, p.5 and 13th November, 1905, p. 5.

Aoyagi commented that it was regrettable that most of the Chinese students came to Japan only for short-term courses which lasted for less than a year as he did not think that the students benefited much from them; and when they, in turn, should educate the young in China, they would find the task beyond them. This would mean that education in China would still be dependent on teachers coming from abroad and "national independence in learning" and the spread of education in China would not materialize for some time to come. According to Aoyagi, this would be most unfortunate for China's younger generation, China's future and the friendship between Japan and China. (24)

Commenting on Aoyagi's view, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said that the Japanese educational authority was largely responsible for the fact that most Chinese students did not receive a perfect education. It was, however, the wish of the Japanese people to educate Chinese students well. They believed that this was a gesture through which they could offer their utmost friendship to China. (25)

As was implied by Aoyagi and the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, the type of education that the majority of Chinese students were receiving in Japan left much to be desired. Moreover, the relations between these students and the authorities of their host country were far from cordial. The major outbreak of hostility came with the regulations set down by the Japanese Mombushō in late 1905. Chinese students objected especially to two rules one of which required every Chinese student who was admitted to either a government or private school to submit not only a letter explaining why he/she wanted to enter that particular school

(24) *ibid.*,

(25) "Question of Chinese students, comments on Aoyagi's article", TAS, 18th July, 1905, p.3.

but also a letter of endorsement from the Chinese legation in Japan. The second rule required Chinese students to enter schools which had been recommended by the Mombushō to the Chinese government. Much has been said of the confrontation between the Japanese and Chinese authorities on the one hand and the Chinese students on the other. In view of the fact that the Japanese and Chinese governments found it necessary to adopt the same line of policy towards the students, one can say that the Chinese students' resentment and anger were not directed so much against the "discriminating policies of the Japanese government" — though they made this their cry — as against interference of the Japanese authorities. The students were extremely sensitive of this as they became increasingly involved in revolutionary activities against the Manchu government at home.

The Mombushō adopted a firm line throughout the incident. It maintained that the students had misinterpreted the meaning and intentions of the regulations. According to the Mombushō officials, only a handful of the thousands of Chinese students coming to Japan managed to enter schools which came under the direct supervision of the Mombushō. The rest had to attend private schools and institutions many of which had been newly set up to accommodate them. These private institutions offered substandard academic training and facilities and unsatisfactory conditions of accommodation for the students. It was with a view to keeping these schools under control that the Mombushō had introduced the regulations. According to the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, the aim was none other than to protect and direct the students so that they could fulfil their ambition of learning. As these students had been sent to Japan with the purpose of receiving good education, the achievement of such an objective would go a long way towards cultivating friendship between the two countries. (26)

(26) "Control of Chinese students", TNNS, 5th November, 1905, p.3,
 "Mombushō's explanation", TNNS, 14th December, 1905, p.4.

The incident also drew the attention of the Diet. Although the spokesman of the government maintained that no diplomatic importance was to be attached to the matter as it had nothing to do with the agreement made between Chang Chih-tung and Uchida, minister to China in 1903, to allow Chinese students to come to Japan, the opposition parties were not prepared to let the matter pass without looking into. On 18th December, an Investigation Committee of State Affairs (Naiseibu Chōsakai) of the Kenseihontō called a meeting to discuss the incident. Representatives from the Mombushō, Gaimushō and the president of the Chinese students were present. At the meeting, it was decided that as the incident would affect Sino-Japanese relations, the officials of the Mombushō were to be persuaded to withdraw the departmental ordinance. If the Mombushō refused to be persuaded, then the Investigation Committee would bring the matter up in the Diet and put pressure on the Mombushō to do so. The Committee pointed out to the students that it sympathized with their point of view but would be appreciative if they would adopt "proper methods" to make their point and that it could not approve of their radical and unreasonable actions. It also reminded them that they should put their studies above everything else. (27)

Criticism of the students' behaviour also came from the Japanese press. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said that the regulations had been set up with the aim of protecting Chinese students from profiteering private schools because responsible sectors of the Japanese society felt it to be within their duty to put a stop to the evil practice. The Chinese students' protests were therefore entirely

(27) "The government and the question of Chinese students", TNNS, 15th December, 1905, p.2, "The Kenseihontō and the question of Chinese students", TNNS, 19th December, 1905, p.2. The regulations, however, were not withdrawn. The students' boycott of classes was ended partly by a wane of enthusiasm after weeks of almost total strike and partly because Chang Chih-tung sent officials to Shanghai to reason with those who had left Japan to go back.

meaningless. Although they might have regarded the rules as a political weapon to restrict their freedom, this could not be used as pretext for their irresponsible behaviour. They had come to Japan to study but now they were squandering their time on other activities. The event had taken a course disadvantageous to both China and Japan and was to add a stigma to the year 1905 in the history of Japanese education.⁽²⁸⁾

But criticism apart, it is evident that the spirit of guidance was not abandoned. As another article in the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun put it,

"... These students are an elite group of four hundred millions Chinese. They are expected to take up the burden of administering their country and educating the masses in future. If they want to succeed in carrying out these tasks, they must enrich themselves further with knowledge. The recent incident shows that they have forsaken their long-term objective in favour of clamouring for conveniences [which they call freedom] of the present moment. Such behaviour is a stumbling block to their far-sighted aspirations. Since China is an expansive and populous country, the task of reforming her conditions to become a strong and progressive nation is not something that can be achieved in a short time. If they hope to see China progress gradually in the same orderly manner as Japan has in arriving at her present state of advancement, and if they wish to conduct China's affairs in the capacity of 'men of high purpose', they should make it their primary objective to develop their abilities and knowledge in order to face the challenge. We do not approve of their indulgence in frivolous and empty talks. We feel that it is our duty to advise them to devote themselves to their studies so that they will be able to enrich China's future with brilliant successes. The present moment is a time of retrospection and self-examination for them."⁽²⁹⁾

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- (28) "Disturbance by Chinese students", TNNS 11th December, 1905, p.5, "The educational and religious sectors in the year 1905", episodes 1 and 2, TNNS, 4th January, 1906, p.1 and 6th January, 1906, p.4.
- (29) "The settlement of the Chinese students' incident", TNNS, 8th January, 1906, p.2.

There is no doubt that the importance attached to the question of educating Chinese students was linked to the belief that it would result in better relations between China and Japan. For some Japanese, the threat of Western encroachment in the Far East had not diminished after the Russo-Japanese war. In an address at Waseda University in March, 1906, Ōkuma drew the attention of a gathering of Chinese students to the Far Eastern situation. He said that the European powers had first threatened, then bullied and lately, by spreading the rumour of the "yellow peril", slandered China. The post-war era was a time when the European people were being led astray and the Eastern nations were undergoing a transitional period with much confusion and turmoil. The state of Chinese society, Chinese politics and the Chinese way of thinking were not enough to enable China to stand on her feet in the competitive world. Chinese students themselves would have to look inward in order to eradicate the faults that were keeping their country backward. It was regrettable that China was no longer respected by the world. She had succumbed at the first encounter with foreign oppression and had to concede to humiliating treaties in order to attain peace which was only short-lived. Was it not time, therefore, for the Chinese students to exert themselves and fight for the future of their own country?⁽³⁰⁾

In short, Chinese students were urged to put their trust in Japanese guidance and place their confidence in Japanese help. The emphasis was on mutual understanding and cooperation. As Uchida said, "Not only is it important that Japan accept China's students

(30) Ōkuma's address to Chinese students at Waseda University, Ōkuma-kō Hachijūgonen-shi, op.cit., Vol.2, pp. 561-562.

and inspire them well, it is necessary for the Chinese government and officials to place their confidence in Japan."⁽³¹⁾

It was felt that in several ways the education of Chinese students could be improved in order that Japanese guidance could be given more effectively. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun urged the authorities to concentrate on improving quality and not coping with the numbers of students. Short term courses, for example, could be abolished. It also believed that the Japanese authorities could encourage more communication and cooperation between Chinese and Japanese students, the former often being more mature in age. That many Chinese students suffered from physical weakness and indulged in opium-smoking was, according to the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, attributable to negligence on the part of the Japanese educational authorities. It maintained that Chinese students needed encouragement from their teachers to take up sports as the first step towards inducing them to mix with Japanese students in cultural and intellectual pursuits.⁽³²⁾

Ōkuma also stressed the importance of improving relations between Chinese and Japanese students. In a speech given at the opening ceremony of the "Sino-Japanese Students Association" in January, 1906, he likened the Chinese students in Japan to Japanese students in Western countries in the late Tokugawa era. The present generation of Chinese students, Ōkuma said, were the inheritors and preservers of Japan's modernization. The relationship between Japan and China was that of brothers and with mutual cooperation and encouragement, the two countries could become pillars of peace in the Far East. As Japan and China belonged to the same race, shared the same culture, moral standards and the heritage of

(31) "Regular meeting of the Tōhō Kyokai", TNNS, 8th June, 1906, p.4.

(32) "The present state of Chinese education", TAS, 26th November, 1907, p.3, "The way to bring about the development of Chinese student", TAS, 15th June, 1907, p.3.

Confucian philosophy, Chinese students coming to Japan should benefit from the fact that they were learning from a totally alien culture which had already been assimilated into Japanese surroundings with which they were familiar owing to the common background between the two countries. This was a convenience which China could not miss. Japanese students should bear this in mind and try to understand their Chinese fellow-students.⁽³³⁾ At the same ceremony, Viscount Aoki Shūzō stressed that a friendly relationship between the peoples of China and Japan was as important as that between the two governments. There should be more integration between students of the two countries. Japanese students should be sincere and helpful and Chinese students should be humble in their search for knowledge and not be suspicious of the foreigners. Such a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship would go a long way towards the materialization of long-lasting friendship between the two countries.⁽³⁴⁾

In the years immediately after the Russo-Japanese war, Chinese students in Japan were exposed to new theories such as national rights, individual freedom, parliamentary politics and international relations. Often carried away by their enthusiasm, they identified nationalism with anti-foreignism and anti-Japanese hostility was one of their expressions of patriotism. One reason for their anti-Japanese sentiment was that they seemed to receive little sympathy and much lack of ~~dis~~respect from the Japanese. Inevitably they themselves contributed to such attitudes through their poverty, disorganization and general confusion. But as the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said, Chinese students had been exploited by the Japanese commercial sector as well as profit-making

(33) "Opening ceremony of the Association for Sino-Japanese students", TNNS, 29th January, 1906, p.4.

(34) ibid.

'educationalists'. It was natural, it pointed out, that these students who had come to Japan with hopes and admiration should react against this kind of treatment and the Japanese people had only themselves to blame for the anti-Japanese hostility that those students took with them back to China. It was regrettable, said the paper, that the promising young people of China, Japan's neighbour and natural ally, should nurture enmity against her. The Japanese people would have to be retrospective and abandon their contemptuous attitudes.⁽³⁵⁾

It would seem that the episode of Chinese students in Japan did not augur well for any other attempt on the part of Japan to pursue her goal of guiding China. Yet many Japanese did not fail to sympathize with the national aspirations of the Chinese students. They believed that only by giving them still more encouragement could Japan hope to bring about closer relations between the two countries.

Chinese rights recovery movement and Japan's recognition of growing Chinese nationalism

Beginning in 1904, despatches from Japanese ministers in China to the government at home were full of references to the rising tide of nationalism in that country. In a long report on railway construction in Fukien, the Japanese consul Nakamura wrote in December, 1904:

"Everyone recognizes the most radical changes which have taken place in the Chinese people's ideas. The change has been especially noticeable in connection with the rights recovery question. The Chinese have become nationalistic and everywhere they are talking about rights recovery, railway redemption and mining development without

(35) "Anti-Japanese hostility in China", TNNS, 30th June, 1906, p.1.

foreign intervention....Nationalistic thought in connection with foreign rights has permeated the entire land of China, and all classes of people have been affected by the currents of the new thought."⁽³⁶⁾

By 1905, this new sense of nationalism had manifested itself in an anti-American boycott protesting against America's discriminatory treatment of Chinese, in particular, the total exclusion of Chinese labourers from the United States. Boycotts were organized in most of the treaty ports, especially Shanghai and Canton where students joined merchants in mass meetings and press agitation. American trade was damaged for several months. But the basic motives of the organizers and leaders, at any rate, were political. As the Wai Chiao Pao said, specific grievances against the United States were not the fundamental issues. What was basic was the elevating of "peoples' wisdom" through political action so as to enhance the standing of China in the world. "All the world is watching us, and our success will determine our fate. If we succeed, foreigners will say we cannot be slighted."⁽³⁷⁾

It could also be true, as Iriye suggested, that it was the implied objective of the organizers and leaders to conduct the movement in a restrained and disciplined manner in order that the Chinese would obtain the sympathy of enlightened foreigners.⁽³⁸⁾ To this end, however, the movement had only partial success. The anti-American boycott was soon followed by outbreaks of hostility, notably in connection with the imprisonment of a Chinese woman in a British prison, ordered by

(36) Japanese consul-general in Fukien Nakamura to foreign minister Komura, 24th December, 1904, NGB, Vol.37, part 2 (1958), pp.117-123.

(37) Quoted in Iriye Akira, "Public opinion and foreign policy, the case of late Ch'ing China", in A. Feuerwerker et al., (eds.), Approaches to Modern Chinese History, op.cit., p.224.

(38) ibid.

the British consular magistrate in Shanghai. Foreign lives and settlements were endangered and relations between China and foreign countries suffered in the course of the unrest. The United States government even felt that it was necessary to increase its military defence in the Philippine Islands.

The movement was directed at all foreign powers at whose hands China had suffered deprivation of her rights. Japan, whose stake in South Manchuria was larger than that of any other powers, was a major target of the Chinese movement. It was interesting, therefore, that during the early phase of the agitation, Japan was alleged by Westerners to have instilled anti-foreign ideas into the minds of the Chinese people. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun reported that the London Times had accused the Japanese residents in Peking of inciting Chinese trouble-makers to break out in anti-American riots; and the British consul in Hankow had written to the Japanese government pointing out that Japanese were not targets of Chinese anti-foreign hostility and that Chinese officials and people alike and in particular, Chinese students recently returning from Japan were inclined towards improving relations with Japan. Japanese nationals in China were therefore, believed to be in a privileged position, economically and politically better than that of their European and American counterparts.⁽³⁹⁾

It would seem that the allegation was unjustified. In fact, Chinese students who had returned to China were equally, if not more, ill-disposed towards Japan. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said that as far as recovering their rights from foreigners was concerned, the

(39) "Anti-foreign ideas and Japan", TAS, 19th March, 1906, p.4, "On relations between Japan and China", TAS, 24th June, 1906, p.2. According to the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, most Europeans and Americans in China including G.E. Morrison, London Times Correspondent in Peking, held the same view.

Chinese made no distinction between the Europeans on the one hand and the Japanese on the other. It maintained, moreover, that as an internal unrest in China would have a more adverse effect on Japan than any other powers, it was within Japan's "moral responsibility" towards the other countries to do her utmost to maintain peace and order in China.⁽⁴⁰⁾

When Japan saw that her own interests alongside those of the Western countries were being threatened in China, she felt it necessary to speak on behalf of the powers as well as for herself. This sense of "moral responsibility" had become part of Japan's consciousness of her own power status since the Russo-Japanese war. At the same time, in warning the Chinese against extreme anti-foreignism, the Japanese believed they were trying to bring harmony to the relations between East and West.

On 19th February, 1906, the Japanese minister in China, Uchida, was ordered by the government to deliver a message to the Chinese government, advising the latter to exercise strict control over the riots:

"... The heat of the Chinese people's anti-foreign hostility will soon reach such a high degree that it cannot be predicted with certainty that disasters will not result. It goes without saying that if this were to take place, it would have grave repercussions on China. The Japanese government sincerely advises the Chinese government to seriously attend to this and make urgent efforts to prevent any further encouragement to this fervour"⁽⁴¹⁾

The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun commented that it was out of a sense of duty as China's friendly neighbour that the Japanese government had given this piece

(40) "Anti-foreign ideas and Japan", TAS, 19th March, 1906, p.4, "The Japanese government's advice to China", TAS, 22nd February, 1906, p.2.
 (41) "China's anti-foreign hostility - admonition from the Japanese government", TNNS, 21st February, 1906, p.3.

of advice. The movement, it said, was an act of folly which would lead to disastrous results for China herself. One had only to look back at the Boxer Rebellion which had been sparked off by nothing more than some senseless acts of violence. Yet it had ended not only in the loss of China's sovereignty over Manchuria but the implantation of the seeds of humiliation in the minds of the entire nation.⁽⁴²⁾

It was most important that the movement should not turn into another Boxer incident, said the same paper. There was no evidence to show that China had acquired the ability to administer the rights which had been lost to foreigners since the Russo-Japanese war had ended. The movement was merely an after-effect of the war and the Chinese had mistaken the achievement of the Japanese victory for proof of their own abilities.⁽⁴³⁾

It was in Manchuria that the movement caused the greatest concern to the Japanese. As the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun put it, anti-Japanese feeling was creating much difficulties for Japan. Japan had put her entire nation at risk in fighting Russia. She had not been able to recover what she had given up in the war except for taking over Russia's rights and interests in Manchuria. Not only had China not sought to repay Japan's efforts, she actually did not have any appreciation for what Japan had contributed towards the maintenance of peace and civilization in the East. Furthermore, she did not have the slightest gratitude for Japan's sacrifices. By clamouring for her lost rights in southern Manchuria, China was in fact manoeuvring to obstruct Japan's claim to the rights which were transferred from

(42) "China's anti-foreign hostility", editorial, TNNS, 23rd February, 1906, p.2.

(43) "The present situation in China" editorial, TNNS, 1st March, 1906, p.2.

the Russians. Such behaviour on China's part was a drawback to the improvement of relations which had hitherto been in progress between the two countries. One could not help feeling dismayed at the prospects for future relations between Japan and China and it was Japan's sincere hope that the Chinese government would wake up to the problem. (44)

Yet the Japanese reacted to the rights recovery movement in China with mixed feelings. On the one hand, they were annoyed by the fact that Japanese rights and interests were threatened by Chinese hostility. On the other hand, they were ready to recognize in the movement a sense of awakening on the part of the Chinese people. Many saw growing nationalism in China as a healthy sign. At last, China was emerging from her backwardness and making progress to become a power in the civilized world. Japan had undergone a similar experience in the past and she could sympathize with this development in China. Indeed, many Japanese would have liked to think that Japanese guidance and leadership were accountable for the emergence of nationalist aspirations in the Asian countries. Hence amidst the misgivings and frustrations surrounding the element of anti-foreignism in the Chinese movement, there were unmistakable signs of optimism and enthusiasm.

An article in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun commented that the anti-Japanese feeling stirred up by Chinese students was no cause for concern. It was merely an expression of the spirit of defiance and enthusiasm natural to the young generation. China badly needed such elements to bring fresh life to her and reform the evil practices of her society. If China was to perpetuate her weakness and become as

(44) "Rights recovery movement and the diplomatic relations between Japan and China", TAS, 22nd October, 1906, p.2.

helpless as Korea, then Japan would never be able to extricate herself from the need to defend herself. The fact that at that moment anti-Japanese feeling was running high was proof that China was not content to succumb to the same fate as Korea. It was a propitious sign that both Japan and China were to become strong and independent.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun saw it as an angry reaction to the past injustice inflicted upon the Chinese people by the foreign powers. An editorial of the same paper said that hitherto, the Chinese people had been misunderstood not only by the Europeans and Americans but also by the Japanese. Chinese from southern provinces who had gone abroad as workers were looked upon as typical of the entire nation. Their forbearance was often mistaken for a lack of the spirit of resistance. Not only were her people subjected to insults in other parts of the world but China also lost her sovereignty. But as the Japanese minister to China in 1905 had once said, China was a "sleeping elephant" which would shock the whole world on its awakening. Indeed, the editorial continued, for the past seven or eight years, through the Boxer incident, the anti-American trade boycott and the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of Chinese living in the British colonies of Hong Kong, Singapore and the Malayan Peninsula, the Chinese had gradually proved themselves to be a nation which was not to be bullied. This had aroused an alarmist reaction from the Europeans and Americans. They seemed to have lost sight of the fact that had they treated the Chinese with fairness and generosity instead of aggressiveness and contempt, the Chinese people would have reciprocated politically and socially, in a manner worthy of the most peace-loving nation in the world. It was hoped that more and more people of the world would gradually come to realize the need to

(45) "Peking at a glance - anti-Japanese hostility," TAS, 27th April, 1906, p.5.

understand the real conditions of China; while the Chinese people themselves would endeavour, in a humble manner, to acquaint themselves with the international situation and contribute to the strengthening of a peaceful foundation in the Far East.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Enthusiasm for China's growing sense of awareness was expressed in another editorial article of the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun which said that a parallel could be drawn between the situation in China at that time and that in Japan in the early Meiji era. The Shanghai riot of December, 1905 had the underlying objective of recovering the jurisdictional autonomy of the Chinese court. One could expect similar incidents to take place in other parts of China where the Chinese would clamour for their rights. The Japanese people had reasons to be sympathetic towards such show of anti-foreignism. Japan herself had been swept by a wave of patriotism and enthusiasm for her national heritage in the 1880's and 1890's. But her aspirations were thwarted by a fear of the Western countries which successfully forced Japan to agree to unequal terms in the treaties. It was only with a sense of awakening resulting from an indignation against foreign oppression that Japan realized the need to rid herself of the humiliating terms particularly that of extraterritoriality. The present anti-foreign movement which had swept China was, therefore, reminiscent of Japan. As the technological gap between China and the Western countries was too big and as China's navy and army were not strong enough to command respect from the powers, there was still no question of an equal treaty relationship between China and the West. Her people were therefore subjected to a sense of national humiliation.

(46) "Europe, America and China", editorial, TNNS, 12th February, 1906, p.2.

Once this feeling was engendered, it was not easy to wipe it away. Japan could not but be concerned about the future of China. Being her neighbouring country, Japan was directly affected by both China's plight and fortune. On the one hand, Japan could not condone the unreasonable behaviour of the Chinese government and people while on the other hand, she could enlighten China on the attainment, in a civilized manner, of independence for the nation and dignity for the individual Chinese people. If Japan would take pains over this task, China should be able to see the day when she would rid herself of all humiliations.⁽⁴⁷⁾

But what policies should a guiding neighbour adopt towards China? Again the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun had this to say,

"For at least half a century since the opening of the ports, the Chinese people have retained their conservative attitudes and have not made much progress. This can be attributed to their arrogance and refusal to dispel illusions of their greatness. However, some responsibilities can also be pinned onto the powers infringing on her territories. Since the opening of trade, the various countries have adopted a wrong attitude towards China. Their goal is to acquire rights and privileges from China and not to spread culture in that country. They apply pressure and insults in their dealings with the Chinese people rather than offer guidance and enlightenment.... Are these not factors contributing to the anti-foreign sentiment?.... Japan's policies towards China have remained constant throughout — maintenance of China, adherence to the principle of the 'open door' and introduction of methods of development into China. The first two are diplomatic policies and the last is an act of friendship.... As long as the wealthy resources of East Asia are unexplored, commercial benefits cannot be reaped. Should the powers realize this and concentrate their efforts on developing China, Japan has every reason to welcome their gesture.... We believe

(47) "Anti-foreign hostility of the Chinese people", editorial, TNNS, 4th January, 1906, p.2.

that the spread of education is the fundamental step in guiding China towards enlightenment.... The way to befriend her is to induce her to taste the benefits of Western advancement so as to gradually remove her antagonism towards the foreigners...."(48)

Still, the Japanese felt cautious as they thought about the difficulties of the task they faced. In particular, they were doubtful about China's response to Japanese guidance. As the Toyko Nichi-Nichi Shimbun put it, nationalism, if suitably guided, could lead to national unification. However, it was no easy task to control China's anti-foreign sentiment and direct it to beneficial nationalism. China was big and expansive. There were immense differences among the people throughout the country and the Peking government did not command allegiance from its subjects. Any mistakes on the part of the government could lead to a second or third Boxer incident. The other powers recognized Japan's natural responsibility to lead China towards development on account of the geographical and historical closeness of the two countries. But this also meant that Japan would inevitably be the first to encounter disaster if she made any mistakes in the venture. One would suppose that it was essential to encourage a sense of loyalty to the Emperor and respect for the military in the Chinese as prerequisites for the implementation of reforms. Nevertheless, one had to bear in mind the danger of growing Chinese arrogance and conceit once they had attained the semblance of national unity. They would probably repudiate Japan's commitment and close her door to the Europeans and Americans. It had often been said that China and Japan should never disassociate from one another on account of their racial

(48) "The enlightenment of China", editorial, TNNS, 4th July, 1906, p.2.

and cultural affinity. However, China had been extremely contemptuous of Japan up until the Sino-Japanese war. At the moment, she was being cooperative towards Japan. She was sending thousands of students. This had been motivated by a desire to strengthen herself and need to learn from Japan. But Chinese students who had returned home were not professing any good-will towards their host country. China was treating Japan in the same way as she did the Western countries. Japan, sadly, had not attained any special position in China's foreign relations. Hence if she was to worry about the lack of nationalistic feeling in the Chinese, she should first realize that the Chinese people also lacked sufficient knowledge of the meaning of nationalism. If China did not discard her arrogance, acknowledge the equality of races, respect justice in international relations and accept the need to be humble in her search for peace and progress, then for Japan to encourage a spirit of loyalty to the Emperor and respect for the military would be tantamount to sowing the seeds of future disaster.⁽⁴⁹⁾

But there was also optimism that China would recover in a short while from the extremity of her anti-foreign hostility. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, for example, said the result of the Russo-Japanese war had led to great changes in international relations in the Far East. The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the strengthened position of the United States in East Asia had paved the way for the preservation of China's territorial integrity and peace in this part of the world. China should make use of this opportune moment to reform her internal policies and strengthen herself. If she would conduct her policies in the manner of a progressive and

(49) "The ways to enlighten China", editorial, TNNS, 15th August, 1906, p.2.

'independent' nation, the recovery of her rights would only be a matter of time.⁽⁵⁰⁾ On 4th June, 1906, the same paper said,

"We cannot deny that the Chinese people's potentials are something to be reckoned with. The contradictions in their theories and ideas and the conflicting policies of the Chinese government are but unavoidable mistakes which we must overlook. It is the duty of Japan to take up the position of a leader offering China supervision and encouragement and guarding her from lapsing into the depths of further mistakes...."⁽⁵¹⁾

Thus, it would appear that the aspirations of the Chinese movement as expressed by the informed sector of the Chinese public like the Wai Chiao Pao — to obtain the sympathy of enlightened foreigners by elevating the people's wisdom through political action — had been answered. Japan, if not any other power, had come to realize that this new nationalism could not be treated as blind anti-foreignism.

The realization of what was happening in China also raised serious problems for Japanese policy. As Iriye puts it, this new sense of awareness was "pictured by Japan as nationalistic vis-à-vis foreign rights and potentially anti-government in domestic politics. Japan ... was confronted with the alternatives of either pursuing its rights and interests in China and risking not only the growth of anti-Japanese sentiment, but possibly also, a dangerous situation for the dynasty, or coming to terms with Chinese public opinion with a view towards consolidating essential Japanese interests and solidifying the power of the Peking government..."⁽⁵²⁾ Hayashi Gonsuke, Japanese minister in Peking between 1906-1908 wrote in March, 1907 that Chinese nationalism was a "natural phenomenon expressing the people's self-awareness". It

(50) "China's anti-foreignism" editorial, TNNS, 23rd February, 1906, p.2.

(51) "The Chinese people's self-awakening", editorial, TNNS, 4th June, 1906, p.2.

(52) Iriye Akira, "Public Opinion and foreign policy, the case of late Ch'ing China", op.cit., p.230.

was impossible to eradicate it by force. Japan should take advantage of such a sentiment with the view towards 'supervising and guiding' Chinese nationalism. It was particularly urgent to form close ties with prominent officials in Peking and the provinces so as to prevent political upheaval. Both these objectives necessitated a conciliatory attitude and compromising spirit in dealing with less vital areas of Japanese rights in China.⁽⁵³⁾

The underlying objective was closer cooperation between the two countries in this new phase of relationship. This idea was also put forward in Hayashi's speech given at a regular meeting of the Tōhō Kyokai in July the same year,

"...There may have been more frequent negotiations on various questions between Japan and China since the Russo-Japanese war. But these are only matters of little importance which do not call for anxiety on our part. Although it is not easy to predict the outcome of the Chinese government's activities [with regard to the rights recovery movement], I am confident that henceforth a still more important relationship must evolve between Japan and China. It would benefit both countries if we would enlighten and guide the Chinese people who are in doubts. Japan's policies towards China since the Sino-Japanese war have been to preserve her territories. China may have suspected Japan's intentions and resented her help. But Japan must dispel China's doubts against all odds and urge her to make progress in her development. There are rumours of various conflicts arising from Manchuria between the two countries but I believe that these are extremely immaterial incidents which must not be used as excuses for mutual conflicts. Not only are present relations between Japan and China in an excellent state, future relations are also hopeful. It is important that Japan must treat China with sincerity and cooperate with her in promoting civilization and peace in the East."⁽⁵⁴⁾

(53) Quoted in Iriye, *ibid.*, Hayashi to Hayashi, 30th April, 1907, Japanese Foreign Ministry File, "Kakukoku naisei kankei zasshin, Shina no bu : Manshū", (Miscellaneous items on domestic policies, China : Manchuria).

(54) "Minister Hayashi's speech", reprinted in TNNS, 12th July, 1907, p.5, "Regular meeting of the Tōhō Kyokai", TAS, 1st July, 1907, p.2.

Japan to force China to strengthen herself

The agitation to recover China's rights from the foreigners preceded a much more fundamental movement for political renovation. Under the pressure of rising nationalist sentiment, the Manchu government launched a programme of internal reforms following the Japanese model. The influence which Japan had on the reforms themselves did not, however, throw much light on Sino-Japanese relations. What was more significant, perhaps, was Japan's attitudes and responses towards this attempt on the part of the Peking government to introduce reforms throughout the country on an unprecedented scale.

Japan's victory over Russia had strengthened her conviction in leading China towards enlightenment. Many believed that Japanese influence in East Asia had significantly increased after the war. In October, 1904, Ōkuma gave a speech entitled "Japanese influence in East Asia" at the Shinkan Kyokai in which he introduced the idea of Japanese power in the "Asian Monroe Doctrine". He argued that Japan's newly acquired influence in the Far East had made her the only country in a position to take up the responsibility of dealing with Asian affairs. No big power should intervene in any matter in Asia which affected Japanese interests. He went on to say that it was urgent for Japan to introduce reform policies in Korea and China. China was like a sick man and Japan was the only country which could cure her. The time had come when Japan's influence in Asia was beginning to be respected by the world and it was also time for her to set to work on China's illness. (55)

(55) Ōkuma, "Japanese influence in East Asia", Gaikō Jihō, Tokyo, No. 84 (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 1904, pp. 42-49. Also Ōkuma-ko Hachijūgonen-shi, op.cit., Vol. 2. pp. 436-438. See also Chapter Four.

One year later in November, 1905, Ōkuma spoke with more urgency about the necessity of reforms in China as the prerequisite to peace in the Far East. In his speech "Further discussion on peace in East Asia", given at the Tōhō Kyokai, he said that Japan had to force China to carry out reforms. He warned that the Anglo-Japanese alliance could not serve to preserve China as the cause of her decline came from within. The Chinese ministers were senile with little insight into the future of the country and the Chinese government was merely trying to prolong its life-span. It had foolishly spurned Japan's friendship and jeopardized peace in the Far East. Hence if Japan wished to save China, she would have to apply pressure and make her influence felt in Peking. Only by making China strengthen herself and guiding her in her reforms could Japan hope to ensure peace in the East. (56)

While many Japanese would have had misgivings about Ōkuma's argument for Japan taking sole responsibility in managing affairs in Asia, they would have had little reservations in supporting his idea of forcing China to adopt more enlightened policies both in her internal affairs and in her relations with Japan. Japan's mission to lead her backward neighbours towards development had derived from her success in modernization. Japan's reform was accomplished, her institutional structure perfected. The Japanese were now looking towards China and Asia where they could make a contribution comparable to those made by the West in other undeveloped parts of the world. In attempting to do so, the Japanese adopted the tactics and tone of a big power. And when they felt that China had continued to be

(56) Ōkuma, "Further discussion on peace in East Asia", *ibid*, No.9 (Vol.9, No.1) January, 1906, pp. 1-13, See also "Okuma's speech at the Tōhō Kyokai on 5th November, 1905", TNNS, 6th November, 1905, p.2 and TAS, 6th November, 1905, p.3.

steeped in backwardness, Japan would have to compel her to do so.

In a review of Ōkuma's speech, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said that the Chinese should not be surprised that Ōkuma, who had spent his life-time espousing the preservation of China, should have uttered those seemingly harsh words. Ōkuma's advice for the Japanese government was wise. But China needed not be alarmed by it. For in assuming such an attitude, Japan had no motive other than seeing peace restored in the Far East. China had to bear in mind that Japan's policies of "open door" and preservation of Chinese territories were carried out to both countries' advantage. China should have nothing to fear if she would openly negotiate and make compromises with Japan in matters relating to Japan's interests. However, she had ignored the overall importance of the situation, turned her back on Japan's friendship and resorted to "crafty plots and tricks". That was why Japan now felt it imperative to exercise her power to meet the situation. As Japan's new position and power had been acknowledged by the other countries, it was only a matter of course that she should make use of them to maintain peace in the interests of both Japan and China.⁽⁵⁷⁾

However, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun believed that Japan should be sympathetic towards the Chinese reform movement and recognize it as the manifestation of good intentions to make progress even though it was sneered by the rest of the world.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Talking of the successful training programme for the Chinese provincial armies which had taken place in the preceding six or seven years, the same newspaper said the Japanese military advisers had done China an invaluable service and it hoped that they would continue to be appointed by the Chinese government.

(57) "Ōkuma's speech", TAS, 8th November, 1905, p.3.

(58) "The progress of massive reforms in China", editorial, TAS, 23rd September, 1906, p.3.

Foreign advisers, it said, often devoted their best to their host countries. During the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government appointed over six hundred foreign experts in various government enterprises and those people had truly devoted their services to the well-being of Japan. Now Japan would offer China what she had received from Europe and America. These were only the obligations of the countries of a civilized world. A weak China would not only be a disaster to the Chinese people but also a serious drawback to Japan's foreign relations. Japan should therefore do her best to make China strong.⁽⁵⁹⁾ In another article, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said that Japan should fulfil the duty of a good neighbour and with the help of England, protect China from foreign incursions by maintaining the principle of "open-door". In this way, China would be able to reform her internal politics in peace. Moreover, Japan's conclusions of agreements with France and Russia should not hinder her from supporting China's reform movement. The Japanese Gaimushō should encourage the Chinese government to implement its constitutional programme regardless of Japan's new involvement with the powers.⁽⁶⁰⁾

But the state of affairs in China was none too promising. The decline of the Empire caused by the deterioration in the functioning of the central and provincial governments called for governmental reforms. This in turn gave rise to occasions in which the century-old rivalry between the Manchu and Chinese officials was manifested within the central government, leading to the further loss of centralization and control over the movement to overthrow the Manchu regime.

(59) "The Chinese army and Japan", editorial, TAS, 24th December, 1906, p.3.

(60) "The Chinese imperial edict for the establishment of a constitution", TAS, 4th September, 1906, p.3, and "The present situation of China's government", TAS, 14th August, 1907, p.3.

Hence it was with a good deal of insight that the Tokyo newspapers gave warnings of the difficulties facing China in establishing a constitution. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, for example, urged China first to sweep away all evil practices notably corruption in the government and institutions such as the army. Then she should centralize all power in Peking from where she could effectively build up her military defence, reorganize the finances, introduce nationwide education and set up a police force. But centralization depended on a harmonious relationship first between the Manchus and Chinese and second, between the new generation represented mainly by returned students who were full of new ideas and the older governmental leaders who were often steeped in inefficiency and corruption. The traditional rivalry between the Manchus and the Chinese was particularly harmful as it brought into the open the question of allegiance from the Chinese people to their Manchu monarch. This was especially important at a time when the Chinese people were beginning to question the ability of the Manchu government to protect the country from Western incursions. Anti-foreignism tended to aggravate the hostility against the Manchus. And it would surely create difficulties and embarrassment for the government. (61)

One ray of hope seemed to come from the fact that both Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung had been included in the Peking government as a result of the reform in the official system in April, 1907. The Japanese press was in favour of Japan giving support to these two progressive Chinese leaders. It hoped that Yuan and Chang would successfully effect centralization, suppress the revolutionary

(61) See various articles in the TNNS and TAS. TNNS : "Difficulties surrounding the implementation of constitutional policies", editorial, 5th September, 1906, p.2, "The present situation of Peking political circles", special report from Peking, 19th September, 1906, p.1, "Inside the Chinese army", 19th June 1907, p.2. "The future of Chinese constitutionalism" editorial, 16th September, 1907, p.2. TAS: "China and the constitutional movement", editorial, 31st July, 1906, p.3.

outbreaks of discontented Chinese. The Tokyo newspapers, on the one hand, urged the Manchu government to exercise its sense of benevolence and responsibility in dealing with the subversive elements and on the other hand, asked the Chinese revolutionaries to discard their narrow-minded hatred for their non-Chinese rulers. Both the Nichi-Nichi Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun reckoned that both parties should channel their efforts towards the completion of constitutional reforms and build up the framework of a self-strengthening society. A revolution in China would only invite foreign intervention, endanger the existence of the country and allow the face and honour of China to be disgraced.⁽⁶²⁾

Rapprochement with the West

Japan's claim to guide China towards reform and modernization had been strengthened by her victory over Russia in 1905. The Japanese believed that they had attained the position to introduce Western civilization to the East. But the victory over Russia had other implications for the Japanese. It was a major step forward towards 'civilization' of which the Far East had hitherto been deprived by the absence of peace. That peace had not been a reality in this part of the world was believed to be as much a result of Russia's violation as the inability on the part of the other Asian countries to overcome their backwardness. Increasingly in the post-Russo-Japanese-war era, the idea of a civilized world had come to be associated by the Japanese with the Western powers which were enjoying the fruit of development

(62) "The riots in southern China", TAS, 1st June, 1907, p.3, "The organization of China's political parties", TNNS, 16th September, 1907, p.2.

and modernization.

At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, the Jiji Shimpō had said that Japan was "striding along the road to civilization under the guidance of England and America."⁽⁶³⁾ Indeed, some Japanese would have liked to believe that the Western rumour of ^{the} "yellow peril" was not directed against Japan but the rest of the Asian countries. When Ueda Mannen was talking of the "Principle of enlightenment in literature" (Bungaku no kaikoku shugi), he said. "Although Japan belongs to the yellow race, she is a civilized nation. One must not generalize and view the Japanese people in the same light as the Chinese, Korean or other nations of East Asia."⁽⁶⁴⁾ Again the Nihonjin said in May, 1904,

"...The so-called yellow people refers to the four hundred million Chinese people. If, [with their unenlightened state of mind], they were as strong as the Japanese, then the European and American peoples would surely be in great danger. This is how the 'yellow peril', in the main, is to be explained.... During the Boxer Rebellion in northern China... a lot of suffering was inflicted on the Europeans and Americans.... If one views the outbreak of harmful unrest as constituting the 'yellow peril', then one must say that it has been prevented [precisely] by the Japanese... who actually carry the principle of guiding China towards enlightenment alongside the European and American countries. It is Russia which has tried to prevent enlightened ideas of the West from reaching the Chinese people and peaceful enterprises from progressing in China, thus opposing the principle of the Japanese people and the hope of the civilized countries.... The Japanese, by fighting the Russians... [only] wish to introduce an opening for peaceful enterprise ⁽⁶⁵⁾ on behalf of the Europeans and Americans."

Undoubtedly, a half century's work had made Japan a far more

(63) "The good-will of America", Jiji Shimpō, 14th February, 1904, quoted in Oka Yoshitake, op.cit., p.44.

(64) "The views of ten distinguished scholars on the Russo-Japanese war" (Jū-taika senji taikan), ibid., p.45.

(65) "The yellow peril and Russia", Nihonjin, No.211, 20th May, 1904, quoted in Sōmura Yasunobu, op.cit., pp.267-268.

developed country than the rest of Asia. The defeat of Russia was an achievement unprecedented in Asian history of the early twentieth century. As the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said, the victory of Japan was not a victory of the Asian peoples. Japan was a unique country. Her defeat of Russia was partly a result of Western technologies and partly Japanese *étatisme*. The Russian people were a mixture of European and Asian races. They were of low calibre and owing to her despotic political system, Russia was entirely different from Japan and the European countries but resembled most Asian countries. The victory of Japan was therefore the victory of a Europeanized country over an Asianized country and not a victory of the Asian people.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Increasingly, the Japanese looked towards the 'civilized countries' of the Western world. Japan, now a Westernized Asian nation, should join hands with the Western powers to spread civilization in the East. This, however, did not necessarily mean a complete break of ties with her Asian neighbours. The Kokka Gakkai Zasshi wrote in 1906 about the rapprochement of Japan and France,

"...Japan wishes to see white and yellow nations united in a common financial policy.... To achieve a thorough cooperation between the white and yellow nations... capital from the former would have to be used to support the needs of the latter.... Japan (and the rest of Asia) could not alienate herself from the white nations owing to the limitations [especially] in her finances...."⁽⁶⁷⁾

Acceptance by the Western powers was important. According to the Kokumin Shimbun, Japan's policies of preservation and "open-door" in China had won the approval and understanding of the West. In fact,

(66) "No victory for the Asian people" editorial, TNNS, 11th July, 1906, p.2.

(67) "On the necessity of an agreement between Japan and France", Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, October, 1906, translated in Wai Chiao Pao, No. 161, 20th November, 1906, pp. 14-15.

it said that Japan's policies had so far run parallel to those of the Western powers. It was true that, because of the geographical and historical closeness of the two countries, Japan had a special duty towards China in introducing her to civilization, peace and progress. But this special relationship should not prevent the powers from cooperating with Japan in guiding and supporting China. Japan was the link between China and the powers. Her role was to open China to world relations, introduce the Chinese mind to the newest technologies and progressive ideas of the West so that China would find a place for herself in the civilized world. The recent argument of some Japanese that Japan had the sole right to manage affairs in East Asia was contrary to Japan's goal which was the attainment of peace, progress and civilization in the Far East and general good-will in the world. Such narrow-minded ideas as put forward in the East Asian Monroe Doctrine could only limit Japan and make enemies for herself and could not justify Japan's claims to be a civilized nation.⁽⁶⁸⁾

In fact, Ōkuma himself accepted in 1907 that the current trend in the relations between the countries of the world was one of gradual harmonization of the Eastern and Western civilizations. He told a gathering of Chinese students that for centuries, civilization in the Eastern hemisphere had spread eastward only as far as Japan and civilization in the Western hemisphere had advanced westward no further than America. It was only lately that the two civilizations had begun to meet. After the initial conflicts, exchanges and adaptations, Western and Eastern cultures gradually blended with one another.

(68) "Policies towards China", Kokumin Shimbun, translated in CCJP, op.cit., Vol.4, 20th November, 1904, p.1.

This process had enabled Japan to become a modernized state. If this could happen to Japan, it was only logical that it could also happen to China. He believed that the likelihood of wars among the "civilized countries" of the world was diminishing. But the Chinese should still exert and strengthen themselves for a nation's weakness would only lead to sacrifice and disasters for the world. After all, the Russo-Japanese war had been caused by the inability of the Chinese to safeguard the three Eastern Provinces in Manchuria.⁽⁶⁹⁾

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Japan entered a new phase in international relations after having emerged as a world power from the war of 1904-1905. A new element developed in her attitudes towards the Western powers on the one hand and China on the other — a concern with the future of East-West relations. The Japanese public and leaders began to talk about Japan's task to "harmonize" relations between East and West and her right to force China to adopt Western civilization. This had stemmed from a fundamental awareness of Japan being an Asian nation, now successfully Westernized and faced with growing aspirations of the Eastern nations on the one hand and increasing competitions from the Western powers on the other.

The Japanese were never more convinced that if permanent peace was to become a reality in the Far East, China had to strengthen herself. There was also a continuation of the feeling that Japan

(69) "Count Ōkuma's speech at a gathering of Chinese students" (at the Chinese Young Men's Christian Association), TAS, 3rd April, 1907, p.4.

should lead the Asian countries in their awakening. In fact, the few years after the Russo-Japanese war saw the concept of Japanese guidance actually put into effect on an unprecedented scale. China's attempt to establish a constitution and launch reforms gave Japan the opportunity to lead her towards modernization notably in the army and educational systems. There was no lack of enthusiasm and optimism surrounding China's "awakening", her resolution to strengthen herself and at last, her search for the key to civilization and peace in the East. Even more fervently, it seems, Japan grasped the long-awaited moment to play the role of a friend and leader and, so she believed, actually do something which would ensure her own national safety.

The Japanese victory over Russia brought revenge and self-confidence. It became imperative that Japan made it clear to the world that her stake in Southern Manchuria was vital to her national independence, as distinct from the interests of the Western powers in that area. This necessitated a re-examination of her relations with China. The assumption underlying Japan's idea of cooperation between the two countries after the war was that China would fully recognize her rights and interests in Southern Manchuria. The Chinese hence found themselves no better off after the war. Moreover, growing Chinese nationalism meant that cooperation on such a basis could hardly materialize. The Japanese, on the other hand, looked upon China's resentment of her new position as indicative of her ingratitude and her inability to see that cooperation with Japan was for her own good.

The Japanese were also frustrated by the Chinese government's slowness in strengthening the country. The mission to guide China had derived from Japanese success in modernization. It represented a heavenly calling which was incumbent upon Japan whether China wished

to be saved from destruction or not. In the post-war era, Japan's 'duty' to lead her Asian neighbours came to be associated with the responsibilities and tactics of a big power. Hence the unexpected remonstrance from Ōkuma in 1905 of the need for Japan to use a strong hand in making the Chinese government see Japan's point of view and forcing it to carry out reforms. This was in fact a continuation of his declaration in the so-called Asian Monroe Doctrine in late 1904 that Japan had sole responsibility in East Asia. The Japanese public too, was concerned at the government's "inadequate" policies towards China. The world, it reckoned, was entering an era of intensive competition. It was doubtful whether Japan was strong enough yet to participate in the competitive power politics. Japan would have to assert herself still further in order to stand up to the challenge. The implantation of her influence in East Asia and the exploitation of the advantages and prestige which she had won in China as a result of the war seemed to be the logical solution.

But Japan had also recognized, at the same time, the emergence of an awareness on the part of the Chinese which was nationalistic especially in face of foreign rights. This nationalism was also potentially anti-government in domestic politics. Rather than risking the growth of anti-Japanese sentiment and a dangerous situation for the dynasty, Japan opted for conciliation and came to terms with Chinese nationalism with a view to consolidating and maintaining the status quo in the Far East. The well-being of the Chinese government was as important for China's stability as Japan's safety. Japan would do well to take positive steps to improve relations with both the Chinese government and people. What was most important was that Japan should guide the national aspirations of the Chinese in the right direction and prevent them from turning into blind anti-foreign hostility.

However, the realization of the need for restraint as exemplified by the decision of the Conference on Manchuria of the genrō and cabinet ministers in March-April, 1906 did not result solely from the consideration of Chinese hostility. In fact, the Conference was called to deal with complaints made by the Western powers that the Japanese authorities in Manchuria had engaged in discriminatory activities. Concern about reactions from the Western powers had come to play an important part in Japanese political thinking. It became evident that the idea of Japan as a civilized nation would be given meaning only by her being accepted by the West. Rather than insisting on her right to guide China on grounds of racial and cultural affinity, many Japanese believed that they could now fulfil this mission in cooperation with the Western powers. Japan was now conscious of the need to abide by the rules of the "community of nations" — rules which constituted the criteria of acceptance and civilization.

Japan's diplomatic position after the Russo-Japanese war led her to follow a line of policy alongside the Western powers in pursuit of her own interests. But more often than not, one is persuaded to feel that for Japan, the question of ~~va~~approchement with the West and cooperation with China were not conflicting issues. The underlying assumption of the Japanese was that improvement in Japan's relations with the Western powers need not entail estrangement with China. Rather, many believed that one complemented the other. Increasingly, Japan was convinced that she had an important role to play in her relations with the Western countries, but it was a role which was closely related to China coming to terms with Japan's growing power and position in East Asia.

CHAPTER SIX

CHINESE STUDENTS IN JAPAN AND JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN
CHINA, 1895-1911

From about 1898 to 1907, Japanese influence in the educational development of China rapidly increased. This was followed by a rather abrupt decline towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. By the time the Chinese revolution broke out in 1911, Japanese involvement in China's educational affairs had ended almost completely. Much has been said of the Japanese and Chinese attitudes towards the question of Chinese students in Japan which arose as part of the argument for Sino-Japanese cooperation. This chapter looks at the two channels by which educational influence was exercised by Japan on China — the academic curricula of Chinese students in Japan and the educational activities of Japanese organizations and individuals in China.

The sending of students to Japan to be educated in the "new learning" began as part of the educational reform in China which took place soon after the Sino-Japanese war. There were obvious advantages of sending students to Japan rather than to the West. Chang Chih-tung in his essay, "Exhortation to Study", pointed out that it was more economical both in time and money, it was easier for Chinese students to learn the Japanese language than to learn Western languages and it was a short-cut to acquiring Western knowledge as the Japanese had selected those areas of Western learning essential for modernization.⁽¹⁾

(1) Excerpt from Chang Chih-tung's "Exhortation to Study" in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsüeh-shi (A history of Chinese students studying abroad in recent times), Shanghai, 1933, pp.47-48.

Mention has been made of the favourable attitude of many Japanese government and military leaders to the idea of Japan training Chinese students in the post-1895 period. It May, 1898, the Japanese minister to China, Yano Fumio, intimated to the Chinese government that the Japanese government intended to cultivate friendly relations with China and as China at that time urgently needed people with abilities and knowledge, it was advisable for her to send people to Japan to study. Japan would contribute to the funds required for such a project and the number of students to take part was tentatively fixed at two hundred.⁽²⁾ Yano's offer coincided with the Japanese government's demand for railway concessions in Fukien. He also believed that new men of ability influenced by Japan and distributed over the old empire would probably favour the extension of Japan's influence on the Asian Continent.⁽³⁾

Yang Shen-hsiu of the Chinese Ministry of Defence who presented Yano's case to the Tsungli Yamen on 1st June was in favour of accepting the Japanese offer. He pointed out that organizations with the objective of helping the development of East Asian countries had been established in Japan and the Chinese government should send students to that country. He also proposed that students who were already studying the Japanese language in the T'ung Wen Kuan (Interpreters' College) should be selected. Furthermore, the governor-generals of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsu and Chekiang should be asked to select young, intelligent people who had some knowledge of the Japanese language.⁽⁴⁾

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- (2) Yano's message quoted in Shu Hsin-ch'eng (ed.) Chung-kuo chin-tai Chiao-yü-shih Tzu-liao (Documents on Chinese education, 1860-1922), Peking, 1962, p. 173.
- (3) Yano to foreign minister Nishi, 29th April, 1898, NGB, Vol. 31, Part 1, (1954) No. 440, p. 502.
- (4) Yang Shen-hsiu to Tsungli Yamen, 1st June, 1898, Yu Pao-hsien (ed.) Huang-ch'ao Hsü-ai Wen-pien (A collection of essays by writers of the reform movement), Shanghai, 1902, Vol. 15, Section on School II, pp. 41-42.

The first group of thirteen students had been sent by the Chinese government in 1896 to Kano Jigorō's Higher Teachers Training College to learn Japanese and literature as well as general subjects under the supervisor Honda Masujiro and other Japanese teachers.⁽⁵⁾ After Japan had made the official offer in 1898, steps were taken by the Japanese educational authorities to cope with the larger number of students with inadequate knowledge of the Japanese language. In June, 1898, the Nichika Gakudō (Sino-Japanese School) was set up in Japan by Takakusu Junjiro. Designed especially for Chinese students, it gave them preparatory tuition in the Japanese language and other subjects to enable them to take up specialized studies in higher institutions such as the university.⁽⁶⁾ In 1899, the Nichika Gakudō had twenty-six students from Chekiang, Kiangsu, Kwangtung, Chihli, Anhwei and Fukien.⁽⁷⁾

Most of the students attended schools and institutions especially set up for them. Many of the earlier students selected from among imperial clansmen were sent by the government to study military science. ~~The largest military science.~~ The largest military preparatory school for Chinese students at that time was the Seijō Gakko to which the first military students were sent by Chang Chih-tung, Yuan Shih-k'ai and Liu K'un-i after the visit of the Japanese emissaries sent by Kawakami Soroku in late 1897. Up to 1902, the school had been taking in Chinese students sponsored by their government. In 1902, nine private students wanted to enter the school but the Chinese minister in Japan refused to endorse their applications.⁽⁸⁾ This was, at that time, an entrance requirement for military students set

(5) "Miscellaneous records of the first lecture in the courses of general subjects and teachers training of the Kōbun Shoin" in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsüeh-shi, p.22.

(6) *ibid.*, p.25.

(7) "Prospectus of the Nichika Gakudō", collected in Huang-ch'ao Hsü-ai Wen-pien, *op.cit.*, Vol.16, Section on School III, pp.15b-16a. Chang Tsung-hsiang, who was among the twenty-six students, wrote an essay "On guidelines to studying in Japan" in 1901 when he returned to China expounding the advantages and necessity of sending more students to Japan.

(8) See Chapter Four.

down by the Chinese government. A dispute ensued between the students and the minister. On the intervention by the Tōa Dōbun Kai, the Chinese minister in Tokyo and the Japanese government arrived at an agreement whereby a Shimbu Gakko was to be established which would take over the entire student body of the Seijō Gakko. From 1903, at the request of the Chinese minister and supervisor of students in Japan, the Seijō Gakko began to offer arts courses to Chinese students.⁽⁹⁾

The Shimbu Gakko was established in July, 1903 by the General Staff of the Japanese army. It became the main military school which gave Chinese students preparatory training for further military education at the various training schools for army officers. It would seem that the nine private students who caused the dispute in 1902 did not win their case. Entrance to the Shimbu Gakko was still restricted to government-sponsored students.⁽¹⁰⁾ From April, 1904, one hundred students were sent annually to the school by the Chinese government which paid the expenses of the students' education as well as the salaries of the teachers.⁽¹¹⁾ The number of students at the Shimbu Gakko exceeded that of the Seijō Gakko in earlier years. By 1907, there was a total of about eight hundred and fifty Chinese military graduates from the two schools. The "Students' Register" in the "Survey of the Shimbu Gakko" in 1907 reveals that ninety percent of the important officers in the Chinese army at the end of the decade had received their training at the school.⁽¹²⁾

Many private students were accepted into the Tōbu Gakudō. Founded

(9) Sanetō Keishū, Chūgoku-jin Nihon Ryūgakushi (A history of Chinese students in Japan), Tokyo, 1960, p.68.

(10) *ibid.*, pp.68-69.

(11) Yo-chang Ch'eng-an Hui-lan (Collection of documented treaty stipulations), Vol. 32, Part 2, cited in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsüeh-shi, p.57.

(12) Sanetō, *op.cit.*, p. 70. Also, "Survey of the Shimbu Gakko, April, 1907", cited in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsüeh-shi, pp. 63-64.

by Terao Tōru in 1903, it was a private school offering military studies to Chinese students who were refused entrance into the Shimbu Gakko and came to be known as the private Shimbu Gakko. Many students who later became leading revolutionaries^{had} studied here. According to Sanetō, the Tōbu Gakudō might well have been a breeding place of the active members of the revolutionary movement in Japan.⁽¹³⁾

In 1902, the Tōa Dōbun Shoin was set up in Tokyo. The school admitted Chinese and Korean students wishing to do general studies. It also offered crash courses to those who wished to study law and politics.⁽¹⁴⁾ In 1903, the Chinese minister of education, Chang Po-hsi, in an "Outline of educational activities", put emphasis on developing the teachers training colleges in China. He called for a general revision of the curricula of the existing teachers training colleges and advocated the setting up of new colleges in more provinces. Students were to be sent abroad to take up teachers training courses so that they might fill the places in the newly-established colleges at home.⁽¹⁵⁾ By 1904, most of the teachers in the provinces had studied in Japan. Many of these students had entered the Kōbun Shoin founded in 1902 by Kano Jigorō who had himself investigated the Chinese educational system. Besides teachers training courses, the school also offered three-year courses in Japanese, psychology, management, physics and chemistry.⁽¹⁶⁾

The emphasis on the establishment of teachers training colleges in various provinces of China in 1903 was part of a major step in the reform of China's educational system. On the prompting of Chang Chih-

(13) Sanetō, p.71.

(14) *ibid.*, p.68.

(15) "Survey of the Shimbu Gakko, April, 1907", cited in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsüeh-shi, p.52.

(16) Sanetō, p.68.

tung, a law was passed that the scholar-gentry in charge of the schools in the provinces be sent outside China to investigate the educational systems in other countries, especially Japan. Chang also drew up a set of regulations encouraging private students to take up studies in Japan.⁽¹⁷⁾ The result was a rapid increase in the number of privately-supported students. The adoption in 1903 of the new educational system modelled on that in Japan, the abolition of the civil service examination system in 1905 and the defeat of Russia in the same year explain the continual increase in the number of students to over seven thousand by 1906.⁽¹⁸⁾

The Chinese government was concerned at the rapidly growing student population in Japan. In August, 1906, it ordered the provincial governments to limit the number of students. Students wishing to study in Japan were required to have already reached higher school standard and to be familiar with the Japanese language. They were also required to sit a preliminary examination at home before they took up specialized or higher studies in Japan. Short-term attendance at schools in Japan was also forbidden.⁽¹⁹⁾

In late 1907, the number of students who were taking preparatory courses in general studies with a view to entering higher educational institutions in Japan exceeded two thousand. Seeing that the places in such higher institutions were limited, the Chinese minister, Li Chia-chü, made an agreement with the Japanese Mombushō that for fifteen years as from 1908, five higher institutes in Japan, namely, the First Higher School (Tokyo), the Higher Teachers Training College

(17) Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chung-kuo chin-tai Chiao-yü-shih Tzu-liao, p.182.

(18) Excerpt from Japanese Mombushō, Gakusei Go-jū-nien-shi (History of fifty years of educational system), in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsüeh-shi, p.70. There were grave discrepancies in the statistics of the total number of Chinese students in Japan during any one year. The Japan Weekly Mail gave the number of 13,000 for 1906. But the Mombushō estimate was "over 7000" for the same year. This would seem to be more reliable, see Sanetō, p.60.

(19) "Despatches to provincial governors to limit students going abroad and promote the establishment of schools at home", 7th August, 1906, Hsieh-pu Tsou-tzü Chi-yao (Curriculum devised by the Board of Education), 1909. Vol.1.

(Tokyo), the Higher Technical College (Tokyo), the Higher Commercial College (Yamaguchi) and the Chiba Medical School, would take in annually a total of one hundred and sixty-five Chinese students who would be given grants by the home government.⁽²⁰⁾ By 1910, the five higher institutes had taken in four hundred and sixty students.⁽²¹⁾

Whilst attendance at other institutions was high, very few students entered government universities in Japan. In 1904, only nineteen Chinese students attended the Tokyo Imperial University and in 1909, there were no more than sixty. On the other hand, private universities were more accessible to Chinese students. In 1909, the figures of these students attending the Meiji and Hosei Universities were seven hundred and three hundred and eighty respectively, while over eight hundred were recorded to have graduated from the Chinese students section of Waseda University.⁽²²⁾ The number of students registered in other private universities were not recorded. Over 1908-1909, many higher institutes offering, in particular, law and politics sprang up requiring very low entrance qualifications and providing poor academic training. Some of the students attending these universities and institutes even refused to disclose the number of years they had studied and the duration of the courses when the Chinese Board of Education made an investigation into these universities.⁽²³⁾

The Chinese government began to regard Japan as an increasingly undesirable place for Chinese students. There was a gradual decline

(20) "Regulations setting down the number of students to be admitted into higher institutions and annual budgets of individual provinces for financing the students", 3rd January, 1908, *ibid.*, Vol.3.

(21) Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsüeh-shi, p.68.

(22) Roger F. Hackett, "Chinese students in Japan, 1900-1911" in Papers on China, East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Vol.3, 1949, p.143.

(23) "Regulations concerning entrance requirements of students wishing to enter Japanese private universities and qualifications to be attained by graduates of such universities before they could be recommended to sit appointment examinations at home", 29th July, 1908, Hsüeh-pu Tsou-tzü Chi-yao, Vol.4.

in the overall standard of education for Chinese students in Japan. In proportion to their numbers, students returning from Japan fared worse than their counterparts from Europe and America in special examinations for government jobs. Moreover, the growing restlessness of the students themselves became problematic for the Manchu government. From 1908, the Chinese government began to send larger numbers of students to America and Germany instead. An imperial decree in early 1908 stressed the importance of sending members of the imperial family to study military science in Germany, politics and legal studies in England and America as the "first step towards the revitalization of the education of the nation".⁽²⁴⁾ From 1909, the number of Chinese students dropped drastically. By 1911, most had returned to China.

Hirakawa Seifu in his "Shina Kyōwa-shi" (A history of the Chinese republic) classified the Chinese students of this period into two groups - those who came prior to 1904 and those who came after. The former were, according to him, acquainted with their own history and culture, and were able to select certain areas of the "new learning" to add to the knowledge they already had of their own society. These were generally conservative and tended to advocate gradual changes in China. Most of them sought only institutional training in Japan to supplement their Chinese education. These students were usually carefully selected and they were assured of government jobs on their return.⁽²⁵⁾ Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and people who were in favour of a constitutional monarchy in China had some influence with these students. Ōkuma and organizations like the Tōa Dōbun Kai made sense to them, so

(24) "The Chinese Emperor's decree", TNNS, 2nd February, 1908, p.4.

(25) Quoted in Hackett, "Chinese students in Japan, 1900-1911", p.143.

much so that a brief period of friendship existed between Liang and the "progressive Chinese" on the one hand and Ōkuma and Inukai on the other in the 1898-1899 period.

Later students, according to Hirakawa's classification, knew little about their own culture. The average age of these students was twenty-three. They literally swallowed the "new learning", and for a time, their only ideology was a shallow worship of the Meiji Constitution. These students often restricted their studies to law, politics and military science, and tended to advocate radical reforms and changes in China.⁽²⁶⁾ Many of these later comers were privately - supported students who had little to lose when they went home. The student movement which centred round them played a central role in undermining the government at home. The same movement also affected Japan's hopes for influencing the ideology of China's new intelligentsia. The successes of Japan at modernization made them aware of the weakness of their own government and country. When confronted by Japanese power and the general ill-feeling on the part of the Japanese populace, they became conscious of their unfriendly environment. These sentiments combined to evoke a new sense of patriotism. Anti-Japanese hostility was but part of this sense of national pride. In seeking outlets for their extremely nationalistic feelings, they reacted against any kind of authority and foreign pressure. Demonstrations and boycott of classes were their usual methods of protest .

By 1907, the thousands of Chinese students who had imbibed nationalism and little else from their stay in Japan were keenly suspicious of all Japanese. At the outbreak of the revolution in 1911, most students had

(26) *ibid.*, pp. 143-144.

returned to China. Their distrust and wariness of Japan were heightened by the fear of Japanese intervention to put down the revolution.

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The first flush of Japanese educational activities in China began soon after the establishment of the Tōa Dōbun Kai in November, 1898. As a semi-official organization, the Tōa Dōbun Kai was partially financed by the Gaimushō. Its professed objective was to promote understanding and solidarity between Japan, China and Korea at the height of Western imperialistic activities in China.

From the outset, the Society was engaged in cultural and journalistic activities in the key centres of China. In Shanghai, where the Society had its headquarters, the monthly Ya-Tung Shih-Pao (East Asian News) was started in 1898. It became an official journal of the Society and was widely read in Chinese intellectual and journalistic circles. This journal was complemented by the Tung Wen Hu Pao (Shanghai Common Culture Newspaper) which was published daily. In Hankow, the Han Pao (China News) was also published daily. It was taken over from the Chinese by a member of the Society, Munakata Kotarō. The publication became the only daily newspaper circulated in Hankow, a trading centre with a population of six hundred thousand people who, apart from their governor-general, Chang Chih-tung, were known to have very strong anti-Japanese feelings. In Fukien, where Japanese influence was greatest, the Tung-Wen Hsüeh-T'ang (Japanese Language College) was founded with the cooperation of the influential gentry class. In the year 1899-1900, sixty students, most of them from upper class families, were admitted. Japanese was the main language taught as the medium through which students could take up general subjects. Some students from this college were sent to Japan to further their studies. Branch quarters had

also been set up in Peking and Newchang but the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion had prevented these from becoming active centres.⁽²⁷⁾

A more important part of the Society's activities in China, it would seem, was for investigational purposes. Japanese students were sent to study in Kwangtung, a trading centre with Japan and a leading political centre in southern China, commanding the affairs of Macao, Hong Kong, Fatshan, Swatow and Chaochow, the last two places having Japanese language schools set up by the Society. Japanese students were also sent to Hankow. It was hoped that through these kinds of activities, the Society would not merely come into contact with the influential people among the Chinese but would acquire more knowledge of Chinese affairs, thus aiding Japanese political and business enterprises in China.⁽²⁸⁾

The largest school set up by the Society was the Tōa Dōbun Shoin for Chinese and Japanese students, first established in Nanking in 1900. The objective was to foster friendly relations between Japan and China - relations which had been jeopardized in the 1894-1895 war. It was hoped that through sending Japanese students to the school, the true facts about China would be made known to the Japanese public. The school had been open for no more than a few months when the Boxer Rebellion broke out; student morale was affected. In August, 1900, the staff and students were moved to Shanghai. At the end of 1901, students were sent from various fu and ken in Japan. They were taught mainly politics and commerce in order that they might, one day, take up responsible positions — such as company directors — in the development of China. Included in the students' curriculum

(27) Tōa Dōbun Kai Kankei Zassen (Miscellaneous documents relating to the Tōa Dobun Kai), sections 1 and 2, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., pp. 38-41, 58-62.

(28) *ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

were investigation tours during the summer vacation. Every year, about eighty students from the third year would travel in the eighteen provinces, Manchuria, Mongolia and the border territories, to investigate in detail the political and economic conditions of the places visited. About every third year, return trips were made to the various fu and ken of Japan and during these periods the students would tell the people at home things about China. (29)

~~an trip~~ ^{extended investigation}

During 1907-1913, an ~~trip~~ ^{extended investigation} of China headed by the president Nabeshima was sponsored by the Society with a view to visiting the entire country and promoting understanding between the two peoples. In the "Proposed plan for the development of China" drawn up at the end of the trip, a positive policy of economic penetration was advocated. The trip coincided with the reforms and revolution in China. It was urged that the Society's plan for the development of China should not be hindered by the unrest in the country. The suggestions included the installation of a Japanese consul, a trade commissioner and a tourist office at every trading port in China. Their aim would be to promote the business relations between the two countries in the hope that anti-Japanese feelings as manifested by the trade boycott in 1908 would be prevented in future. It was also proposed that agricultural and engineering studies be included in the curricula of the Japanese students studying in the Shanghai Dōbun Shoin so that they would be well-equipped when they finished studying to take up agricultural and industrial activities in various parts of China. Furthermore, more frequent reports were to be made and published on the affairs investigated, especially in the important areas. More Chinese language newspapers

(29) *ibid.*, pp. 586-590.

were to be published in Shanghai and Hankow and the prices were to be kept low to ensure wide circulation. It was hoped that these would be circulated among the members of provincial assemblies, commercial organizations and principals of schools. As the Chinese students studying in Japan would eventually take up responsibilities in the newly established republican government, it was urged that their goodwill towards Japan be cultivated, by improving their welfare and academic training in Japan.⁽³⁰⁾

In the years following the Sino-Japanese war, large numbers of Japanese went to China, not a few of whom became military, legal, diplomatic, educational and agricultural advisers in the Chinese government. In 1899, there were 1725 Japanese in China and in 1905, 16,910.⁽³¹⁾ Many of these Japanese took up educational careers and opened schools for Chinese students. By 1905, there were no less than fifteen schools other than the Shanghai Dōbun Shoin and its subsidiary schools run by the Japanese. These were scattered throughout northern and central China. The more notable were the Nihongo Gakudō in Hangchow (1898), the Shōka Gakudō in Chuanchow (1899), Tōbun Gakudō in Tientsin (1899), Tōa Gakuin in Amoy (1900), Honganji Tōbun Gakudō in Nanking (1901), Tōbun Gakusha in Peking (1901), and Ryūgaku Kōtō Yōbi Gakudō in Shanghai (1905)⁽³²⁾ All of these schools were teaching general subjects in addition to the Japanese language. General and crash courses were offered in much the same way as in most schools set up for Chinese students in Japan.

Probably the most successful of these schools was the Tōbun Gakusha founded by Nakashima Tatsuyuki in Peking in March, 1901. Nakashima

(30) *ibid.*, pp. 282-284, 496-497, 500-512.

(31) Tōa Dōbun Kai, Shina Nenkan (Annual Report on China), cited in Sanetō, pp. 88-89.

(32) *ibid.*, p. 89.

himself had studied under a Chinese scholar in 1898. The school offered special studies in Japanese and translations for more mature students with a good background of Chinese learning and general subjects plus Japanese for younger students. Japanese scholars who were themselves studying the Chinese language were employed to take up part of the teaching in the school. The school admitted students of all ages from all kinds of social backgrounds — the only entrance requirement was that they did not smoke opium. In six years from 1901 to the first half of 1906, about 1,867 students had attended the school. Many of them eventually took up educational careers in various provinces of China. Nakashima was known to have expended his entire energy on keeping up the academic standard and the morale of the staff and students. The sources of finance and assistance came from the intellectual and official circles in China as well as Japan. Supporters included people like Yuan Shih-k'ai, Li Hung-chang, Kawashima Naniwa and Kano Jigorō; help came even from members of the Japanese army stationed in China.⁽³³⁾ In the latter half of 1905, when Yuan Shih-k'ai was governor-general, the school came under the jurisdiction of the Chihli Ministry of Education.

Nakashima himself said, "...It is out of a sense of vocation and gratitude that I have embarked on a career of education in China..."⁽³⁴⁾ Asked if he thought Japan would be threatened by a China grown strong as a result of the introduction of modern education, he replied that when China reached the stage of enlightenment and prosperity, the trade between the two countries would expand as a result of increased Japanese exports. Secondly, in times of crisis, a strong China could possibly

(33) *ibid.*, p.90.

(34) "Brief record of the Tōhū Gakusha", cited in Sanetō, p.210.

be the source of a foreign loan. Thirdly, a strong neighbour could resist the aggressive designs of other powers, leaving Japan to pursue her national destinies in peace. Fourthly, there had never been a precedent in history when Japan had suffered destruction because of China's physical greatness. Finally, the Chinese people tended to put self-interest before everything and a sense of nationalism was lacking in them.⁽³⁵⁾

After the establishment of the Tōbun Gakusha, other schools modelled on the same line were set up by the Japanese in Peking itself after 1901. Some of these were the Bummei Gakudō, the Nichi-Eigo Gakudō, the Nihongo Sokusei Gakudō, the Nichi-Ei Sokusei Gakko and the Shinka Gakudō, all founded by scholars who had formerly taught at Nakashima's Tōbun Gakusha. Other schools included the Tōa Zenrin Gakudō and Hakki Chūgakudō.⁽³⁶⁾

In this connection, the Japanese who went to China as teachers deserve mention. Although they had started to go to China before 1900, it was only after the Boxer Rebellion that it became a common practice for Japanese teachers to be sent to China. The highest recorded number in 1906 of these teachers in Nakashima's school was almost six hundred. According to a Japanese teacher, Nakashima Hanjiro, who had taught at the Tientsin Peiyang Teachers Training College, the total number of foreign teachers in China in November, 1909 was 356 and of these, 311 were Japanese, that is, over eighty-four per cent.⁽³⁷⁾ Over the decade, these teachers had taught at kindergartens, primary schools, secondary schools, higher level institutes, Japanese schools as well as schools where other languages were taught, translation institutes,

(35) *ibid.*

(36) *ibid.*, p.93.

(37) Figures quoted in Sanetō pp. 93-96. Sanetō, however, thinks that there were at least 460 Japanese teachers in China in 1909, see pp. 94, 97.

teachers training colleges, schools of law and politics, technical colleges, commercial colleges, agricultural institutes, medical schools, veterinary colleges, schools for studying railways, engineering schools, police academies and military preparatory schools. With the exception of Kansu, the schools were distributed over the provinces.⁽³⁸⁾

However, towards the end of the decade, the influence of Japanese teachers began to decline. As the Chinese Board of Education stepped up the establishment of more schools in China, the need for foreign education became less felt. Chinese students returned home in increasing numbers with the qualifications to teach in Chinese schools. They filled many teaching posts which formerly had to be given to recruits from Japan. Also, the Chinese public was beginning to talk about the recovery of rights including what it called the "right to educate" the Chinese youths. Foreign especially Japanese teachers and educationists became increasingly unpopular with the Chinese students and scholars. In 1907, the Wai Chiao Pao condemned the foreign countries for their encroachment on China's educational development and called upon the Chinese government to speed up the implementation of educational reform and methods throughout the country.⁽³⁹⁾

Moreover, Japan's hitherto predominant position in China's education began to be seriously challenged by Western influences. American and German universities, medical schools and higher institutes were established in Tientsin, Shanghai, Peking, Tsingtao and other Chinese cities, often with funds from the American and German governments.⁽⁴⁰⁾ The Americans, in particular, made a decided effort to reduce the

(38) When the T'ung Meng Hui was formed in Tokyo in 1905, Kansu was also the only province not represented in its membership.

(39) Wai Chiao Pao, No.183, 1907, quoted in Shu Hsin-ch'eng (ed.) Chung-kuo Chin-tai Chiao-yü-shih Tzu-liao, op.cit. pp. 1077-1079.

(40) Aoyagi Atsutsure, "The education of the Chinese and the international rivalry between Japan, America and Germany", Gaiko Jihō, op.cit., No.122 (Vol.11, No.1), January, 1908, pp. 71-74.

Japanese influence. On 2nd June, 1907, an article entitled "Chinese don't want Japanese teachers" appeared in the New York Daily Tribune. It criticized the Japanese teachers employed in Chinese government schools as ignorant and inadequate. It also warned the Chinese government that Chinese students in Japan were easily led astray and given substandard academic training.⁽⁴¹⁾ Meanwhile, the first batch of Chinese students were sent in 1907 to Yale, Cornell, Wellesley and other American universities as a result of an agreement made between Tuan Fang and the American government during his tour of investigation of constitutionalism in the West in 1906.⁽⁴²⁾ In 1908, President Roosevelt stressed in his inaugural address in Congress that America was willing to give financial aid to Chinese educational activities; a sum of ten million dollars from the Boxer indemnity was put aside and channelled into educational development in China.⁽⁴³⁾

Over the years, the academic achievement and enthusiasm of the teaching corps from Japan had declined considerably.⁽⁴⁴⁾ It was partly the result of the gradually decreasing interest of the Japanese authorities in Japan's involvement in educating the Chinese. There was a marked lack of attention paid to the welfare of the Japanese teachers in China. They were often poorly paid, especially when compared to Western teachers and the authorities at home made no attempt to control their affairs. Although the Japanese government took no active step to put an end to Japanese commitment in China's educational affairs, it took an increasingly lukewarm attitude towards the question.⁽⁴⁵⁾ As the number of Chinese students going to Japan fell rapidly, so the number of Japanese teachers in China dwindled quickly towards the end of the decade. By 1911, almost all of them had returned to Japan.

(41) *ibid.*, pp. 70-71

(42) *ibid.*, p.74

(43) *ibid.*, p.75

(44) Hirakawa Seifu, Shina Kyōwa-shi, quoted in Sanetō, p. 103.

(45) See Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN

JAPAN'S RECONSIDERATION OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA:
CONSOLIDATION OF JAPAN'S SPECIAL POSITION IN CHINA, 1907-1911

While the Chinese believed that Japan's diplomatic successes with the Western countries in 1907 had secured for her a place among the imperialist powers, many Japanese were beginning to feel uncertain about their new relationship with the West. Contrary to what the Japanese had expected, Japan's policy of alignment with the powers did not entail her acceptance by the latter as their equals. The 'civilized nations' of the West appeared to be jealously preserving their own interests and superior positions and many in Japan began to have doubts about the 'harmony' between East and West.

Japan's awareness of Western hostility

The first blow came with America's legislations against the immigration of Japanese (as well as Chinese and Korean) labourers. The "yellow peril" had taken on a new meaning in America after Japan emerged from her triumph over Russia. Japanese immigrants, entering in large numbers especially to California aroused fears in the American states on the Pacific coast. A gentlemen's agreement was made between President Roosevelt and the Japanese government whereby the latter would refuse Japanese labourers passports to the mainland United States. It was, however, nothing more than a façade of American-Japanese good-will. Anti-Japanese prejudice among the populace remained and the West-coast agitators continued to clamour for restrictive measures against Japanese labourers and their families

already in America.

The Japanese were bitterly frustrated by this show of racial predudice. They could not explain the phenomenon as they felt they had done much to allay the Western fear of a "yellow peril".⁽¹⁾ The Japanese government, however, was anxious to preserve the confidence and understanding of the Western powers. It concluded the Root-Takahira agreement with America in 1908 and took pains to ensure that the visit of the American fleet to Japan — part of a round-the-world cruise in 1908-1909 demonstrating American naval power in the Pacific — was given an extraordinarily cordial reception by the Japanese people.⁽²⁾ But the immigration dispute had made the Japanese realize that Western prejudices against the East still persisted and that Japan's position in the world was as uncertain as before the war. At the end of 1907, the year in which Japan had entered into political agreements with France and Russia, Itō himself admitted that "Japan's position in the world is most grievous. The situation is such that there is an unmistakable trend towards Japanese isolation".⁽³⁾

Anti-Japanese feelings in this period were not confined to America. Throughout 1908 and well into 1909, Japan encountered criticism of her activities in Manchuria from other powers as well as America. The most severe allegations came from Morrison, London Times Correspondent in Peking, who attacked the Japanese government for subjecting Southern Manchuria under military rule and going back on its promise to observe the "open door" in the area. He also claimed that foreign

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- (1) No less than twenty editorial articles appeared in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun and the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun over the 1905-1907 period expressing concern and amazement at the influence of the "yellow peril" idea in America and criticizing the American authorities' legislations against Japanese immigrants especially the segregation orders of the American Schools Board.
 - (2) The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun even printed a series of "Guide to conversations with the American visitors" in English for its readers.
 - (3) Quoted by Iriye Akira, Across the Pacific : an inner history of American - East Asian relations, New York, 1967, p.114.

especially British merchants in Manchuria were very dissatisfied with the Japanese authorities and that Japanese nationals on the Asian continent were extremely unpopular.⁽⁴⁾ The New York Times likewise received unfavourable reports of the Japanese from its correspondent in Peking who urged the American government and the powers to "help China resist Japanese and Russian invasions of Manchuria and violation of China's independence... as China's protests are ineffective in face of Russian and Japanese military presence in the area".⁽⁵⁾

Similar criticism had been made by the Westerners in early 1906 and Japan had made an effort to mitigate the suspicions of the Western powers. In 1908, however, the Japanese reacted with bitterness. They felt they had been done a grave injustice. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said that as Japan had made great sacrifices of human lives and money to preserve the "open door" and Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, she expected to receive praise and approval from the powers for her endeavour towards the improvement of world relations in East Asia. Trade between China and England, America, Germany, for example, had increased rapidly since 1905 as a result of Japanese efforts in Manchuria. The accusations by the British and Americans were totally unexpected.⁽⁶⁾

In a later editorial article, the same newspaper commented that it was most grievous for Japan that she should have been accused of being an aggressive nation by the Europeans and Americans. Japan's economic and political relations with the Western powers would inevitably

(4) "Dr. Morrison and Manchurian policy", TNNS, 1st January, 1908, p.3. For an account of Morrison's relations with Japan from 1905 to 1911, see I.H.Nish, "Dr.G.E. Morrison and Japan" in Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia, Vol.II, No.1 (June, 1963), pp. 42-47.

(5) The New York Times report is quoted in "Manchuria and the open door", TNNS, 20th May, 1908, p.1.

(6) "The powers and the truth in Manchuria", editorial, TAS, 10th April, 1908, p.3.

suffer as a result of the latters' suspicions and unjust allegations. Japan's victory over Russia was the finest yet of her achievements. During the war, Japan did not receive a single word of complaint against her ways and conduct from the powers. Criticism directed against her at this moment of triumph sounded like thunder. The Japanese looked upon themselves as a civilized nation in the East and believed that their culture and institutions were comparable to those of the other countries. Europeans and Americans who had no knowledge of the Japanese language and whose customs and habits differed from those of Japan could not easily appreciate the excellent quality of the Japanese culture and customs. (7)

The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun put it more plainly,

"As the rumour of ^{the} 'yellow peril' gradually subsides, Japan-phobia is emerging.... The recent groundless accusations against Japan have resulted from the world's jealousy of Japan's rising status and prestige.... The Japanese people are looked upon as the leader of the awakening of Asia. This arouses a sense of danger in the European countries especially England. They fear that Japan may become a rival and talk of her as a successful commercial enemy. They conjure up fears of Japan dealing harmful blows to the white race...." (8)

Once again, the question of racial tension and East-West rivalry arose in Japanese thinking. The conviction that Japan had an important role to play in her relations with the Western countries was shaken by seemingly irrational factors in international politics. Hostility of the Western powers put Japan on the defensive. Many Japanese came to advocate that Japan assert herself as the leader of the Eastern nations in opposition to Western civilization.

(7) "Western suspicions of Japan", editorial, TAS, 9th September, 1908, p.3.

(8) "Japan-phobia", TNNS, 18th May, 1908, p.1.

Renewed emphasis on Sino-Japanese solidarity against the West, 1908

The anti-Japanese boycott of 1908 aroused much concern in Japan for the future relations between the two countries. The Gaikō Jihō commented that estrangement between Japan and China did not begin with the Tatsu Maru incident. Sino-Japanese relations had suffered since the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese agreements. While the Chinese were to blame for wrongly suspecting Japan's intentions, Japan's association with France and Russia, however, opened herself to suspicions. For although those two countries pledged themselves to respect the principle of preservation of China in their agreements with Japan, both had, in fact, disregarded their promises. Russia, realizing that she would encounter strong resistance in Manchuria, had turned her attention to Mongolia and Tibet, implanting her influence by intervening in the internal politics of those areas. France, for her part, had used the revolutionary outbreaks in Kwangsi in late 1907 as an excuse to send troops to the border between Yunnan and Indo-China; whereas the French officers were known to have encouraged the revolutionary movement in Kwangsi and Yunnan. Had Japan taken the initiative to cooperate with France and Russia in partitioning China, she would have obtained willing support from them. Was it not, therefore, self-contradiction and hypocrisy on Japan's part to befriend these two aggressive powers on the one hand and proclaim to the world her intention of preserving China on the other?

Moreover, the Gaikō Jihō went on, there was a tendency for the Japanese to look up to Europe and America and dismiss the rest of the world as unworthy of her friendship. If the Japanese were really to examine themselves, they would find that they held the Chinese in contempt. The Chientao question was in fact an example of a policy which had been motivated by a desire to bully China. But China in

1908 was very different from China at the time of the Sino-Japanese war. Her people's knowledge had greatly increased and she had firmly established herself as a nation. During the Tatsu Maru incident, there was the rumour that the Chinese government contemplated asking the American President to intervene on its behalf. American influence in China had greatly increased since Japan and Russia concluded their agreement in 1907 and more and more, the Chinese regarded President Roosevelt as the guardian of peace. If this new relationship between China and America continued to develop and relations between Japan and China were allowed to deteriorate, then Japan would soon find herself at a disadvantage. In future, there would be no harmony between countries of the East.

In conclusion, the Gaikō Jihō said,

"Asia belongs to the Asiatics, Japan and China should strengthen their friendship and cooperate to maintain a peaceful situation in the Far East. For these purposes, both countries must try to understand one another's national temperament. Each should be humble and be ready to make sacrifices.... In the interests of the [general well-being of the] Far East... both Japan and China should conduct their relations with integrity and magnanimity. We urge the peoples of both countries to be forbearing and helpful to one another so that no immaterial disputes should be allowed to permanently jeopardize the stability of the overall situation, leaving much regrets to posterity...."(9)

The Taiyō said that the Japanese authorities and leaders, through their ignorance of Chinese affairs, were letting ^{the} Western powers supersede Japan's special position in that country. It commented that although Japan had come into contact with Chinese culture and

(9) "On China and Japan should trust one another and harmonize their relations", Gaikō Jihō, 1908, translated in Wai Chiao Pao, No.210, 3rd June, 1908, pp.17-18.

learning for over a thousand years, she compared poorly with the Western countries in their knowledge of Chinese affairs. At the same time, Japan, far more than the Western powers, looked down on the Chinese and resorted to high-handed diplomacy in dealing with China. The anti-Japanese boycott had caused considerable damage to Japan's trade with China and if this condition deteriorated, Japan's diplomatic relations with China would be weakened, giving America and the European powers the opportunity to strengthen their influences in China.

Furthermore, the Taiyō believed that China had come a long way from the days when the powers could use threat and coercion to make her give way in diplomatic and commercial matters. That was why all the countries were stepping up their research of China and making efforts to improve their relations with that country. The Japanese had the advantage of being China's closest neighbour and sharing the same culture and customs with the Chinese. They were in the best position to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship with the Chinese. Above all, Japan should assume the role of a mentor in all aspects of Chinese affairs, diplomatic, financial and otherwise, in order that she would not lag behind the Western countries in such matters. (10)

The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun urged the Japanese government to get rid of the "disease of military policy" (gun sei byō) which had "poisoned" its political thinking in relation to Manchuria since the Russo-Japanese war. The disease, it said, was the fundamental cause

(10) "The basis of Sin-Japanese relations", Taiyō, November, 1908, translated in Wai Chiao Pao, No. 231, 27th December, 1908, pp. 15-16, 17-18.

of conflict between Japan and China and only by eradicating it could Japan hope to gain the friendship of the Chinese government and people. The government leaders and ministers had failed to recognize China's progress in reforming the country and take account of the rising tide of Chinese nationalism, thus arousing resentment from the Chinese people. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun also believed that this was largely the fault of Hayashi, minister to Peking from 1906 to 1908.⁽¹¹⁾ It welcomed the impending appointment of Ijūin Hikokichi as it was time, it reckoned Japan changed her image in the Chinese eye. Ijūin had been able to make friends with Chinese leaders when he was consul-general of Tientsin and he could be relied upon to promote better relations between the two countries. It maintained that the change of the minister to Peking must be accompanied by the change of attitude towards China. Japan must be sympathetic towards the Chinese people who were becoming aware of the need to preserve their own country. Japanese sympathy and support at this juncture would no doubt be appreciated by China.⁽¹²⁾

Such arguments reflected a sense of insecurity in face of the possibility of Japanese isolation in the post-1907 period. Confronted with Western hostility, many Japanese had misgivings about a cooperative policy with the powers. Moreover, they were also aware that Japan's rapprochement with the West had aroused doubts and suspicions in her Asian neighbours. Rather than risking the danger of a rejection from both sides, some Japanese came to advocate the strengthening of ties with the Eastern countries. The continuation of steady progress in China made them reconsider the possibility of a special relationship

(11) Hayashi, however, was not unaware of the need for Japan to come to terms with Chinese nationalism with a view to consolidating Japanese interests in China. See Chapter Five.

(12) "The question of the change of diplomats", editorial, TAS, 28th April, 1908, p.3, "Improvement in Sino-Japanese relations", editorial, TAS, 9th June, 1908, p.3.

between the two countries in^{the} face of increasing influence of the Western powers in the Far East.

Concern at the government's declining interest in Japanese involvement in the education of Chinese students

The question of Japanese leadership was seen by many as of particular importance at this juncture. The Japanese press and individual educationists maintained that Japan should not abandon her duty of guiding China at a time when the Western countries were trying to undermine Japan's predominant position in Chinese education.

Returning from a trip of investigation to China in early 1908, Inukai, a leading member of the House of Representatives in the Diet, commented that most Japanese were inclined to think the Chinese ungrateful for their anti-Japanese hostility. They expected obeisance from the Chinese students on account of the latter having received their education from Japan. This, however, was asking too much. If the Japanese would find out the causes of the Chinese rights recovery movement, they would no doubt think it justified. Japan's opposition to the movement would amount to an acquiescence of the act of partitioning China by the powers. (13)

Moreover, Inukai believed that the anti-Japanese and rights recovery movements in China indicated a development in the mind of the Chinese students and a desire to rid China of her dependence on the other countries. Such were in fact signs of progress which

(13) "Inukai's talk on his investigation in China" TNNS, 28th January, 1908. p.4.

had resulted from Japanese guidance. However, Japan would have to handle the movements with care, she could not abandon her role as the guardian of China for the next twenty years. There were recent rumours of China planning to send her students to Germany. Japan must restore her prestige in China and the only way to do so was to offer Chinese students better care and education. Japanese teachers in China seldom commanded respect from the Chinese because of the inadequacy and rivalries among themselves. The Japanese authorities should pay more attention to these matters for it was often because of their negligence in such matters that the relations between the two countries suffered.⁽¹⁴⁾

Ōkuma attributed the decline of Japanese influence in the education of Chinese students to the "short-sighted" policies of the Gaimushō and Mombushō. The 1905 regulations, he said, was a failure for the Mombushō and the first major cause of the decreasing number of Chinese students going to Japan. Instead of overcoming the inadequacy in educational facilities and taking measures to control profiteering schools and ill-qualified teachers, the Mombushō unwisely clamped down on the Chinese students who had come a long way, "inspired with hopes, ambitions and a sense of purpose to serve their own country when they return to China". It was also a mistake for the Mombushō to send people of inferior calibre and qualifications to teach in China. Many of these teachers went to China because they had failed to seek employment in Japan. Meanwhile, the Gaimushō, failing to comprehend the situation in China, had aggravated the anti-Japanese hostility

(14) "Talk by Inukai", TAS, 21st January, 1908, p.2. "Inukai's talk on China", TAS, 25th January, 1908, p.4.

in that country by adopting a high-handed policy towards Manchuria. For the Chinese, the Russo-Japanese war had made little change to the question of their national independence except that it was now Japan, instead of Russia, that was threatening her sovereignty in Manchuria.

Ōkuma also urged the Japanese authorities to take into account the economic benefits which would result from a special relationship with China. He pointed out that China's trade with other countries as well as the Chinese market were both expanding and Japan stood to gain from strengthening her economic ties with China. America and Germany were both trying to expand their influence in that country through educating Chinese students. If the Japanese authorities persisted in disappointing "Chinese hopes of learning from Japan", they would not only drive Chinese students into the arms of America and Germany but also abandon all her future interests in China.⁽¹⁵⁾

Aoyagi was particularly concerned at the increasingly competitive character of Western, especially American educational activities in China. He believed that America's interest in Chinese education was fundamentally political and that the educational activities of the powers had become one of the major aspects of international rivalries in China. President Roosevelt's speech in Congress was a challenge to Japan and Japan must not allow her prestige and influence in China to be undermined. Japan had a unique role to play in the education of Chinese students who looked to Japan as a model in building up their own country. The Meiji Restoration, though a result of much copying

(15) "Decline in the number of Chinese students and Count Ōkuma", TNNS, 16th February, 1908, p.4.

of Western technology and modernization, had been a product of inspirations and perseverance indigenous to the East. The new civilization that Japan had built up was suited to be adopted by China. Japan alone could introduce the education of a nation (*kokumin kyoiku*) into the Chinese mind. In spite of the increasing competition from the Western countries, Japan still had a heaven-ordained mission (*tenshoku*) to educate Chinese youths. By carrying out this mission, Japan would strengthen her special position in China. Neglect on the part of the Japanese authorities reflected a failure to recognize that this was vital to the future relations between the two countries. (16)

There were indeed signs of indifference and a loss of interest in the Japanese official attitude in connection with this question. In a "conversation with a friend" in 1908, prime minister Saionji regretted that Japan's involvement in the education of Chinese students was causing much trouble in her diplomatic relations with Europe and America. He hoped the Japanese authorities would soon refrain from further commitment thus easing Japan's relations with the Western countries. Moreover, he said that it was a mistake for Chinese students to come to Japan. The progress in civilization which Japan had attained compared poorly with that of the advanced countries of the West. The Western countries would be a more ideal place for Chinese students to seek the knowledge and methods of strengthening their own country. (17)

In a conversation with Chirol, foreign editor of the London Times, in April, 1909, Katō Takaaki, minister to England, actually disclaimed Japan's influence over Chinese students. Chirol had commented that

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- (16) Aoyagi Atsutsure, "The education of Chinese students and international rivalries between Japan, America and Germany", Gaiko Jihō, No.122 (Vol.11, No.1), January, 1908, pp.14-16, 17-18.
- (17) Aoyagi Atsutsure, "The danger of the present government's policy towards China", Gaiko Jihō, No. 124 (Vol.11, No.3), March, 1908, pp.37-38.

Japan had not been using her influence with China to good purposes and that Japanese influence had given rise to adverse effects in China contrary to the goal of helping the Chinese make progress. Katō admitted that Chinese students who had studied in Japan often returned to their own country with anti-Japanese ideas and many spoke slanderously of their host country. Japan regretted deeply her failure to guide these students. But this only indicated that she had little or no influence on China, to say nothing of exercising an undesirable influence on the Chinese. (18)

This change in official attitude was significant. The Japanese government, concerned at Japan's uncertain relationship with the powers, believed that she needed political understanding and economic assistance of the Western nations in order to safeguard her rights on the Asian continent. Although it was interested in the post-war movements and development in China, it was reluctant to involve itself deeply for fear of losing the confidence and arousing the suspicions of the powers. Further commitment in the education of Chinese students would have meant a greater identification than it was prepared to make with the awakening of the Asian countries.

Japan's special position in China

The Japanese public, however, was becoming more and more doubtful whether Japan was benefiting from her rapprochement with the Western powers especially with regard to her position in China after 1907. It believed that Japan would have to act independently of the powers

(18) Japanese minister to England Katō to Komura, 7th April, 1909, NGB, Vol.42, Part1, No.232, p.261.

to safeguard and extend her position and interests in China. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun urged the government to be more assertive in its diplomatic relations with the West. It said,

"... Although the establishment of peace by the various agreements is a happy event for all countries concerned, it by no means compensates for the damage of Japanese interests and honour through the set-backs and losses Japan suffers on the diplomatic front. As long as the government leaders fail to cure their fears of the Europeans and Americans, one cannot expect to see a revitalization in Japan's foreign policy". (19)

In a later editorial article, the same newspaper said that the objectives of the agreements concluded between Japan and the powers in 1907 and 1908 were not merely to prevent war but also to respect each other's rights and interests and uphold the principle of equal opportunity in commerce and industries in the Far East. However, the concord and harmony one had expected of such treaty relations were not discernible with regard to China. The Americans were making noisy allegations against Japan's "monopolistic activities". This was because they refused to respect Japan's rights in Manchuria. One faction in the Peking government even advocated the strengthening of friendship between America and China in order to obstruct Japan's plans in Manchuria. Also, the question of the Hsinmintun-Fengtien Railway had remained unresolved between Japan and China as a result of the intervention of some British capitalists. The Japanese never expected that obstructions against the development of their interests would come from an ally. It would seem that for every diplomatic issue between Japan and China, there was a third party manipulating the Chinese mind to the disadvantage of Japan. The agreements between Japan and

(19) "Japan's foreign relations", editorial, TNNS, 4th February, 1909, p.1.

the powers had hardly served Japan's interests. Relations between Japan and the powers had remained in the same state as before the conclusion of the agreements. It was much to the regret of the Japanese that the efforts they made in coming to terms with the powers had been in vain.⁽²⁰⁾

As a matter of fact, the need to safeguard Japan's interests in China was appreciated by the government as much as by the public. For the Japanese government leaders, cooperation with the Western powers was not incompatible with Japan's special position in China. Japan's position in Asia, in particular Manchuria, was a part of the new order in East Asia which Japan's rapprochement with the West had helped to establish. Japan could claim special interests in that area as due her status as a power.

Although many Japanese professed to favour and sympathize with growing nationalism in China, they were not prepared to concede what they considered to be their vital interests in Manchuria merely to pacify the Chinese. More often than not, Japanese policy in this period failed to respond consistently and adequately to the emergence of Chinese nationalism. The railway disputes in Manchuria, in particular, revealed Japan's disregard for China's growing rights recovery movement. The government had the support of the country at large in pressing its demands on China and encountered criticism from the press only for its lack of firmness in dealing with the Chinese government.

(20) "The application of the various agreements - Japan must not allow the agreements to become a dead letter", editorial, TNNS, 16th April, 1909, p.2.

a. The Hsinmintun - Fakumen Railway question

In November, 1907, the Chinese government signed a contract with a British firm for the construction of the railway running from Hsinmintun to Fakumen. Japan protested against the project on the basis of the treaty of 1905 by which China had committed herself not to construct lines parallel to or in the vicinity of the South Manchuria Railway or any other line which would compete with it. The Chinese, however, denied the competitive character of the proposed line and requested a definition of the area which Japan regarded as competitive. On this question opinions altogether differed; the Japanese claiming the benefit of the doubt for their own contention, and in respect of the question of area affirmed that each case must be judged on its own merits, as the question was never purely one of mileage.⁽²¹⁾

The Japanese government's failure to arrive at a quick agreement with the Chinese aroused dissatisfaction at home. The opposition in the Diet attacked the government for being inadequate and allowing Japan's national interests be trampled underfoot.⁽²²⁾ The Japanese press, however, directed its criticisms mainly at China. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun asserted that it was the right of Japan as the owner of the South Manchuria Railway to set down regulations controlling the construction of competing lines in the area. Such a measure was vital to the existence of the South Manchuria Railway and was not motivated by selfishness. In so doing, Japan was not contravening the

(21) For documents relating to the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway, see NGB, Vol. 41, Part. 1, pp. 630ff. See in particular No. 660, 685 for Japan's case against the construction. It was in connection with this particular railway dispute that Japan was most severely criticized by Morrison and the British contractors interested in the construction of the line. See No. 651, 669, 688.

(22) "Ōishi Masaji's speech at the general meeting of the Shimpotō", TAS, 20th January, 1908, p.2. "The Shimpotō's policy towards the cabinet: rebuke of the government's inadequate foreign policies", TAS, 21st January, 1908, p.2.

principles of "open door" and equal opportunity in Manchuria. Moreover, China owed much to Japan for the reconstruction of Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese war and she was being ungrateful in trying to undermine Japanese rights in that area.⁽²³⁾

The question remained unresolved throughout 1908. During the negotiations, Japan had offered to waive her claim on Chientao, provided that all other questions in Manchuria including that of jurisdiction over Korean settlers in Chientao were adjusted to her satisfaction. The Chinese did not accept the Japanese offer at first and in early 1909, proposed the arbitration of all pending questions in Manchuria at the Hague Tribunal. The Japanese government rejected the Chinese proposal and insisted on direct negotiations with Peking. China's proposal also aroused much opposition in the Japanese public. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said if the matter was referred to the Hague Tribunal, it would only reflect on the ignorance and inadequacy of both the Japanese and Chinese governments in their use of diplomacy and the politicians of the Eastern countries would become the laughing-stock of the world.⁽²⁴⁾ The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun criticized the Chinese government for its lack of sincerity: China was greatly indebted to Japan and she had a moral obligation to respect Japan's rights as laid down in the Peking treaty of 1905. It had been the hope of the Japanese people that the Chinese would become more friendly towards them for their act of chivalry in the Russo-Japanese war. However, the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said, the Japanese were disappointed with China's attitudes and actions in connection

(23) "The question of the parallel line in Manchuria", editorial, TAS, 17th January, 1908, p.3. "The question of the parallel line in Manchuria", editorial, TAS, 7th April, 1908, p.3.

(24) "The solution of unresolved questions between Japan and China", editorial, TAS, 30th March, 1909, p.3.

with the Manchurian questions.⁽²⁵⁾

The question was not settled until September, 1909. The matter was never referred to the Hague Tribunal and China discarded her plan to build the railway. In this and other questions relating to Manchuria, Japan expected the Chinese to remember that without the intervention of Japanese arms, Manchuria would have been irretrievably lost to them. The Japanese found it intolerable that China should begrudge them protection of what in their view were Japan's legitimate imperialist interests. As the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun put it, Japan did not object in principle to the growing enthusiasm in China for the recovery of her rights but Japanese rights could not be sacrificed in the interest of this movement.⁽²⁶⁾

b. The Antung - Mukden Railway question

During the Russo-Japanese war, Japan had built a light railway between Antung and Mukden for military purposes. When the South Manchuria Railway passed into the hands of Japan, the Japanese government wanted to connect it with the Korean railway system. The reconstruction of the Antung-Mukden line was necessary for linking Fusan at the southern tip of the Korean peninsula with the South Manchuria Railway and, via Harbin, with the Chinese Eastern Railway. Hence save the 122 miles across the Tsushima Strait, an entire land route would be established for intercourse between Japan and Europe on the one hand and Japan and the Far East generally, on the other.

(25) "The unresolved issues between Japan and China and friendship between the two countries", editorial, TNNS, 5th April, 1909. p.2.

(26) "The misunderstanding on the part of China", editorial, TAS, 5th June, 1909, p.3.

The Japanese viewed the Antung-Mukden Railway as of greater importance than any other disputes in Manchuria with China as the railway would be of great value for the extension of Japan's economic and strategic interests in the Far East.

By the treaty of 1905, it was agreed that Japan had the right to maintain the military line for fifteen years at the end of which China would redeem the railway. It was also agreed that the line be converted from a military into a commercial line, the reconstruction to be commenced within two years of the signing of the treaty of 1905 and carried out as a joint Chinese and Japanese enterprise. However, it was not until the spring of 1909 that the Japanese government made the proposal to the Chinese. In addition to the reconstruction of the Antung-Mukden line, the Japanese requested that a section be built between Mukden and Ch'en-hsiang-t'un, twenty miles west of Mukden. The Chinese countered that it was not necessary, in the interest of trade and commerce, to extend the railway zone. The Chinese reply also specified that the work of improvement must be confined to the existing track and that no broadening of the gauge would be permitted. In addition, the Chinese government emphasized that Japan must not extend her military control or patrolling of the railway zone when the railway was rebuilt. The Chinese government would furnish police for guarding the line. The Japanese government refused to accept the Chinese terms objecting especially to the last condition.⁽²⁷⁾

In early August, 1909, Ijuin, Japanese minister in Peking, launched a campaign to improve the relations between Japan and China

(27) See NGB, Vol.42, Part 1, Nos. 320, 321. For Japan's case, see Nos. 323, 324, 339. For Japan's ~~government's~~ explanation to the powers, see No. 340.

(Nisshin kankei kaizen no undō). With the help of Kawashima Naniwa, Ijūin tried to persuade the Manchu princes, in particular the Prince Regent, to come to an understanding with the Japanese government on the various unsettled questions in Manchuria. The two countries, Ijūin maintained, should plan their future in concert with one another. China's "intransigent attitude" towards the Antung-Mukden Railway and Chientao questions had exhibited her disregard for the future of the two countries and provoked resentment in Japan.⁽²⁸⁾ At the same time, Odagiri tried to impress upon Chang Chih-tung that the Japanese government and people sincerely wished to "harmonize the relations and strengthen the friendship between the two countries" and that the Japanese government had a "genuine desire to settle the disputes in the interests of Japan and China". The Chinese leaders must do their part to respond to Japan's good-will.⁽²⁹⁾

While this was going on, the Japanese government instructed Ijūin to deliver an ultimatum to the Waiwupu on 6th August, informing the Peking government that Japan had decided to undertake the reconstruction work on the line whatever the response of the Chinese government would be.⁽³⁰⁾ And on the same day, on orders received from Tokyo, the reconstruction of the line promptly began.

By delivering the ultimatum, Japan achieved a breakthrough in her negotiations with China on the various pending questions in Manchuria. In the face of Japan's firm stand, the Chinese government conceded and an agreement on the reconstruction of the Antung-Mukden line was signed between Koike, Japanese consul-general in Mukden

(28) Ijūin to foreign minister Komura, 4th August, 1909, NGB, Vol.42, part 1, No. 342, pp. 390-392.

(29) *ibid.*

(30) Komura to Ijūin, 2nd August, 1909, *ibid.*, No. 339, p.386 and Komura to Ijūin, 4th August, 1909, *ibid.*, No. 343, pp. 392-393.

and Hsi Liang, governor-general of Manchuria. Komura, Japanese foreign minister, was satisfied that the Japanese government's ultimatum had strengthened "the force of the argument for improving Sino-Japanese relations which has been fermenting within the Chinese government" and that the Chinese government had "changed its attitude entirely and shown a sincere desire to come to an agreement with Japan on the unsettled questions in Manchuria".⁽³¹⁾

The government's decision to take independent action in commencing work on the reconstruction of the Antung-Mukden Railway was fully supported by the Japanese public. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said China had lately resorted to trickery and exhibited no sign of sincerity in dealing with Japan. Not only had she obstructed Japan's rightful action in turning her interests to the best economic and strategic accounts but she had also inflicted an insult on the Japanese nation. By seeking refuge in the people's enthusiasm for the so-called recovery of Chinese rights, the Chinese government and leaders tried to bypass their obligation to carry out the treaty stipulations. In this way, the recovery of rights was none other than an advocacy of closing the country (*Sakoku Shugi*), an unenlightened policy which obstructed the course of normal relations between civilized countries. If Japan were to take the movement in China seriously, then the future between the two countries would be one of pessimism. But Japan had not lost hopes in China. The clamour for the recovery of rights was but a passing phase. As long as the Japanese government did not slack in seeing that Japan's treaty rights were respected, the Chinese would

(31) Foreign minister Komura to minister to England Katō, 19th August, 1909, *ibid.*, No.380, p.430.

soon awaken to the futility of anti-Japanese hostility. The Japanese people were confident that with the government's recent action with regard to the Antung-Mukden Railway dispute, Sino-Japanese negotiations would enter a new era.⁽³²⁾

The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun warned China that "unreasonableness" and "disregard for the law" were the most feeble forms of diplomacy. A country put her own safety at risk by defying another which was her superior in strength and wealth. The Chinese would be wise to examine and restrain themselves in their future relations with Japan.⁽³³⁾ In a later editorial, the same newspaper said,

"...There are many among the Chinese who do not appreciate and understand as we do the vital importance of a sincere and cordial friendship between Japan and China, and who are not as concerned as we are at the disharmony of the two countries. If this is not the time to lead them away from their unenlightened and confused state of mind, when will it be...?"⁽³⁴⁾ and
(34)

Thus anti-Japanese sentiment came to be regarded as an unenlightened attitude which the Chinese must discard if they wished to see Sino-Japanese cooperation materialize in the future. The Japanese stressed that a harmonious relationship between the two countries was necessary so that Japanese wishes and actions would be 'respected' and accepted by China. As the Chinese government increasingly lost ground to the Japanese government, a cooperative relationship would inevitably result in Japan dictating her terms to China. For the Japanese, solidarity with China must not be allowed to interfere with the requirements of Japanese security and prestige. It should, rather,

(32) "Reasons for the independent action - the government's determination", TNNS, 7th August, 1909, p.7 and "The future of unresolved questions between Japan and China", editorial, TNNS, 10th August, 1909, p.2.

(33) "The attitude of the Chinese government", editorial, TAS, 11th August, 1909, p.3.

(34) "The announcement of the Sino-Japanese Convention", editorial, TAS, 9th September, 1909, p.3.

help to enhance Japan's influence and position in that country.

Japanese economic expansion in China: competition within the framework
of cooperation with the Western powers

The question of Japan's trading relations with China aroused serious concern in 1908 when Japanese goods were boycotted in southern China as a result of the Tatsu Maru incident. Japanese export of silk and textile goods to China was especially hard-hit and trade with southern China did not pick up after the boycott. The Japanese public urged the government to strengthen the economic ties between the two countries with a view to counteracting the economic influence of the Western countries in China. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said at the time,

"....As Japan is separated from China by only a strip of water, she has better prospects of developing trade with China than America and the European countries.... The governments and peoples of Japan and China must ... strive to promote and respect their mutual interests and preserve their friendship."⁽³⁵⁾

Japanese interests in promoting economic activities in China was further aroused in 1909 when a British - French - German syndicate proposed to make a loan to the Chinese government for the purpose of building two railways out of Hankow, known as the Hukuang loan. When an American group, known as the Morgan Syndicate consisting of four New York banks demanded a one-quarter share in the project, Japanese attention was drawn to the expansion of America's economic activities

(35) "The boycott of Japanese goods by Chinese merchants", editorial, TNNS, 9th September, 1909, p.3.

in China. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun remarked that Japan could not stand aside and watch America pour her investments into China. Japan must assume an active role in the economic development of the Far East. The Japanese government and people must make a concerted effort to build up enterprises in China. They should use Japan's historical and geographical closeness with China to their best advantage. (36)

In June, 1909, a plan was drawn up by a group of Japanese industrialists for the organization of a syndicate which would promote Japanese economic enterprises especially the building of railways in China. The proposed syndicate was in the main a capitalists' concern which included big business units like Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Ōkura and others, mostly banking groups in Tokyo and Osaka. It was also backed by government leaders. The preparatory meetings for its establishment were attended by Katsura, prime minister, Komura, foreign minister, Ishii, deputy foreign minister and Kurachi, head of the Political Affairs Bureau. At one of the meetings held on 13th July, 1909, Komura had expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of support for the government on the part of the private sector in developing Japan's economic interests in China. He said that as a result of this, Japanese claims in China were not substantiated. The secret agreement made with China on the nonalienation of Fukien, for example, gained for Japan very little advantages because Japanese enterprises had made little headway in the area in the past decade. At the same meeting, Katsura promised Japanese capitalists necessary government protection

(36) "America's activities in China - competition between the powers and Japan's position", editorial, TNNS, 20th June, 1909, p.2.
 "The difficulties of launching enterprises in China", editorial, TNNS, 28th July, 1909, p.2.

for their activities in China.⁽³⁷⁾

On 20th July, 1909, the Nisshin Kōgyō Kaisha (Sino-Japanese Development Company) was established by thirty Japanese banking and business groups. An initial capital of one hundred million yens was to be raised by its members, a quarter of the sum to be invested directly in railways, civil engineering, mining, ship-building and electrical industries in China. This was to be a departure from the usual ^{pattern of} foreign business commitments in China as the European and American syndicates had so far invested only in Chinese railways. However, the main objective of the Nisshin Kōgyō Kaisha was to act as an agent for Japanese capitalists, introducing businesses in China to potential investors, encouraging development projects and making investigations and plans for the purpose of promoting Japanese trade and industrial interests in China. Although the Company began with a limited capital, it nevertheless marked the beginning of a new phase of Japanese economic activities in China.⁽³⁸⁾

Joint enterprises with the Chinese was an important part of the Japanese business interest at this stage. In May, 1910, a trip to China was arranged by six business organizations in Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe. The main objective of the visit was to see the Chinese trade promotion exhibition in Nanking, inspect the industries and commerce in the Yangtze region and establish contacts with the business circles in China. Although the trip was ostensibly a private visit, it had been organized in early 1909 with the help of Komura, Ijūin and seven Japanese consuls in various parts

(37) "Proceedings at the Conference of the China Development Company (Taishin Kigyōtan): purpose of its establishment and nature of its business", TAS, 16th July, 1909, p.4.

(38) "The Sino-Japanese Development Company (Nisshin Kōgyō Kaisha)", editorial, TNNS, 21st July, 1909, p.2.

of China. Foreign minister Komura's letter to the Japanese consuls in China said,

"...It is the objective [of the Japanese trade groups] to minimize the friction between the Japanese and Chinese peoples....[Sino-Japanese] disputes and negotiations in the past few years have caused disharmony between the two countries and given rise to mutual misunderstandings.... Because of this, the Japanese government has taken care to ... settle its differences with China. However, although diplomats in various parts of China have gradually regained the friendship of the Chinese officials, Japanese and Chinese businessmen have never [been able to] exchange their ideas with one another.... [Japanese ministers in China] should hence contact influential Chinese business groups... and make arrangements for them to meet with their Japanese counterparts in the latter's forthcoming visit to China...."(39)

Headed by Kondō of the Tokyo Trade Council (Shōgyō Kaigishō), the sight-seeing business group (Kankō Jitsugyōtan) took off on 3rd May, 1910. It was to tour China for two months, visiting various cities in northern and southern China. News of the visit, however, did not go down well with the Chinese public. Newspapers in Peking, Tientsin, Changchun, Hangchow and Shanghai took a hostile attitude and called on the people to turn a cold shoulder on the Japanese visitors. They warned the Chinese people of Japan's "conspiracy" to expand her economic interests in China and used highly inflammatory language to describe the visiting Japanese: "the monster's visit to China" (Shanghai Shenchow Jih Pao), "burning ambition of the Japanese" (Chung Wai Jih Pao), "Alas, the unpredictable calculations of the Japanese!" (Hangchow Kung Min Jih Pao) and "the perilous visiting group to China" (Tientsin Chung-kuo Pao).⁽⁴⁰⁾

(39) Foreign minister Komura to Japanese minister and seven consuls in China, 28th January, 1909, NGB, Vol. 43, Part 2, p. 386.

(40) Report of the "Nippon Dempo" on the visit to China of the Japanese business group and the Chinese press, NGB, Vol. 43, Part 2, pp. 394-395.

The Japanese were, however, warmly welcomed by Chinese officials and businessmen in all the places they visited. Mutual good-will was exchanged. To quote the speech^{given} by the Japanese group leader Kondō at the reception given by the governor and influential gentry of Hangchow,

"Japan and China, being two independent brother countries in the East, belong to the same race and share the same culture.... It goes without saying that they should strengthen their interdependence. However, communications between the two countries have not been frequent. This has resulted in a lack of understanding of one another's natural inclinations and given rise to mutual suspicions and bad feelings. As the old saying has it, 'brotherly disputes invite invasion from the outsider'. In order to rectify this regrettable situation, Japan and China must make joint efforts to promote business, encourage industries and commerce and strive for progress with one mind and purpose.... They must take up the responsibilities [befitting their status in this part of the world] and place themselves in the key position [in order to fight for survival] in the competitive economic world of the twentieth century...."(41)

The tour was, on the whole, a success. In all the places they visited, the Japanese met with large numbers of Chinese businessmen and members of the wealthy gentry class. In Nanking, a plan was even drawn up for the formation of an "organization for the liaison" of Sino-Japanese merchants. A scheme for the opening of a Sino-Japanese exhibition was also discussed between the Japanese and a group of merchants from Shanghai.(42)

News reports on the Japanese visit were received with enthusiasm at home. The Japanese press was hopeful that the visit would herald a new era of Sino-Japanese cooperation. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun

(41) Japanese chargé d'affaires in Hangchow to Komura: report on the reception given to the Japanese business group at Hangchow, 27th June, 1910, NGB, Vol.43, Part 2, No.1007, pp.425-426.

(42) Japanese consul in Nanking to Komura, 16th June, 1910, NGB, Vol.43, Part 2, No.996, p.417.

said that at a time of Western encroachment, Japan and China, being the only two independent countries in the Far East, should look upon one another as the one friend and ally. Yet this was a far cry from reality. Whilst the politicians and people of Japan and China never stopped talking of the cultural and racial affinity and the need for cooperation between the two countries, so much so that such terms had lost their meanings, there was nothing but mutual suspicions and insincerity. This was because Japan and China had never openly expressed their innermost feelings to one another. In future the two peoples must create more opportunities to come into contact with one another and try to analyse and understand each other's problems. Those were the duties of the organizers and promoters of the Japanese visit to China. (43)

In an interview with the reporter of the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun after they had returned to Japan, leading members of the Japanese business group commented that Japan would no longer have to worry about her lagging behind America and the European powers in developing her economic interests in China. The Chinese had begun to realize that they had to look for support from a country of the same culture and race. They were beginning to show signs of willingness to see Japan's point of view and appreciate her real intentions. The Japanese should seize this opportunity to cultivate joint economic activities with the Chinese people. (44)

Having arrived at the position of a big power, Japan began to take an interest in pursuing her economic interests in China alongside

(43) "The way to attain friendship between Japan and China", editorial, TNNS, 16th May, 1910, p.2, "The appearance and reality of Sino-Japanese friendship", editorial, TNNS, 4th July, 1910, p.2.

(44) "Conversation on the inspection tour of China", TAS, 4th July, 1910, p.4.

the other powers. As a relatively new participant in this particular power-game, Japan was conscious of the predominant Western influence. Throughout the post-Russo-Japanese - war period, the Western countries were inclined to believe that Japan strove for political and economic influences in China which would be detrimental to their own interests. The Japanese, for their part, were convinced that the Western powers were so strong and rich that they would have to establish a stronghold in China in order to contain the challenge of Western competition. This was but part of the argument for securing Japan's special position in China in this period. The strengthening of friendly relations with China was vital for the expansion of Japan's economic influence at this early stage. Once again, the Japanese reminded themselves - and the Chinese - of the special relationship which had existed between the two countries. The cultural and geographical proximity with China would be an advantage for Japan in competing with the Western powers.

Thus in 1911, at the same time that the international loan was being negotiated between China on the one hand and America, Germany, England and France on the other, an agreement for a loan of ten million yens was concluded between Sheng Hsüan-huai, secretary of the Board of Posts and Communications and Odagiri of the Yokohama Specie Bank, for the purpose of constructing the Canton-Hankow and Szechuan-Hankow Railways and reforming China's finances.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Although the question of a Japanese financial adviser was discussed between the two parties, it was not made as a condition of the loan. But the terms and rate of interests were the same as those being negotiated between China

(45) Decree relating to the four-power loan and Specie loan as published in the Chinese Government Gazette on 4th May, 1911, NGB, Vol.44, part 2, p. 309.

and the powers.

The Japanese considered the loan as a great success. It was regarded as proof of Japan having risen to the status of a creditor-nation alongside the other powers. The Japanese public viewed it as the beginning of closer economic cooperation between Japan and China. The Sino-Japanese loan, like the four-power loan, had aroused bitter hostility in the Chinese people especially the Chekiang and Kiangsu gentry. Within the government itself, Sheng encountered opposition from the Ministry of Defence especially Hsü Shih-ch'ang who was believed to be extremely anti-Japanese.⁽⁴⁶⁾ The eventual conclusion was hailed by the Japanese press as evidence of the far-sighted judgment of the Chinese government and economic sector and proof of the "faith and confidence on the part of the Chinese official circles in Japan".⁽⁴⁷⁾ Furthermore, the Japanese press optimistically observed, it signified the combination of Japanese and Chinese interests which would help to remove the Chinese people's needless and uncalled-for fear and suspicion of Japan. It was regarded as a sign of strengthening economic relations which paved the way for closer friendship between the two countries.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Nevertheless, the extension and consolidation of Japan's influence and interests in China took place within the diplomatic framework of understanding with the Western powers. To safeguard her share of imperialist activities in China, Japan needed to coordinate her actions with some, if not all, of the Western countries to ensure the powers' recognition of Japan's special position and enable Japan to pursue

(46) Ijūin to Komura, 4th May, 1911, NGB, Vol.44, Part 2, No.653, p.308.

(47) "The by-product of the conclusion of the loan", TNNS, 29th March, 1911, p.3.

(48) "The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese loan", editorials in TNNS, 27th March, 1911, p.1 and TAS, 27th March, 1911, p.3.

further interests in China.

Thus Japan was at the same time interested in participating in international financial enterprises in China. When in late 1910, Willard Straight initiated the four-power banking loan to the Chinese government, Baron Takahashi, vice-president of the Bank of Japan, wrote to Jacob Schiff, American representative of the consortium,

"...The matter of international financial business in China has again come into prominence, and as the condition of our money market and the financial strength of the country have changed a great deal in the meantime, the desire has materialized on the part of our leading bankers to participate in the international group...."(49)

Japanese interest in joining the international consortium, however, received no immediate attention from the powers. In June, 1911, an agreement for a loan of ten million pounds was signed between China and the four powers. Article 16 gave the four powers preferential right in loan operations. It also stipulated that "should the Imperial Chinese government decide to invite foreign capitalists to participate with Chinese interests in Manchurian business contemplated under this loan, or to be undertaken in connection therewith, the [four-power] Banks should first be invited to so participate." (50)

Soon after the announcement of this agreement, Komura instructed Motono, Japanese minister in Russia, to approach the Russian government with a proposal for taking joint action in pressing the powers to either amend or expunge Article 16. Japan maintained that she possessed in the region of southern Manchuria special rights and interests, and while she was fully

(49) Takahashi to Schiff, 29th November, 1910, appendix to Takahashi to Komura, 31st January, 1911, NGB, Vol.44, Part 2, pp. 276-277.

(50) For full text of the "Currency Reform and Industrial Development Loan Agreement", see NGB, Vol.44, Part 2, pp.341-354, For Article 16, see p.352.

prepared to respect the rights of others, she was unable to view with indifference measures which tended, not only to menace those special rights and interests, but to place her subjects and institutions at a disadvantage as compared with the subjects and institutions of any other country.⁽⁵¹⁾

The Russian government, after consultation with Japan, notified the consortium governments that Russia maintained special rights in northern Manchuria under the provisions of treaties and agreements concluded with China, and that Russia reserved the right to take any essential measure to protect her interests in the said region. Japan made a similar declaration that, in view of the Russian pronouncement, she reserved the right to take the same posture concerning southern Manchuria.⁽⁵²⁾

This coordinated action led to the conclusion of the third Russo-Japanese agreement in July, 1912, under which the two powers pledged to respect the regions of special interests of both countries and confirmed the division of Inner Mongolia into eastern and western sectors as they had divided Manchuria into northern and southern sectors in 1907.

x x x

By entering into a series of agreements and understanding with the powers in 1907 and 1908, Japan was able to expand and consolidate her power and position in East Asia. But as Japanese interests in

(51) Komura to Motono, 14th June, 1911, NGB, Vol.44, Part 2, No.682, pp. 356-357.

(52) See NGB, Vol.44, Part 2, Nos. 691, 717, 721 and 722.

southern Manchuria considerably increased after 1907, they came into conflict with those of the powers in the area. Thus by cooperating with the Western countries, Japan had arrived at a position to compete with them. This element of competition in her relationship with the powers led Japan to see the need for retaining her special relationship with China when acting in concert with the West was not obviously advantageous to her own interests.

The Japanese government did not feel it necessary to account to the powers for its actions in strengthening Japan's position in China. The assumption was that Japan's special position in China, secured by coordination of Western and Japanese activity, was a part of the new equilibrium being established in the post-Russo-Japanese-war era. In matters where Japan's vital interests were not affected, however, the Japanese government was ready to forgo Japan's special relationship with China in the interest of coordination with the Western countries. In 1908, Japanese government leaders disclaimed Japanese influence in the emergence of Chinese nationalism. They feared that identification with the "awakening of China" would result in embarrassment for the government in its relations with the Western countries. The Japanese government leaders were aware that they had to tread cautiously in order not to aggravate the insecurity of Japan's position among the powers.

The Japanese public, on the other hand, was not bound by the need to exercise caution in delicate situations in international politics. Bewildered by the racial prejudice and suspicions of the Western countries, the Japanese suddenly became aware of their isolation in the post-war world. They began to have doubts about the real value of international understanding. Many Japanese came to advocate that instead of coordinating her actions with the powers, Japan must

henceforth carry out what she believed to be in her interests whatever the attitudes of the Western countries.

Unlike the government leaders, many Japanese had not relinquished the hope of guiding China towards development. The Chinese rights recovery and reform movements in this period were evidence of China's gradual awakening in face of foreign encroachment. Japan was, moreover, deeply involved as the Chinese nationalists began resorting to the boycotting of Japanese goods to protest against Japan's imperialist policy in Manchuria.

However, the concept of guidance had increasingly come to be associated with the possibilities and tactics of big power status. Nationalism was seen as necessary for making China a strong country which would be a worthy ally for Japan in combating predominant Western influences, but it must not be allowed to jeopardize Japanese interests. And in face of the "stubborn" and hostile attitude of the Chinese, Japan must force or coax China to cooperate with her. It was in this connection that the Japanese public threw its weight behind the government's policy in Manchuria. It was also in this connection that the Japanese business sector launched a campaign for economic cooperation between Japan and China. Having as its objective the expansion of Japanese economic interests in China, such unprecedented economic activities were in turn fully endorsed and supported by the government.

CONCLUSION

After the Manchus were overthrown, Japan's position in China was considerably less secure. The Japanese government now faced an overtly hostile government led by Yuan Shih-k'ai. Yuan was ready to accept financial and political assistance from the Western powers especially Germany to counter Japanese influence in China. The Japanese government became more and more convinced that it had to use force to ensure Japan's special position in China.

Japan was especially alarmed at the prospect of her leases in Manchuria expiring in 1923. Since 1907, she had been making a series of agreements with Russia with a view to safeguarding her interests in Manchuria. These agreements, however, had not ensured a permanent possession of the region while enabling Russia to consolidate her interests in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. In 1913, Katō Takaaki, soon to take over the office of foreign minister from Prime Minister Katsur_a, told the British foreign secretary, Edward Grey, that Manchuria was a tree planted and fertilized in Japanese blood and money. In addition to having tangible interests, Japan had a "historical and sentimental affinity for the area". She could not give it up and was determined to have exclusive possession of Port Arthur, Port Dairen and the area contiguous to those places. That was the "immutable policy of any Japanese government, based ... upon the will of the Japanese people".⁽¹⁾

Economic rivalry among the powers had also intensified after the fall of the Manchus. The Japanese, though eager to lend money

(1) Interview between Katō and Grey on 3rd January, 1913, full text in Itō Masanori, ed., Katō Komei Den (Biography of Katō Komei), Tokyo, 1929, Vol.2, pp. 133-136. Quoted in Paul S. Dull, "Count Katō Komei and the Twenty-one Demands" in Pacific Historical Review, California, Vol.19 (1950), p.152.

to China, found that they were being outstripped by wealthy competitors. By 1914, Japan felt that her influence was being frozen out of China by foreign capital. Moreover, Yuan Shih-k'ai was planning to nationalize the iron ore production and the management of the Hanyehping Company which had been supplying Japan with iron ore. This plan, if implemented, would have shattered Japan's hope for joint control of the Company with China.

The enforced inactivity of the European powers in Asia during the First World War provided an opportunity for Japan to strengthen her economic and political influence in China. By capturing the German installations in Shantung in November, 1914, Japan was able to remove German influence from China as well as enlarge her own sphere of interest. She feared that once the war was over, the Western powers would resume and intensify their exploitation of Asia. It was believed that the time had come for Japan to negotiate with the Yuan Shih-k'ai government for an all-out agreement which would ensure for Japan substantial increases in economic, political and military rights in Manchuria, Shantung, Inner Mongolia, Fukien and central China. The strengthening of Japan's position vis-à-vis her Western competitors depended on a Sino-Japanese collaboration which would make further foreign aggression impossible. Yamagata Aritomo said in August, 1914 that Japan had to settle on a policy towards China, aiming "primarily at improving Sino-Japanese relations and inspiring in China a feeling of abiding trust in us".⁽²⁾ He also warned that Japan needed friendly Chinese aid in the coming war between the yellow and white races although Japan must not raise the question of a league of coloured peoples when

(2) From the memorandum submitted by Yamagata to the government in August, 1914 in Tokutomi Iichirō, Kōsaku Yamagata Aritomo Den (Biography of Prince Yamagata Aritomo), Tokyo, 1933, Vol.3, pp.920-927, translated in Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922, Massachusetts, 1971, p.273.

approaching the Chinese government for an agreement as this would "injure the feelings of other countries and impair their friendship for our Empire".⁽³⁾

There were others in Japan, however, who were less concerned with foreign opinions. Japanese nationalists, in particular, firmly believed that Japan should ally herself with China, protect China from the Western powers and encourage the inevitable nationalist revolution against Yuan Shih-k'ai. They envisaged that a Nationalist China under a government rid of Yuan would be much less hostile to Japanese aid and intervention.⁽⁴⁾ Sun Yat-sen had said as much in his desperate appeal to the Ōkuma government for support against Yuan Shih-k'ai.⁽⁵⁾

Thus in January, 1915, the Twenty-one Demands, a logical fruition of Japanese attitudes and policies towards China since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, were presented to the Yuan Shih-k'ai government in five groups. The fifth group demanded full cooperation from the Chinese. Arrangements were to be made for the employment of Japanese political, financial and military advisers in the Chinese governments, joint Sino-Japanese police administration in key areas, the purchase by China of Japanese munitions and joint operation of certain Chinese arsenals. These demands, though exacting, were reminiscent of Japan's offer of guidance and assistance to which the Chinese responded favourably in the 1898-1904 period. In 1898, Chang Chih-tung had had little misgivings in employing Japanese military advisers to train his Hupeh army. And in the decade following the Japanese mission to China led by Kamio Mitsuomi, it was not unusual for Japanese advisers and instructors in Chinese railway companies, military and police academies to be given the Chinese imperial awards.

(3) Hackett, *ibid.*, pp. 274-275. Yamagata specifically pointed out that Japan was in alliance with England and had agreements with Russia and France.

(4) See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, pp. 180-182.

(5) See *ibid.*, pp. 188-189, for Sun's letter to Ōkuma.

Nevertheless, the fifth group of demands raised a storm of protest in China. Chinese resistance and opposition were not unreasonable or surprising. By 1915, the cooperation theme in Japanese policy and attitude towards China had incorporated a powerful element of desire for exploitation of imperialist gains. The sweeping demands for military and governmental control by Japan, if accepted, would have reduced China to the status of a Japanese protectorate. This was incompatible with the nationalist aspirations of the Chinese. The last demands aroused much anti-Japanese hostility in China and many Chinese including some of the opponents of Yuan Shih-k'ai rallied to his support in an attempt to hold out against Japanese aggression. An ultimatum delivered to the Chinese government in May secured Chinese concessions to the other four groups of demands. But Japan's hope for a Sino-Japanese alliance which would strengthen her political ties with China did not materialize. The Twenty-one Demands marked a definite break in the relations of the two countries.

Japan's rise to power was in part self-assertiveness and in part a belief in Japanese leadership in East Asia. When China and Japan were forced to enter world politics in the nineteenth century, neither country was able to hold her own in face of the Western encroachment in the East. Each country, however, went her own way in response to the Western challenge. The Japanese attempts to renovate and strengthen the country indicated an acute awareness of the foreign threat to the independence of the nation. The fact that the Chinese whom the Japanese held in traditional respect as a powerful nation had failed to keep the Western powers at bay could only have convinced Japan that she could not challenge the Western threat single-handedly. The idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation was founded on the assumption that both countries needed to unite their efforts to ensure their survival. The increasing Western imperialistic activities on East Asian territory and in particular the Triple Intervention in 1895

followed by the scramble for concessions in China three years later heightened Japan's fear for her own security. Many Japanese came to view the world in terms of confrontation between the Eastern and Western countries. Hence although China's weakness was exposed in the war of 1894-1895, many Japanese still regarded her as a necessary ally in a racial struggle.

The disparity in strength and development between Japan and China meant that if the two countries were to join hands in preserving themselves from Western engulfment, Japan, rather than China, must lead. The concept of Japanese leadership was founded on Japan's realization of her superiority of strength in East Asia. This realization led the Japanese to identify themselves as the leader of the Asian awakening in the early twentieth century, but it also foreshadowed an unequal partnership in a cooperative relationship and the eventual parting of the way for Japan and China.

The Russo-Japanese war changed the political situation in the Far East. Southern Manchuria became a Japanese sphere of influence. Japan felt that she needed to protect and exploit her new continental position. For many Japanese, the fact that Japan had stronger political, historical and geographical ties with China than did the other powers was a valid reason for Japan to expand her rights and interests in China more extensively than those of other countries. This was considered to be Japan's natural right just as it was Japan's natural duty to guide and lead China towards modernization. Thus in the post-war period, Japanese writers who urged the government to adopt a strong policy towards China also emphasized that Japan had stronger claims to help China carry out reforms now that she had become a significant force in the Far East. When, however, the extension of Japan's vital interests in China met with Chinese opposition, the

requirements of Japanese prestige and security prevailed against the need for coming to terms with Chinese nationalism. Japan's growing imperialist opportunities and position led to the submergence, though not extinction, of the *Nisshin teikei ron*. The combination of force and guidance in Japan's tactics resulted in even greater suspicion of Japanese intentions in the Chinese mind.

At the same time, military domination of China, or parts of China, would altogether free Japan from dependence on Chinese friendship in safeguarding Japanese security from Western aggression in Asia. Thus in 1900, Japan tested her opportunity for expansion in southern China by sending an expedition to Amoy while northern China was preoccupied with the Boxer disturbances. After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan's defence policy was both defensive and aggressive. Military preparations after the war were directed chiefly at Russia in the event of the latter seeking revenge for her defeat. But one of the main points, in fact, the main objective of the "Plan of National Defence for the Empire" (*Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin*) devised by Tanaka Giichi of the General Staff and Yamagata in October, 1906 was that Japan's "efforts to expand our national sovereignty and enhance our interests in China must excel others".⁽⁶⁾ And the last point in the "plan" stated that if action against China should be necessary, the army would conquer South China and the navy would control the Formosan straits and harass the southern coastal cities.⁽⁷⁾ The extension of Japan's national power on the

(6) Text of Yamagata's "National Defence Policy of the Empire" (*Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin-an*) of 1906 is collected in Ōyama Azusa, Yamagata Aritomo Iken sho, (Reprints of 77 memoranda to the Prime Minister and other writings by Yamagata Aritomo), op.cit., pp. 290-301, see especially pp. 299-300.

(7) *ibid.*

Asian continent was seen by some as a logical development of Japanese policy now that her own security had been secured by military strength.

Inevitably, as Japan emerged from Asian backwardness, she began to have doubts about relying totally on cooperation with China and the other Asian countries whose weakness continued to invite Western control. By 1900, Japan had created a military and economic strength unrivalled by her Asian neighbours. She had also rid herself of the humiliating term of extraterritoriality in her treaty relationship with some of the Western powers. Her moderation and conscientious participation in the allied expedition to Peking during the Boxer Rebellion won her not only Chinese admiration but also Western friendship. The Japanese realized that their rising status and prestige promised an important role in Far Eastern international politics. If the Western powers were to be prevented from further expansion in Asia, it would require diplomatic rapprochement and cooperative policies.

Hence instead of looking for a general union of Asian nations against Western domination, Japanese leaders, in particular, saw a more promising future for Japan in coordinating her actions with the West. By forming an alliance with England in 1902, Japan arrived at a position to partake in the politics of the big powers. Having defeated Russia in 1905, she proceeded to reach a diplomatic reconciliation with the latter. Subsequent agreements with France, Russia and America enabled her to safeguard her spheres of influence in China and increase her capacity for international competition.

By 1910, Japan was competing with the powers in the pursuit of imperialist gains in East Asia. China and in particular Manchuria was gradually gaining importance as a market and a source of raw materials for Japan and there were growing possibilities for the expansion of Japanese trade and investment. Japan had to woo or force China to

be cooperative but only with a view to enhancing Japan's bargaining power vis-à-vis her Western competitors. The promotion of Japanese interests still depended on the recognition of Japan's special position in China by the powers. Nothing should be done to jeopardize Japan's chances of entering into firmer alliances with the Western countries especially England and Russia.

Thus cooperation with China, territorial expansion on the Chinese mainland and alliance with one or more Western powers could all usefully safeguard Japanese security and contribute to the increase of Japanese strength. Indeed, more often than not, Japanese attitudes and policies towards China in this period indicated that the adoption of one method was not necessarily a barrier to the acceptance of the rest. Nevertheless, the use of military force and alignment of policies with the imperialist powers to ensure Japan's position of supremacy in China necessarily weakened the possibilities of a genuine Sino-Japanese cooperation.

A more fundamental factor working against the realization of a Sino-Japanese special relationship would seem to be China's slow realization of her passing supremacy in the East and ^{her} belated rediscovery of Japan. Before the Sino-Japanese war, the Chinese response to the Nisshin teikei ron had been slow and lukewarm. The Japanese assumption that countries in the East, being weak in comparison with the Western powers, should combine their strength to defend themselves, was not shared by most Chinese. The reality of China's old world was founded on an acknowledgment of China's superiority by all smaller states in the East. It is not unlikely that in the early stage of Western expansion in the Far East, China had never entertained the idea that her Asian neighbours including Japan might have had the adequate potential for assisting her in her encounters with the Western powers. Before the Chinese mission was established in Japan in 1877, the Chinese government had

not regarded Japan as a possible force in Asia. And few Chinese at that time were ready to view Japan in the light of a possible ally. It was only in the 1880's that China began to consider the possibility of enlisting Japanese help in countering the Russian threat. But the influential faction in Peking still regarded a policy of appeasing Russia as a better alternative in safeguarding Chinese security. Nineteenth-century China did not share the Japanese image of East and West. Consequently, the Chinese were much more lukewarm about Asian solidarity in a racial struggle. They were more concerned with "using barbarian to control barbarian".

It was Japan's superior strength demonstrated in the war of 1894-1895 which convinced the Chinese that they needed Japanese help in preserving Asian integrity. In the following decade, China's traditional sense of superiority over the Japanese was replaced by an acknowledgment of Japanese leadership. Enlightened Chinese leaders welcomed Japanese help and advice in improving Chinese military and economic affairs. The Chinese government saw the need to reform its institutions on the Japanese model and entrusted the Japanese with the education of Chinese students. Chinese reformers urged the authorities to learn from Japan. Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionaries were anxious for guidance proffered by their Japanese sympathisers in fighting Western imperialism. In fact, at the turn of the century, the Chinese had hoped for a Sino-Japanese alliance - a hope which was not realized as Japan was already contemplating a policy of cooperation with the West.

Up until the eve of the Russo-Japanese war, the need for strengthening the country had been seen by comparatively few people in China. As the literate section of the public gradually acquired a sense of political consciousness, more Chinese became concerned at the plight of the country. Japan's efforts in stopping Russian expansion in Manchuria were admired by all in China. Her victory over Russia

inspired the Chinese with hopes for a revival of the Asian nations. Many Chinese were encouraged to believe that if ^Csuccess could happen to Japan, it could also happen to China. It was a shameful thing for the Chinese that they should have needed Japan to fight the war for them.

Chinese aspirations in the post-war era were ^{towards}~~after~~ a strong country which would resist all foreign aggressions. Identifying the Manchu government with the cause of China's weakness, the revolutionaries acquired a sense of Chinese pride and Chinese nationalism. They began to clamour for the recovery of Chinese national rights and sovereignty and an end to her unequal relationship with the powers. Whilst this national consciousness was necessary for China's strengthening which many Japanese professed to favour, it was also ominous of what was happening to their hopes for leadership and aggrandizement in Asia. The emergence of Chinese nationalism meant that the Chinese would only accept cooperation on terms of equality. And as Japan exploited her position of power in China, she became the prime target of Chinese anti-imperialist hostility.

ABBREVIATIONS

CCJP

CHING CHUNG JIH PAO

DOCUMENTS: HSÜAN-T'UNG

CH'ING HSÜAN-T'UNG CH'AO CHUNG-
JIH CHIAO-SHE SHIH-LIAO

DOCUMENTS: KUANG-HSÜ

CH'ING KUANG-HSÜ CH'AO CHUNG-
JIH CHIAO-SHE SHIH-LIAO

HMTP

HSIN MIN TS'UNG PAO

NGB

NIHON GAIKŌ BUNSHO

NIKKI

KONOE ATSUMARO NIKKI

OSCW

O SHIH CHING WEN

TAS

TOKYO ASAHI SHIMBUN

TFTC

TUNG FANG TSA CHIH

TNNS

TOKYO NICHI-NICHI SHIMBUN

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